# *The* REVIEW *of* RELIGION

Volume IV JANUARY, 1940 Number 2

EDITOR
Raymond C. Knox

ASSOCIATE EDITOR
Horace L. Friess

SECRETARY
Marguerite Block

EDITORIAL BOARD

William Adams Brown
Eugene H. Byrne
Louis H. Gray
Arthur Jeffery
Eugene W. Lyman
Clarence A. Manning
Ralph Marcus
Cyril C. Richardson
Herbert W. Schneider
Ryusaku Tsunoda

*The Review of Religion* is published bi-monthly during the eight months of the academic year (November, January, March and May). Subscription: $2.00 a year (foreign, $2.30); single copies 60 cents (foreign 70 cents). All subscriptions and business matters should be addressed to the publisher, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York City. Manuscripts, editorial communications and books for review should be addressed to the Editorial Office, 401 Low Memorial Library, Columbia University, New York City.

COPYRIGHT 1939 BY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

## ARTICLES

Poems by Monk and Nun. By CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS . . 129
Is Theology Reducible to Mythology? By DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH . . . . . 140
The Authority of the Church and Freedom. By PAUL L. LEHMANN . . . . . 159

## COMMUNICATIONS

Symbol and Myth in Religion. By E. MCCLUNG FLEMING . . 170

## BOOK REVIEWS

S. Radhakrishnan: *Eastern Religions and Western Thought.* (Kurt F. Leidecker) . . . . . 177
Haridas Bhattacharyya: *The Foundations of Living Faiths.* (John Clark Archer) . . . . . 183

*(Continued on next page)*

Antoinette K. Gordon: *The Iconography of Tibetan Lamaism.* (Helen B. Chapin) ..... 187
Mehemed Ali Aini: *Un grand Saint de l'Islam: 'Abd al-Kâdir Guilînî (1077-1166).* (Arthur Jeffery) ..... 192
Louis Finkelstein: *The Pharisees.* (Salo W. Baron) ..... 196
Erwin I. J. Rosenthal, Ed.: *Law and Religion.* (Joseph L. Blau) . 200
Arthur Darby Nock: *St. Paul.*
Wilfred L. Knox: *St. Paul and the Church of the Gentiles.* (Burton Scott Easton) ..... 202
Vincent Foster Hopper: *Medieval Number Symbolism.* (Joseph L. Blau) ..... 206
Aziz Suryal Atiya: *The Crusades in the Later Middle Ages.* (Arthur Jeffery) ..... 208
ΚΥΡΙΛΛΟΣ Ο ΛΟΥΚΑΡΙΣ *(1572-1638).* Anniversary volume. (Clarence A. Manning) ..... 211
James King Morse: *Jedidiah Morse.* (W. R. Waterman) ..... 213
Frank Hugh Foster: *The Modern Movement in American Theology.* (Daniel D. Williams) ..... 217
Richard S. Emrich: *The Conception of the Church in the Writings and Life of the German-English Philosopher Baron von Hügel.* (A. Hazard Dakin) ..... 221
Edmond Rochedieu: *La Personnalité divine: Comment faut-il l'envisager?* (Samuel L. Terrien) ..... 223
Karl Barth: *The Knowledge of God and the Service of God.* (Vergilius Ferm) ..... 229
John Morrison Moore: *Theories of Religious Experience.* (George F. Thomas) ..... 230
Book Notes. H. Jacobsohn: *Die dogmatische Stellung des Königs in der Theologie der alten Aegypter.* N. Macnicol, Ed.: *Hindu Scriptures.* T. Bernard: *Penthouse of the Gods.* M. J. Bradshaw: *Third Class World. A Roving Philosopher Observes the Common Man.* A. Zajaczkowski: *Manuel arabe de la langue des Turcs et de Kiptchaks.* J. H. Greenstone: *The Holy Scriptures: Numbers.* H. Hailperin: *A Rabbi Teaches.* F. S. Schmitt: *S. Anselmi: opera omnia.* William Blake: *A Descriptive Catalogue.* N. H. Sonne: *Liberal Kentucky, 1780-1828.* O. Piper: *God in History.* W. Paton: *World Community.* S. Wadia: *The Brotherhood of Religions.* E. A. Burtt: *Types of Religious Philosophy.* L. W. Grensted: *This Business of Living.* H. Roberts: *The Troubled Mind.* P. Fletcher: *Life Without Fear.* F. G. Lieb: *Sight Unseen.* C. M. Perry: *Toward a Dimensional Realism* ..... 234
Among the Periodicals ..... 250

# POEMS BY MONK AND NUN

By Caroline A. F. Rhys Davids
*President, Pali Text Society*

It is now the thirtieth anniversary of the Pali Text Society's beginning a series of translations, as companion to its texts, by publishing a translation I had made of what is, I believe, a unique work in religious literature. This was the Pali Anthology of verses ascribed to early Buddhist nuns, and appearing as *Psalms of the Sisters* in 1909. Since then there has been needed only one fresh impression (by offset) some twenty-five years later. Truly a humble and obscure career to set beside the records of best-sellers! Four years later I followed it up with translation of the larger anthology of Buddhist monks: *Psalms of the Brethren*, the pair being entitled *Psalms of the Early Buddhists*. This, selling at about the same rate, was reprinted by offset twenty-seven years later.

At the close of my introduction to the latter volume I wrote: "To other more competent hands I leave the fascinating task of bringing these *Varieties of Religious Experience*—unknown alas! to William James and his successors in that field—into comparison with the religious self-expression of other lands and other times. . . ." A pious hope, which, so far as I know, is still unaccomplished. There will have been too few readers. This can hardly be through lack of attractiveness of subject matter. To a few, as to myself, the two anthologies seem to be, for the most part, of absorbing human interest. And they are told, for the most part, with a directness, a naturalness, often a pathos, which lift them above all dull and drab telling, making them very interesting reading. In them we are given an insight into the lives of many men and women of India, as told, or said to have been told, by those of each titular name, during a period dating from the sixth to the third century, or second century, B.C.

This is not to say that there may not have been some editorial curling and combing: words and lines suppressed, altered, added, or inserted to fit the changed and changing values of the time when the revision was undertaken. But for the most part, I hold that relatively little has been doctored in this way. The Pali, at least, is of the older sort (albeit, as to that, poetry tends to be conservative in style). For

instance, such a later term as *nirupadhi*,[1] a technical term belonging more to our era, occurs only once. Again, the so-called *Abhiññā's* (higher knowledges),[2] which later came to be six, occur more than once as the earlier five only, indicating an early date.

But, over and above later revision for standardization, there is the probability that not all the brethren and sisters here named are responsible for the *metrical* work. No reader of the Pali Canon will think of the venerated founder-missioners, who are found among the poets, as poets: Sāriputta, Moggallāna, Anuruddha, Kassapa, Ānanda. These men lived in a bookless world. Their teachings will have been uttered in simple, sober prose. But to aid followers in memorizing and handing them on, some of their sayings, whether brief gnomes or longer discourses, will have been, at a relatively early date, converted into metrical verse by men of the new settlements, not yet "monasteries," who had the gift, and turned them, not into the as yet unused writing, but into oral mnemonic verses.

In the case of these distinguished few, taking Sāriputta first, I confess to finding, in his thirty-seven couplets, divided by the Commentary into thirteen sections of separate utterance, no signs of a talent for poetry. Gifted with such religious vision and will that the Founder is shown declaring, of him alone, that he "teaches just what I teach," his verses show a quiet wisdom and a steadfast outlook on earthly life, and mindfulness of it as a great opportunity, but no trace of aesthetic inspirations:

> Fulfil ye then your course, lest ye be lost.
> See that this 'moment' pass not by for nought.
> For many mourn in woe that moment lost (1004).

We have many discourses ascribed to him (one can alas! go no further than to say this), and among these I find him at his best. "I praise not standing still . . . . I praise growth . . . . thus will he be a striver," he says in one. And how the doctrine of the non-reality of the man or self can be maintained by Buddhists in face of his parable about the donning and doffing of this or that suit by a gentleman, compared to the control a man should have over his mind-ways, and not these to have control over him, is always to me a puzzle. Their present teaching looks on the man *as* his "suits."

1. Absence of basis (or condition) for rebirth.
2. Actually, psychic gifts.

Nor is the poetic muse, as such, any happier in his fellow-leader Moggallāna's forty-two couplets in sixteen divisions. Restless, in contrast to Sāriputta's steadfastness, his verses are mainly appreciations of this fellow-monk and that, but especially of his own extraordinary psychic powers. Here is even less of the genuine poet. Nor are Anuruddha and Ānanda any better, save only when the latter is mourning the loss of his great "comrade" and cousin, the Master. Kassapa alone of the leaders, whose couplets amount to forty, in eight sections, would seem to have had the poetic gift. He was both recluse and nature-lover, and it is in his expression of this that we find someone to whom expression in poetry was a felt need.

> Crags where clear waters lie, a rocky world,
> Haunted by black-faced apes and timid deer,
> Where 'neath bright blossoms run the silver streams:
> Such are the braes wherein lies my delight (1070).
> Fair uplands rain-refreshed and resonant
> With crested creatures' cries antiphonal,
> Lone heights where silent Rishis oft resort:
> These are the braes wherein lies my delight (1065).

Now Kassapa was a brāhman and therefore would have been reared with the highly trained memory of one; hence he may well have been able to repeat his own sayings in verse to his own band of disciples, needing no metricizer.

Of other first missioners, the last in the work as author of the greatest number of couplets is Vangīsa. Now Vangīsa had the gift of improvisation, and had a way of asking leave to show it, insisting on one occasion on its spontaneity.[3] His seventy-one couplets are in thirteen sections, mainly appreciative spoutings on his fellow-teachers, which he would be able to reproduce, in more or less identical form, to learners who recorded. But the last section is longer and different, and in it I somehow scent the trace of the later editor. In fact, we find the Commentary admits that an interpolated verse, claiming to be the Master's reply, was "compilers" work.

Finally, less long but ascribed to the very first "convert," are sixteen couplets in four sections over the name of Aññā-Kondaññā, the brahmin held to be one of those who were summoned by the Founder's father as augurs of the babe's future. He must have predeceased that

3. *Brethren*, p. 404.

babe by many years, yet what he is shown saying includes: (1) references to similes in the Suttas, as if from a body of sayings known to him, (2) emphatic repetition of the threefold formula of Hīnayāna: *aniccha, dukkha, anattā*,[4] which for me, cannot possibly have been a creed of the Founder's lifetime. The following is not devoid of poetic gift:

> Elder Kondañña, wakened by the Wake:—[5]
> Lo! he hath passed with vigour out and on;
> Sloughed off hath he the dyings and the births,
> Wholly accomplishing the life sublime.
> And be it 'flood' or 'snare' or 'stumbling-block,'
> Or be it 'mountain' hard to rive in twain,
> The 'net,' the 'stumbling-stone' I've hacked away,
> And cloven is the rock so hard to break,
> And crossed the flood. I, one to musing given,
> Dwell now at liberty from devil's bonds.

Kondañña was a venerated figure, and special editorial care may have been given to the few sayings long handed down associated with his name. It may have been held fitting to link with his name verses on a threefold formula held in worth in the day of Revision, and inserted also in that mnemonic of early and later verse, the *Dhammapada*.

But the more outstanding poetry, as such, is found over[6] the names of a few men unknown to the Pitakas save here: Bhūta, Ekavihariya and Tālaputa. The first is not linked with the Founder as his teacher. The second is said to have been a brother of King Asoka, three centuries after the day of the Founder. The third is, indeed, in the Commentary, made to ask for information from a "Bhagavā"—name for any teacher—or if the Founder be more clearly specified, this may be a usual device for enhancing the authority of the poem.[7] These three are genuine poets, and needed poetic form for their sense of beauty in landscape, physical and spiritual. This does not make them, as men, in a spiritual sense "More"; I would only herein exempt their sayings from the need of being turned from prose into verse. I see these as original poems, and moreover, I suspect we have here very early specimens of Indian written compositions, even if nothing more definite can as yet be said about it.

4. (All is) impermanent, ill, without-self.
5. "Buddha" means this.
6. The Indian way puts title at the end.
7. Students of Omar Khayyam will know this.

In the case of the nuns, I venture to guess that the last eight poems were also written compositions. Readers can see how different these are in literary form from those that preceded. In them we have nothing fragmentary strung together, but a definite story to tell, or contemplative mood to be exhaustively described. There is: (1) the conversation between the nun while a slave-girl and her brāhman master on the inefficacy of baptism to cleanse as such from past Karma; (2) the once famous ageing courtezan calmly apraising her wasted charms; (3) a conversation between brāhman father and daughter on the desirability or otherwise of patronizing the begging monk; (4) the dialogue between a trapper's daughter and her husband, once an ascetic, now a convert to Sakya and the new fellowship, and determined to leave her and his child; (5) a play-poem or ballad, showing how a son's death breaks up the home, the daughter and heiress also leaving the world, and visiting the Master to salute him as her new father; (6) the two Subhā's—the rich craftsman's daughter choosing poverty and salvation, and (7) the brāhman beauty, a novice, disputing with a libertine as she wanders through woods fragrant with the message of spring, and giving him the eye he raves about; (8) a talk, possibly a stray Jain poem, between two nuns on the long heavy heritage of karma now exhausted,—"Well, now of all that have I made an end!"; and finally, (9) the long and ecstatic protests by princess Sumedhā when sought in marriage, after the conventional way, by a young noble.

The striking variety in these nine poems is almost sufficient of itself to win them a place as notable pieces of old world-literature, so very human and universal are they, one and all. But the variety is more than enhanced by the literary charm of much in the Pali. And the mystery remains, whether we have here nine stories handed down for generations by a triumph of verbal transmissions, known to the brāhman (and in a way, to the actor) in their poetic form, or nine literary compositions, product from the first, of the style and the bark, or palm leaf. Not one of the nine, save only Ambapālī the courtezan, is known to Vinaya or Suta Collections. And the last-named quotes, as does Aññā Kondaññā, and at greater length, from Sutta parables, as if she had before her, if not scripture, at least a teacher's list of such teaching memoranda. Who will solve the problem?

If I have dealt at some length with how and when these anthologies

took their present form, it is not only because, as history, writing in India is an interesting problem, unnoticed in my Introductions of an earlier date, but because the major object of this paper is concerned with it. Namely, if we ask to what extent there is unity of interest and of object in the Anthologies, we cannot but be concerned with the question:—is that interest, and are those objects such as belong to the earliest years of the original Sakyan teaching, or to the later years of the Midland South Asian Hīnayāna? Do they belong to the time of purely missionary work, before the foundation of centres harboring living libraries of the accumulated oral teachings, where it is highly probable that monks were converting, for mnemonic purposes, the "saying" into metric form, grouping them and, inscribing on little thin metal plates title and "argument" for the teacher, like our pulpit-holder, to expand in his own way?

We may find contributory evidence in the terms used in the Anthologies for persons and for doctrines. Let us consider some of these, as I did not in my Introductions. The founder is frequently called Gotama, as he entirely ceased to be called in later Buddhism. We may see a similar tendency in the superseding of "Jesus" by "Christ" (that unpleasantly grating word in English), in our own tradition. Buddha too is frequently used, as the prevailing names in the Suttas, Tathāgata and Bhagavā, are not. I have contended that to call the Founder, the Satthar (teacher), Buddha, the Wake, was not customary in his lifetime, nor perhaps for a century after that. My chief reason is the omission of the title in the chronicle of the first two Councils. Have we here, then, a "curling" by the editors nearer the date of the Third, the Patna Council?

This is less important than the terms used for the religious ideal. In my Introductions I sought, in order to prevent too superficial an estimate of unity in purpose or interest, to analyze these under negative and positive heads, in other words, under riddance of the undesirable (bulking so large in Buddhism), and attainment, or at least quest, of the more desirable. These tables are not for me the quite desirable shop-windows they seemed long ago to be. I should now simplify them under fewer heads. I should make more of what (omitted in the Sisters), in the Brethren is entered under objective aspects of the religious quest. I mean the term "ambrosial."

The word is for us weak and misty. It was anything but that for the

birth of Buddhism. It was the Very Desirable, however otherwise this might be conceived. In the current teaching it was less an attribute of consummation than of Deity Itself. Any study of the early Upanishads shows this. "Brahman the immortal, the fearless. . . . The self (or spirit) . . . immortal is Brahman." And when Gotama announces his resolve to teach, he calls this "beating the drum of the immortal" (i.e., proclaiming the immortal). And he is also shown saying, "Wide opened are the gates of the immortal." We are not up against any fancy term for the Highest, for the ultimate Goal; we have in view the very Goal itself, and in terms which are at least as subjective in content as they are objective. For surely, it is "I" who seek to "become" *actually* that Immortal Who I am here and now *potentially*. Immortal, it may be, among Immortals, but here we are confronting the crowning mystery of life; the Many in the One, and I seek not to solve the insoluble as yet, but only to keep in view that the End so conceived is both subjective and objective.

Sāriputta and Moggallāna are recorded as coming to Gotama because they were "seeking the immortal," and he was teaching it, else had they not come. What he actually told them thereon, to win them to him, is quite lost. It has been confused with another quest, another teacher, another reply concerning the current interest in causal uniformities. But in their poems *no trace of that earlier quest is found*. Both predeceased their Master, and, if indeed they were in any way authors of the verses over their names, both may possibly have had an extra share of editorial trimming. In that later day, *amata* was virtually superseded, as *summum bonum*, by nirvana. And Sāriputta, who in the Suttas is shown defining nirvana, *not as this*, but only as a purging of bad springs of action, is made to say:

> He to nirvana surely finds the way,
> To utmost haven safely steers his course (990).

Surely he cannot have made both pronouncements!

But it was not they alone who were seeking *amata*. At least two other seekers are so represented, that is, in the story of the Commentary: Ajjuna and Uttiya (pp. 83, 34). Another, Nigrodha, found the Master "skilled in the lore of Amata," (21); Channa learnt of "the way for winning Amata" (69); Kaṇhādinna learnt how to wayfare in "the road plunged in the Immortal" (179); Rāhula claims he has

"vision of Amata" (296); and so does Vaddha; Sumana confesses to "longing for th' Immortal" (330); Pārapāriya admits that, even in his worsened age, the wise man may yet touch the path of Amata- (947); and Phussa believes no less (980); Tālaputa bewails his slackness of purpose "to win to Amata" (1000), his professed choice being "to make become the Way for winning Amata" (1115); while Vangīsa sees in the True the "word of the Immortal," and the Master's teaching:

> And we to whom he hath declarèd Amata
> Stand seers of Dhamma inexpugnable (1243).

So did the word, mighty in the beginning of the Mission, hold its power, perhaps mainly through the conservative force of metric speech. For the weaker use of the term had come in, similar to its classic use for us in the words "ambrosia" and "nectar." Amata was being stripped from the End-terms and used as an epithet of teaching, this being likened to a shower, a sprinkling of Amata (e.g. 199). Life was getting tied up with the life of body and mind—in spite of Aññā-Kondaññā's fine lines:

> Lo! *he* hath passed with vigour out and on
> Sloughed off hath *he* the dyings and the births.

The "man" for him was very real, in spite of the formula inserted over his name. But for the majority, the positive, the very live force in the negative "immortal," was being rejected for the vaguer man-less ultimate of nirvana.

But, in the last of the Sisters' poems, we have Amata used with fearless vivid insistence, even though I have judged her work late enough to have been a written composition. This is by Sumedhā, stated in the Commentary to have been an eager student at the convent, and, like, the later Catherine of Siena, to have herself cut off her hair, determined, in defiance of her parents' wishes, to leave the world. As her lengthy plea draws to its impassioned close she invokes the ideals she finds alone worth while, and the Immortal comes *first:*

> Since Amata exists,[8] what are for thee
> the bitter draughts of sense?
> Since Amata exists, what are for thee
> the fevers of desire?

8. Literally a locative absolute, like our "given this."

Emancipation *(mokkha)* is next invoked. And then, casting off in her solemn ecstasy the bonds of metre, she stammers forth in a whirl of words a picture of the Way to the Immortal:

> This that doth ne'er grow old, this never ageing, never dying Way—
> No sorrow cometh there nor any enemies, nor is there any crowd,
> None faint or fail, no fear cometh, nor aught that doth torment—
> To THIS, the Way of Amata, have gone
> Full many, and today e'en now it may be won
> But only by a life that's utterly
> Surrendered in devotion. Labour not,
> And ye shall not attain!

Is there a reader seeking what is worth while who can, even today, read these lines without emotion? And note, that the nirvana with which she linked her aim earlier:

> All my heart's love is to nirvana given
> . . . beyond nirvana's bliss is naught!

comes not into this final picture of the older Ideal! She has taken us back to an earlier day, and in that peroration we hear the beating of the drum of Amata and see the open gates.

But nirvana was for her contemporaries the winner. For Buddhism of today Amata is dead. For that has turned utterly from its mother, the Immanence of the Upanishads; it sees in growing and unending spiritual life nothing beyond a recurring birth and dying of the man's instruments, denying that the man is other than they. Hence the virtually positive ideal of the term Amata has been exchanged for the more truly negative notion of a waning out (nirvana). This is qualified as "happy," "bliss" (*sukha*), but not logically, since with no one to feel happy or blissful, the state is, as such, unthinkable.

Were I now to rewrite those two summaries of ideals, it would be differently done. I might first sum up the things won and deemed more desirable in this life; release, especially for the women; congenial company and work; training ever in what was held better; assurance regarding the future, however envisaged. I might then dwell on the changed and changing forward view: the scanty survival of the term uplifted, expanded, in the first teaching:—the word *attha*, *param'attha*—the Aim, the supreme Aim, mentioned in only one or two poems, but in the First Utterance of the Founder used for the

ultimate religious Goal. Thus Telakāni, singer otherwise unknown, but whose poem has all the unity of a written composition:

> Oh the long days I cast about in thought . . .
> Ardent to find the truth. . . .
> What man in all the world hath got beyond?
> Who hath in Amata a foothold won?
> Whose doctrine can I to my bosom take,
> Learning therein the Aim that is supreme?

Then I might note the rivalry, as it were, between Amata and Nirvana; the infrequent reference to any ideal we render by "peace"; the frequent allusion, on the other hand, to the much-saying word *yogakkhema*, safety after toil.

However worded, the ultimate goal is never long out of sight, as the thing most worth while. To win that there runs throughout the anthologies a groundwave of the dynamic of will. I have occasionally used "will" in the translation, albeit a fit word, equating "will," is lacking. I do not approve of the phrase "the Buddha's will," used often by me for *Buddha-sāsana*, "The Buddha's will is done." Better are the renderings "ordinance" (1016), or "Accomplished is the 'bidding' of the lord" (26). "Will" meant a great help in scansion, and was likely to evoke reverberations in readers. It is true that there may have been in the devoted disciple much loyal surrender of will, but the Suttas do not show us, in the Founder, a man imposing his will on his hearers. On the contrary, never, perhaps did a great teacher so little substitute his own will for the desire that he found. Never was anyone less of a Dictator. And he named as his successor each man's conscience, in the word *dhamma*.

As to the need of stirred-up will in that teaching, and of a strong word to express it, I have gone into this elsewhere and often. The strong word *kāma* was becoming hopelessly worsened as sensual desire; the strong word *kratu* had been let die; the strong word *vasa* is neglected; the strong word *vara* is restricted to the suppression of unworthy will; the strong word *chanda* is on the border line of will worthy and unworthy; the strong word *tanhā* (thirst) was damned into mere craving. There remained only the weak word *sankappa* for "purpose," and strong words for "effort," which is not "will," but the mode of exercising it.

Wordless, then, they were as to "will," these elect men and women,

as well as weakening in their outlook on that Most to which they were wayfaring in a More, such as they had found in earthly life. *More* were they in faith, in fearlessness, in confidence, in work with and for others. *Less* were they because, whereas in their verses each is very definitely real as spirit, self, soul, *homo,* man, rightly seeing in body and mind something very impermanent and not themselves: "Finding thyself in limbs that are not 'thou' " (1150), they were being borne along by the *Zeitgeist* of their day (or their editors were), wherein the strong words of the More and The Most were being ousted by words expressive of an outlook in a Less. The one strong word that remained to tell of the hope that lay in life itself, *bhava* (becoming), was being lessened to mean merely physical becoming, and worlds of such. The ultimate consummation of man, each man, in a Most-as-Man was fading out in a manless vision, or hurried forward as attainable—the folly of it!—in this span of life, imperfect at its best. And the next step in wayfaring, for those unready for this Most, was lessened to a prospect of merely enhanced physical wellbeing in a temporary Paradise.

And yet how bravely do they not appear making the best of the words that failed them, of the ideals that were worsening! How greatly is it an "utterly well" they are bound for, for all they had yet so far to go! When shall we come to have, under the shadow of any church, anthologies which may stand beside these as witnessing to a yet nobler vision, a yet better based confidence?

# IS THEOLOGY REDUCIBLE TO MYTHOLOGY?

By Douglas Clyde Macintosh
*Dwight Professor of Theology and Philosophy of Religion, Yale University*

## I

This is the third and—barring further aggravation from my devoted former students (!)—the last installment of my invited reply to the criticisms stated or implied in the graciously tendered and gratefully received volume of essays entitled *The Nature of Religious Experience.* As Ruskin wrote of himself, so I, methinks, might almost presume to say, "My native disposition is extremely amiable, *when I'm not bothered*" (italics mine!). I have reserved for the last the essay of one who is the most widely known, perhaps, of all my former students, Reinhold Niebuhr. He is the one college preacher whose annual visit to the pulpit of Battell Chapel at Yale continues, year after year, to entice me away from the Sunday services of my own minister and church, not that I may be soothed, like Tennyson's Northern farmer, by hearing the preacher say "whot a owt to 'a said," but for the sake of experiencing instead the always-to-be-expected "kick" of his vigorous, sometimes exaggerated and one-sided, but always penetrating and prophetic preaching.

Professor Niebuhr's essay is entitled "The Truth in Myths"—a favorite theme with him, apparently, for it is one to which he has returned repeatedly. Even in the *Leaves from the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic,* we find the beginnings of what has come to be a characteristic emphasis. In that published series of excerpts from his journals, the diarist criticizes typical "intellectuals" and "most scientists" for sharing with "wooden-headed" fundamentalists the literalism which must either reject all religious symbolism as mythology, or else insist that every bit of it appearing in a given tradition be accepted literally and defended metaphysically. In contradistinction from both he insists, very defensibly, that "poetic and religious imagination has a way of arriving at truth by giving a clue to the total meaning of things" (pp. 120, 141). In this early work, however, the position is taken that it is "our business" to destroy the irrationalities which gather about the circumference and, at the same time, restore the reasonableness at the heart of "almost every tradition" by fitting it to con-

temporaneous circumstances and conditions (p. 152). And yet, apparently as an afterthought, Mr. Niebuhr expresses the opinion that not everyone should make the dangerous attempt to discriminate between the rational and the irrational in inherited tradition; indeed, recalling and renewing his customary scorn for those liberal theologians who are so preoccupied with reforming religion that they show no interest in the betterment of social life and institutions, he goes further and warns them that the complete rationalization of religion which they are seeking to accomplish can only mean, in so far as they are successful, the death of religion itself. Here, he admits, he is talking like a fundamentalist. "But why not?" he asks. If we must choose, better the fanaticism which would "strangle a new culture at birth in the name of authority and dogma" than the fanaticism which would "destroy a vital culture in the name of freedom and reason" (pp. 153, 161, 162). Here we find foretokens of such later developments as the flight to irrationalism, the apology for fanaticism (he has a sermon on the subject), and the famous slogan, "Politically to the Left and theologically to the Right." All is symptomatic of Mr. Niebuhr's settled disinclination to grapple with the intricate but not necessarily insoluble problems of theological metaphysics.

In *Reflections on the End of an Era* (1934), the preface, quite in the spirit of the slogan referred to, calls for "a more radical political orientation and more conservative religious convictions than are comprehended in the culture of our era." But it is claimed forthwith that even any "adequate philosophy of history must be a mythology rather than a philosophy." "Meaning can be attributed to history only by a mythology" (pp. 122, 123). The liberalistic myth of inevitable progress is cited as an example in support of this thesis; in this connection the question of the philosophical defensibility of the *possibility* of progress as literally true is left undiscussed. In the religious realm conceptions of divine providence and grace are declared to be stateable "adequately only in mythical terms." For instance, in the familiar saying about sun and rain being bestowed on just and unjust alike, "nature's unconcern for the moral distinctions between human good and evil" has been transmuted, according to Mr. Niebuhr, and that in a way which is not quite rationally warranted by the facts, into a revelation of God's forgiving love (pp. 282, 290, 292). No consideration is given to the possibility that, in a metaphysical theology, place

might logically be found for a gracious divine purpose underlying both the desirably dependable, predictable natural order and the continuing opportunity for moral choice and education through experience. Both the orthodox and the liberal rationalizations are condemned as endangering the profundity of the "mythological conceptions of the incarnation and atonement" (p. 287). No intermediate course is envisaged between making use of confessedly mythical concepts, uninterpreted in literal terms, and depotentiating religion through the rationalizations of philosophy (pp. 291-92). As is usual with this antithetically-minded author, contraries are treated as if they were contradictories; time after time recourse is had to that favorite device of the special pleader, the "excluded middle."

In *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics* the same point of view and attitude are maintained. The concepts of divine creation, judgment, and redemption are alike classed as inescapably mythical, transcending the canons of rationality (pp. 26-29). A distinction is made, however, between "pre-scientific" and "trans-scientific" myths. The former can now be dispensed with; the latter, it is held, are and will remain indispensable. Orthodox religion clings to the incredible myths of primitive religion, insisting on their literal truth. Liberalism seeks, with the aid of philosophy, to bring religious myth into rational coherence with science, a course leading to consequences which, according to Mr. Niebuhr, are necessarily disastrous to the vitality of religion. Thus, it is claimed, the mythical concept of sin, as rebellion against God, is transformed into the liberalistic explanation of human imperfection as due solely to man's ignorance (pp. 5-15). Again, it is tacitly assumed that there is no other alternative worth considering, with the exception of the author's own position, according to which the concepts in question are still to be employed, but with the understanding that they are only mythical representations not to be regarded as literally true. No *metaphysical* alternative to naturalistic predeterminism and absolute, or some other form of deterministic idealism is brought into the picture.

Next in order in Mr. Niebuhr's exposition of his proposed reduction of theology to the status of mythology is his essay, already referred to, "The Truths in Myths," in *The Nature of Religious Experience*. The title chosen might suggest an eirenic intention, to the effect that there is, after all, some essential content of religious thought which can be

stated and defended philosophically as literally believable and true. But here again the only distinction featured is that between "primitive myth" and "permanent myth." Primitive myth is defined as pre-scientific, whereas what is dealt with in permanent myth is the "supra-scientific" (pp. 118, 119), or what was earlier called "trans-scientific." Appreciations of value, aesthetic, religious, or other, can be expressed only in mythical terms, it is held (pp. 119, 120), and the same limitation applies to apprehensions of "depth in existence." Thus the concepts of creation, teleology, the fall of man, original sin, divine judgment, the incarnation of God, the cross, redemptive love and salvation, are all interpreted as typical permanent myths, the real depth of whose meaning cannot be expressed in literal terms of philosophical truth (pp. 120-129). Even the concept of God is to be interpreted as merely the most important of the permanent myths of religion (p. 131); to try to set forth the content of this or any other religious myth in terms of rational philosophy is to destroy its virtue and transform religion into something merely natural and secular.

Later in the same year (1937) Mr. Niebuhr's latest book appeared, bearing the title, *Beyond Tragedy*. In the first chapter, his doctrine of the inveterately mythical character of religious doctrine is expounded under the shelter of the Pauline text, "As deceivers, yet true." Now it has been my plan to postpone criticism until after having made a brief comparison of Niebuhr's views with those others who have held to the mythical interpretation; but at this point I take the liberty of objecting at once that he must not be allowed to hide the defects of his theology and religious epistemology behind the august example of the great apostle; the parallelism between what Paul was evidently talking about and what Mr. Niebuhr is concerned to defend is very far from being close or exact. A much better illustration of the principle underlying Niebuhr's methodology I can furnish by recalling a remark made in my hearing by one of the greatest teachers of the generation just past. I refer to William Rainey Harper, the famous first president of the University of Chicago. Referring in his class in biblical history to some of the army statistics given in the Book of Chronicles the lecturer admitted that they were probably exaggerated, but he went on to point out that exaggeration was apparently sometimes necessary in order to give the stolid hearer or reader anything like a true impression of the facts. "In short," he continued, "one

sometimes has to lie to teach the truth,—and," he added whimsically, "I'm lying to you now!"

Now it is a nice logical question, and perhaps a psychological problem as well, whether a speaker who is accustomed to take liberties with the literal truth can always, by the mere confession that he has been lying, transform himself into an honest man. And it is, I think, a fair question whether Professor Niebuhr's device for dodging theological difficulties by confessing that his theology is made up entirely of "permanent myths," will suffice to transform him into a theologian who can be accepted by the faithful as a trustworthy guide in matters pertaining to religious belief. As a cloak for theological sins of omission and commission what is offered us here is altogether too large and covers too much.

## II

There are and have been others—a very considerable company in all—whose views on this matter are more or less closely similar to those of Dr. Niebuhr. We must not forget, in this connection, the Hegelian doctrine that the ordinary language of religion belongs in the world of figurative ideas only. Religious ideas are couched in the forms of feeling and imagination; they are not to be taken as absolutely true, but as merely symbolical representations "strained through finite images and materialized conceptions." Speculative philosophy, it was claimed, has in the purely rational *Begriff* what ordinary naïve religion has only in figurative approximation in the *Vorstellung*. In other words and more specifically, for the transcendent personal God of theistic religion philosophy of the Hegelian type proposed to substitute the all-inclusive Absolute Mind or Experience.[1] Finally, F. H. Bradley was logical and courageous enough to conclude that the impersonal or "superpersonal" Absolute of speculative philosophy was plainly not the God of practical religion. There are still some, however, who occupy essentially the original, more conservative Hegelian or neo-Hegelian position, taking it to be the task of the metaphysics of religion to preserve in the form of literally true philosophical concepts as much as possible of what is set forth by religion itself in the form of metaphorical expressions with only symbolic validity.

1. The parallelism is close between this Hegelian or neo-Hegelian position and that of the dominant school of Hindu religion and religious philosophy, in which even when the language of personal theism is used, the general understanding is that not this but impersonal absolutism is the final truth for the human mind.

For some who entered into this so-called "Great Tradition" the reinterpretation of religious concepts which it made possible came as a great liberation, but for others it meant confusion and bafflement. As an illustration of the former, I would cite the case of a young speculative idealist who was a candidate for appointment to the foreign mission field a generation ago, and who, confronted with a very conservative credal statement, found no difficulty in indicating his acceptance of the same, justifying his action to himself and later to his former fellow-students of philosophy by the consideration that the creed in question belonged somewhere in the dialectic of absolute truth, either as thesis or antithesis, or one of the earlier syntheses! In illustration of the other and less jubilant attitude among representatives of the absolutist tradition, I would prefer to the sententious and highly stimulating fragmentary, posthumously published discussion by the brilliant Charles Bennett of what he well calls, from his point of view, *The Dilemma of Religious Knowledge*. "To take religious knowledge as literally true is impossible," in his opinion, "yet to assign it merely symbolic value is disastrous for religion." If we take religion as poetry it will not continue to nourish our minds and to promote moral and spiritual values as it did when we took it literally (*op. cit.*, pp. 68, 70). "Reason cannot do with the supernatural, and religion," Bennett felt, "cannot do without it" (*ibid.*, p. 93). While still clinging to the conviction that "the metaphysical pretensions of religion are the most important thing about it," and that its "claim to convey insight about the real world is not to be denied," he was forced by his critical views to the conclusion that there is no course left open for faith but to oscillate "between dumb intuition and articulate expression, in neither of which the mind can rest" (pp. 27, 119, 120).

A second group of deniers of the literal truth of any of the characteristic concepts of religion is made up of the naturalists, this term being defined in such a way as to cover both the materialists and the positivists. Feuerbach may be taken as an early representative of those psychologists who take theological concepts as valid only as expressing in unconsciously symbolic form what is true only of the religious individual himself. Freud, and other psychiatrists who have taken their cue from him, lightly dismissing all religion as being in its objective reference wholly illusory, find symbolic value nevertheless in religious ideas, which they regard as the disguised, more or less pathological

expression of disturbing factors in the subconscious or "unconscious" mental life. Durkheim and his followers, on the other hand, will have it that what religious concepts symbolize ultimately is not anything in the mere individual as such, but rather the human society to which he belongs, with its fundamental interests and values. Somewhat less specific on the positive side, but quite as definite in its negative implications, is Santayana's reduction of religion and religious ideas to poetry. "The idea that religion contains a literal, not a symbolic, representation of truth and life is simply an impossible idea," he maintains. "Whoever entertains it has not come within the region of profitable philosophizing on that subject" (*Reason in Religion,* p. 98).

It may seem strange to include among these confessed opponents of theistic religion the late Bishop William Montgomery Brown, but the propriety of doing so can hardly be disputed in the light of the thorough way in which he carried through the purely symbolic interpretation of religious ideas. While he was still a bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church, his position changed from the most uncritical orthodoxy, in accordance with which he had accepted all of the Thirty-nine Articles literally and without question, to one in which, while he still professed to adhere to them all, he confessed that he could take not a single one of them in any other sense than as symbolic of purely material and human realities and values. Darwin, he declared, was his Old Testament, and Marx his New. The only Trinity, or Trinities, he could recognize were Matter, Force, and Motion in the realm of ultimate reality, and the True, the Beautiful, and the Good in the realm of human value. He was deprived of his episcopal office by the action of his fellow-bishops, but it was not long before he was given the same standing in the American branch of the Old Catholic Church.

It will not be supposed that I am thinking of classing Reinhold Niebuhr either with the speculative idealists or with the materialists and positivists. Rather is his proposed reduction of theology to mythology to be understood as the joint product of two factors: first, the essentially Kantian metaphysical agnosticism which has been traditional for generations in German and German-influenced Protestant theology, and, second, as a later influence, the recurrent inroads of irrationalism associated with the names of Bergson, Rudolf Otto, the rediscovered Kierkegaard, Karl Barth, Berdyaev, and Paul Tillich, to

the last-mentioned of whom Niebuhr acknowledges "a particular debt of gratitude." The form in which the Kantian dualism and agnosticism enters into the mythologism we are considering is determined in large part by the influence of the Schleiermacher-Ritschlian development, with its religious preoccupation, and it resembles the symbolo-fideism of Auguste Sabatier, except that, while it is at least equally agnostic, it is much more definitely irrationalistic, and consequently, as it seems to me, more destructive of any bona fide theology. One might compare Niebuhr's position with that of Höffding; there is the same essentially Kantian metaphysical agnosticism in both, and for both there is a symbolic element in all religious ideas. But there are several important differences. Höffding is more careful in the definition of myth; it is not the Dane, with his postulate of the conservation of values, who is the more "melancholy"; and finally, for Höffding the religious consciousness approximates to the aesthetic, while for Niebuhr it is more closely related to the practical and ethical, so that his position is the more specifically Christian.

Easily recognizable in Niebuhr's thought and coming to him in large part through Tillich apparently, is the influence of the neo-Friesianism of Rudolf Otto, for whom empirical knowledge in the religious realm is restricted to the description of the mere phenomena of religious history and experience, and for whom rational belief is limited to an empirically unverifiable but rationally necessary, albeit purely negative, conception of the Absolute, whereas the positive, functioning theology of religion is neither knowledge nor rational belief, but a more or less harmonious system of purely figurative concepts, undertaking for purposes of practical religion and worship to represent the unknowable Absolute in terms of figures of speech drawn from the phenomenal realities with which we are familiar. One suspects, too, that through Tillich's influence Niebuhr's real thought of God is being brought, however dangerously for his Christian faith, into close approximation to Schelling's amorphous Absolute—that "Night in which all cows are black"!

But powerful also as a contemporary influence in Niebuhr's combination of a sceptical mythologism with the call for a movement "theologically to the Right," has been Barthianism, with its utterly conservative "church dogmatics" now in process of construction and

meant, at least originally, to be built upon the very shifting sands of a fundamentally sceptical dialectic of paradox. Barth himself is to be accounted for, partly in terms of the Kantian agnostic epistemology, mediated to him through the logical as well as epistemological dualism of his "unforgettable teacher," Wilhelm Herrmann; partly by the influence of the long-continued pounding impact of what we are now coming to think of as the *first* World War; and in part, finally, by the encouragement he received from the resurrected writings of that arch-irrationalist, Kierkegaard.

I hope it will not be taken as invidious nor attributed to the particular historic date on which this is being written, if I register a mild protest against the implicit fallacy of *argumentum ad verecundiam* which lurks in the background of much if not most of our modern English-speaking theology. Especially in view of the already widespread and still spreading impression that, difficult as it may be for us to swallow the bitter dose, we American theologians, like our British brethren, ought to drink deeply of the freely flowing fountains of Barthian and other reactionary Continental theology, it seems not altogether out of place to ask just why we should always be like reeds shaken by the changeable wind of German doctrine. I gladly recognize the oft recurring stimulus and the many positive contributions of German theology from Kant and Schleiermacher down to the present; but it is hardly a self-evident proposition that truth in theology changes every time the doctrinal wind in Germany changes its direction! Let us indeed give honor to whom honor is due, tribute to whom tribute; but let us not as theologians too lightly take up the slogan, *Deutschland über alles,* nor act as if, so far as theology is concerned, we had no minds of our own. The "last word" in theology is not necessarily the truest or best.

Apart from all such minor considerations and partial irrelevancies, however, the point to emphasize here is that the traditionally inherited Kantian agnosticism has opened up the theology under review to the inroads of a sceptical irrationalism which, even if it goes forth in the name of the "revealed Word," is ultimately fatal to any secure assurance of divine revelation, for the simple reason that, in repudiating the rational and other spiritually valuational criteria of the divine, it throws away the only critically available key for distinguishing what may be from what cannot be accepted as *revelation* of the divine.

## III

In the last paragraph of his essay, "The Truth in Myths," Professor Niebuhr gives expression to what, in view of his dualistic and logically agnostic epistemology, it does not seem possible to take as being anything more than a subjective intuition or surmise, namely, that "the transcendent source of the meaning of life is in such relation to all temporal process that a profound insight into any process or reality yields a glimpse of the reality which is beyond it" (p. 135). But he goes on immediately, as we should expect, to qualify the knowledge value of this supposed "insight" in a summary statement of his position: "This reality can be revealed and expressed only in mythical terms. These mythical terms are the most adequate symbols of reality, because the reality which we experience constantly suggests a center and source of reality which not only transcends immediate experience, but also finally transcends the rational forms and categories by which we seek to apprehend and describe it" (*ibid.*).

Now the words I have quoted must have been written fully three years ago, and I have no information as to what Professor Niebuhr has been doing in the Gifford Lectures which he has been delivering this year (1939). I would hope, however, that he has been keeping closer to the terms of Lord Gifford's will than did his recent predecessor, Karl Barth. If so, he will presumably have had a grapple with problems of religious epistemology and theological metaphysics, in which case he may perhaps have been led to correct some of the anomalies of his position. It may even be that he will be found to have returned to something like what he wrote over twelve years ago (*Leaves from the Notebook,* etc., p. 152), and to have developed more fully at last the opinion which I have quoted once already, that "there is at the heart of almost every tradition an element of reasonableness and around its circumference a whole series of irrationalities," and that it is "our business to destroy the latter and restore the former by fitting it to contemporaneous circumstances and conditions." This may be wishful thinking on my part, but until I am informed to the contrary I will try to trust, even if only faintly, this larger hope.

Meanwhile I offer some further animadversions on Professor Niebuhr's published opinions on the subject before us, interspersed with a few incidental suggestions of a constructive nature from my own point

of view. I would agree, of course, with Mr. Niebuhr that the fundamentalists make a great mistake when they take the primitive, prescientific myths of the Bible story as literally true in either a scientific or a metaphysical sense. We can easily reconcile ourselves, as Christion believers in God, to a permanent place for poetical and "mythical" elements in the concepts employed in the religious group with which we are associated, provided it be clearly understood that at least the most important theological concepts, such as that of God as a superhuman rational intelligence and moral will, are to be taken as literally true and their contradictories as literally false. But if all our best religious ideas are to be dismissed as mere poetic representations of an inaccessible Something which we not only can never begin to know but can never even think about with real and literal truth, the result of finding this out must be fatal, not only for theology, but ultimately for the life of practical religion itself. Unless, with such help as he may be able to obtain from the theologian and philosopher, the man of faith can distinguish true belief from mere myth, he must begin to falter where once he firmly trod. "For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself for the battle?"

As a matter of fact, the main task of the theologian, in one way of stating it, is just this: the distinction and separation of literal truth from all mere figure of speech in the language of religion. We can recognize as symbolic the concepts of Warrior, King, Judge, and even Father, when applied to God; but to deny ultimate theological validity to such terms as spirituality, rationality, purpose, and moral goodness (*The Nature of Religious Experience*, pp. 119, 131; cf. pp. 100, 102), is to undermine the very corner-stones of religion. The notion of the necessarily mythical character of all religious thought might make for conciliation in ecclesiastical gatherings, but it can hardly be claimed that it makes at present for mutual understanding. The harmony to which it seems likely to lead is neither the peace of understanding nor the peace which passes understanding, but that which is due to failure to understand, the peace of misunderstanding. Such peace can hardly be expected to prove permanent, being precariously built upon fundamentalist ignorance and that sceptical variety of modernism which is so foreign to the spirit of evangelical Protestantism, and indeed to all historic Christianity.

Theology cannot, without fatal loss to religion and life, be reduced

in toto even to what Mr. Niebuhr calls "permanent myth," with literal truth of belief excluded as impossible of attainment. Admitted that man has a *life*-interest in religion in distinction from a mere *truth*-interest; it is equally true that he has an interest in the truth of the ideas he uses for the support and guidance of his life. In the name of the integrity of the theological conscience and the security of religious faith, protest may well be made against the doctrine that, in religion, one has the right to use as if they were literally true ideas which neither are literally true nor are translatable into terms that have an equivalent religious meaning and can be taken as literally true. It was not without reason that even Vaihinger, not a theologian but a philosopher, refrained for thirty-five years from giving out for publication his ethical and religious fictionalism, according to which the ideas of God and moral freedom, while indispensable for the support of the religious and moral life, are mere fictions to which no reality truly corresponds. So far as I can see, it is only his intense moral earnestness and not anything in his theological mythologism which distinguishes Reinhold Niebuhr's philosophical position, fundamentally, from that of the fictionalist, Hans Vaihinger. If such mythologism and fictionalism seems satisfactory to anyone, must it not be either because of religious indifference or else because the true nature of the doctrine has not yet been found out? I know that Dr. Niebuhr himself claims to have travelled fast and far "theologically to the Right"; but the trouble with that is that his mythological fictionalism makes it altogether too easy to move in that or any other direction. Mr. Niebuhr has been giving us a very interesting exhibition of running with the neo-Calvinistic hares and hunting with the naturalistic hounds. Or, to change the figure, he has cut the theological Gordian knot with what may seem to have been a master-stroke, but that same stroke is bound to prove destructive of precious spiritual values which might have been conserved at the cost of a patient disentangling of the threads of religious epistemology and theological metaphysics.

I once heard the late Professor John P. Peters relate an interesting story about his old teacher, the famous Dr. W. G. T. Shedd, whose very conservative twelve-hundred-page *Dogmatic Theology* gathers dust on many a theological bookshelf today. Dr. Shedd had been lecturing on some doctrine difficult to be understood and still more difficult to be accepted when understood. After the lecture one of his

students ventured to ask, "Dr. Shedd, do you never have any doubts?" The frank reply was, "There are times when I doubt everything!" What a pity the learned theologian was not acquainted with the modern doctrine of the necessarily mythical, fictional, or merely symbolical character of all theological thought! How much distress of mind it might have spared him! He might have been as conservative in his doctrinal teaching as he wanted to be, and at the same time as open-minded and sceptical as any of his critics.

It is not so much Dr. Niebuhr's metaphysical agnosticism to which I object, although that does seem to me regrettable, as injurious and unnecessary. One may be a metaphysical agnostic and still a religious believer. Tennyson spoke for many and gave religious help to many when he wrote, "We have but faith, we cannot know, For knowledge is of things we see." There have been many Christian agnostics. But I fail to see how anyone who maintains that no religious concepts are literally true can, without confusion, be regarded as even a religious *believer*. I sometimes wonder whether Niebuhr has really moved theologically to the Right after all. Extremes meet, and may it be that he has travelled so far to the Left that he has come round the circle to a point where he is within hailing distance of the real conservatives?

## IV

The problem of the distinction between literal truth and purely symbolical representation presupposes the question of the relation of ideas to reality, of predicates to subject-matter—an elementary topic in logical theory which should not be the occasion of misunderstanding, though it frequently is. According to a rationalistic intellectualism, theological ideas are essentially nothing but copies, representations of divine reality. According to pragmatism, they are nothing but instruments for practical guidance, either in religious adjustment itself or in the social expression of religious motivation. According to an extreme symbolism, religious ideas are nothing but the emotional overflow and symbolic expression of religious feeling. One should always be on his intellectual guard, however, when he meets the phrase, "nothing but." Theology is not rightly defined in any one of the definitions just given, to the exclusion of the other two. It is indeed, in its genesis, a more or less symbolic expression of religious feeling and experience. As such, and especially at what seems to be its best, it

tends to be made normative, a guide to religious adjustment and practical religious living. And if it is to serve satisfactorily as such a practical guide, it must be made as true a representation as possible of objective divine reality. Here the translation of poetry into literal truth, whether scientific or philosophical, is what must be sought. And it will be easier to maintain that this is logically and psychologically possible, if it can be maintained on critical grounds that direct access to objective divine realty is possible and somewhere a fact.

It will not do to contend that all that is meant in the doctrine of the necessarily non-literal, merely symbolical and even mythical nature of religious concepts is a protest against the rationalistic dogma that there is a relation of identity between reality and ideas, between the subject-matter of our judgments and the predicates we attach to them. There is occasion, to be sure, for protest against extreme rationalism as well as against irrationalism. It must in fairness be conceded to the critic of rationalism that no predicate ever exhausts the content of the concrete reality which is ordinarily the subject-matter of the judgment. But there is no need that it should do so. We do not need tautology in order to have truth, even though the transition from premises to conclusion, especially in familiar trains of thought, comes close to being that, as John Stuart Mill among others pointed out. Bradley's fallacious analysis of the judging process, leading to the paradoxical conclusion that all judgments are either tautologous or false, seems to have been repeated in principle in Reinhold Niebuhr's thought, reaching as it does in effect the conclusion that all value-judgments, including those of theology, must be, however metaphysical, either meaningless or mythical. So nihilistic a theory of religious knowledge is by no means necessary. Predicates are abstract functional representations of reality, but they may nevertheless be adequate from every proper point of view and, as thus adequate, true in the proper sense of "true." Perhaps even Dr. Niebuhr would find food for further philosophical thought in Pilate's lightly asked but weighty question.

Of course predicates, being abstract, can never as such be completely identical with the concrete things of which they are predicated. There must always be difference as well as agreement, if the judgment is to be significant as well as true. And yet, some judgments *are* literally true, while some others are figurative or even mythological. The

judgment, The carpenter uses a hammer, is literally true, even if there is much more in the reality of the carpenter than is expressed in the predicate, hammer-using. On the other hand the judgment, The thunder is the sound of Thor's hammer, is clearly mythological. And what truth there is in the statement need not be left in the mythical form; myth can be translated into metaphor, and metaphor into literal truth, as simile.

Because some religious truths find temporary expression in mythical form, it does not follow that we are required to conclude that all religious truths must always be expressed in the form of myths. No one would deny that the judgment, John Smith is a person, is literally true, and that this is so in spite of the wide discrepancy between the real, concrete John Smith and the abstract predicate, "person," *as existences*. And whether or not the judgment, God is a person, is literally true is not to be settled by the mere consideration that there is more content in God as a concrete reality, presumably, than in the abstract predicate, "person." It is to be settled, as nearly as it can be settled at all, by considering how reasonable it is, in the light of religion and philosophy, to believe that there is a superhuman being who knows that he exists, who acts with a purpose, and who is great enough and good enough for our absolute worship and ultimate trust. If it is reasonable so to believe, we are justified in holding that the judgment, God is a person, is *literally* true. If not, and if there is nothing in the God-idea that can be reasonably taken as literally true, then the theologian is left holding an empty bag which he may as well get rid of at once; there is little to be gained by continuing to hold it and calling it a "permanent myth." It is what we can take as literally true in our theology which really counts in our religion.

Is there not in each of the principal theological ideas which Mr. Niebuhr labels "permanent myth" something which may be reasonably regarded as literally true? Creation may be defended as real in the sense of self-transcending causality at the time, a becoming which is neither completely necessitated beforehand nor emerging without cause; we have a sample of it in our own responsible free agency. The Fall and Original Sin are realities in the sense of man's repeated failure to do as well as he can, with the evil consequences of that failure in his own character and in his social influence; we are handicapped by the moral failures of those who have gone before us, as those who

come after us will be handicapped by ours. There is literal truth in the doctrine of Incarnation: spiritual values worthy of man's absolute devotion found fuller realization, probably, in the will, character, and active, self-sacrificing love of Jesus of Nazareth than in any other human being known to us in history, so that he becomes our best individual manifestation of the Divine Rational Spirit, making it reasonably believable that here we have the result of the fullest human response to a divine initiative which is active and available for others, at least to such an extent as would make it unnecessary to think of God as unwilling to act in and through others in an impartial and essentially similar way. There is truth, we may believe, in the Resurrection, in that, as believers in a God great enough and good enough for the conservation of absolute values beyond that which we human beings are responsible for accomplishing, we can reasonably conclude that all the absolute values of the spiritual personality of Jesus were conserved intact in spite of his bodily death, and that the same thing has been and will be true of all absolute values bound up with individual personality. And so it may be maintained that in each of the so-called myths of theology there is an essence which is defensible as literally true. I can think of no better illustration of "emptying out the baby with the bath-water" than the interpretation of all such religious concepts as being, wholly and without remainder, of the nature of myth.

## V

An obvious logical defect of Dr. Niebuhr's argument for the critically agnostic and irrationalistic species of the doctrine that theology is inescapably mythological in character, and indeed of his method of arguing in general, is, as was intimated above, the way in which, in his summary dismissal of alternative views, he falls into the fallacy of "undistributed middle." It is not that he never considers any intermediate position between sharply defined antitheses. If they are already well above the horizon, writ large in history, he is likely not only to consider them, but to indulge in striking and sweeping generalizations concerning them. He is less likely to consider the *possibility* that a reasonably defensible intermediate standpoint might be found between certain opposite extremes which he chooses to treat as if they exhausted the possibilities. His own position may be regarded as in some respects intermediate between contrary extremes, namely,

between the fundamentalist interpretation of all primitive biblical myths as literally true and the naturalistic rejection of all the characteristic ideas of religion as, not only mythical but, as mythical, simply untrue, whatever their aesthetic value may be as poetry. Mr. Niebuhr also recognizes another position, intermediate between his own point of view and fundamentalism, namely, speculative idealism. But what he habitually overlooks is that there is still another position, intermediate in some respects between his own irrationalistic, agnostic, dualistic realism and the rationalistic absolutism he likes to take as the logical outcome of the application of metaphysics to theology; intermediate also in other respects between his own standpoint and that of the naturalistic empirical realists.

The neglected intermediate position to which I refer is the one which I myself would defend. There is no longer room in this article for any detailed defense or even exposition of views which I have already explained and defended more than once, but a brief characterization, sufficient for purposes of identification, may not be out of place. The view I refer to is a not uncritical common-sense realism which I take to be reasonably defensible, not only in the realm of sense-experience, but in social and religious experience as well. In the light of this critically monistic and realistic religious epistemology agnosticism can be avoided; the object of religious perception and the content of a not unnatural divine revelation (especially in religious experience) are seen to be essentially coincident. On this empirical and realistic religious basis it may be claimed that a certain body of empirically verified religious *knowledge* is possible, supplemented by a rather extensive series of religious propositions which are philosophically defensible as literally true *belief*. From this point of view it may be admitted that, beyond all this scientific and philosophical theology, there is a proper place for religious metaphor and even for elements of traditional mythology clearly recognized as such and used as mere poetic representation of what can be otherwise expressed. But this last, so far from comprising the entire content of theological thought, forms no *essential* part of theology as a systematic discipline. Thus, while the naïve fundamentalist theology is a mixture of prescientific, mythological elements with propositions reasonably defensible as literally true, and while the absolute idealists, the materialistic and positivistic naturalists, and the agnostic, more or less irrationalistic

thinkers of the group to which Niebuhr belongs, tend to agree in maintaining that the characteristic theology of the religious consciousness has its place entirely within the realm of mythology, there is another alternative, to my own particular variety of which I have just now very briefly referred. Its basic presupposition is one with which I believe most modern-minded theologians would heartily agree, the view, namely, that the task of theology may be defined as that of distinguishing, within the whole body of conceptual expressions of religious faith and experience, between those elements which may be defended as literally true and other elements which are recognized as being of the nature of poetry, metaphor, and myth. It is the former, what is believed to be literally true, and that alone, that is regarded as making up the essential content of theology.

As for the much advertised movement "theologically to the Right," it may well be asked of what significance that can be, if all the theological ideas are mere mythical representations—or misrepresentations—of we know not what. No such theology, however conservative, can be more than counterfeit coin, bogus checks drawn on a bank in which there are no longer any funds on deposit. Dr. Niebuhr has recently informed us that a good many years ago he rejected "almost all the liberal ideals and ideas with which he ventured forth in 1915" (*Christian Century*, April 26, 1939). Does this mean that when he found himself unable to subsist on a liberal theological allowance and finally became theologically bankrupt, he joined the ranks of the confidence men and began circulating counterfeit conservatism among the unsuspecting? If so, I would exhort him to "remember from whence he is fallen and repent and do the first works." I would counsel him to buy theological gold tried in the metaphysical fire, that he may be securely rich. "As many as I love, I rebuke and chasten."

Now I would not have my readers take my myth of the confidence man too seriously. To avoid any risk of misunderstanding I hasten to add what would probably go without saying. I have no doubt whatsoever of Reinhold Niebuhr's complete sincerity. We cannot judge a man fully or infallibly by the company he keeps, and in this matter of the interpretation of theology as mythology Niebuhr is vastly superior, religiously, to most of his associates. It is his judgment, not his intention which I question. If he will read the words of apostolic advice with the good humor which suffereth long and is kind, which is not

easily provoked and thinketh no evil, thus eliminating any seeming harshness from the passage, I would, in the spirit which I have invoked in him, suggest that he read the fourteenth, fifteenth, and seventeenth verses of the sixth chapter of II Corinthians.

One final word. It is not a mere external, *theological* conservatism that our languishing modern religion primarily needs. What we need above all else is a renewal of vital religious experience; not indoctrination with the so-called orthodoxy of a bygone generation, but spiritual regeneration and a positive faith, such as will grow its own creed and doctrinal system; not a mere external reaction to the old, so-called evangelical doctrines in their no longer digestible form, whether these be taken in good faith, literally, as by the fundamentalists, or in the latest style, as mere mythology. The old theological evangelicalism functioned serviceably in the evangelism of an earlier day, and while the functional test is not an adequate test of the truth of a theology, it is a proper test of its evangelical quality. That will be our modern evangelical theology which, having successfully passed all fair theoretical tests and been shown to be intellectually permissible at the very least, functions effectively as an instrument of personal religious evangelism in this our own day. What we need and what is, I believe, available, is an experientially verifiable evangel of a spiritual regeneration universally accessible on the fulfillment of certain specifiable and practicable religious conditions. And we need a theology which we can reasonably take as literally true, and which is functionally evangelical in that it is effectively instrumental to that spiritual evangel. And precisely this, if I am not mistaken, is what is within our reach in the realistic religious epistemology and metaphysically defensible empirical theology which I still make bold to recommend to my brilliant and distinguished former student.

# THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHURCH AND FREEDOM

By Paul L. Lehmann
*Professor of Religion, Elmhurst College*

At the logical center of Fyodor Dostoevsky's maturest work,[1] there is the legend of "The Grand Inquisitor." This tale is Dostoevsky's instrument for a fresh and fruitful interpretation of the problem of the authority of the Church and freedom. The language and distinctions of the schools are set aside in favor of the eminently practical consideration of the living relationship between God and man.

Dostoevsky's people live on the fringes of being—where human existence bursts all bonds of sense and reason and convention and becomes a sheer problem. Death is as acute an alternative as life, frustration as achievement, skepticism as faith. The burning issue is not that of the possibilities for deciding but the critical act of decision itself. It is, in Kierkegaard's graphic figure, "as though the stroke of a wild bird's wings were heard overhead by the tame of the same species which lives securely in the trustworthiness of reality and indifferently permits itself to be struck by the wings because the stroke is at once fearful—and fascinating."[2]

The question of freedom is sterile in any other world. In this kind of a world, the authority of the Church is either the intolerable nemesis of freedom or its guardian angel. Dostoevsky's violent dislike of Roman Catholicism was rooted in his inability to dissociate it from the systematic destruction of freedom. Tradition kept him loosely connected with his own institution, which he thought had more adequately safeguarded the liberty of the Christian. "But his own religion," as Berdyaev suggests, "went far beyond either historical Orthodoxy or historical Catholicism in freedom of spirit."[3] Whether he could have understood Protestantism on this point remains to be seen. He was, as a matter of fact, unable to abandon his positive passion for the existential character of freedom to look behind the negative impact of the protest of the Reformers against Rome. If the only author-

1. *The Brothers Karamazov*, translated by Constance Garnett (New York, 1923), pp. 270-91.
2. Ed. Thurneysen, *Dostojewski* (Munich, 1930), p. 2.
3. N. Berdyaev, *Dostoevsky* (New York, 1930), p. 79.

ity he knew in State or in the Church was a violation of freedom, his analysis of freedom need not be disqualified because he failed to consider the proper role of authority with respect to it.

According to the legend, the Grand Inquisitor is an aged Cardinal of the Church who causes an unknown visitor to Seville to be imprisoned. His only offense is the resurrection of a maiden from the dead, which act partly gratifies and partly aggravates the superstitious, wistful, impoverished, and generally burdened populace. Behind the locked doors of the Prisoner's cell a conversation ensues which is really a monologue directed by the Cardinal to the captive. The latter is readily recognizable as Christ. What the Cardinal says takes the form of an allegory of our Lord's Temptation (Matthew 4). Jesus as the Lord of the Church is accused of a complete misunderstanding of his redemptive work. This mistake the Church has deliberately undertaken to correct. The Inquisitor "claims it as a merit for himself and his Church that at last they have vanquished freedom and have done so to make men happy." "Nothing," he continues, "is more insupportable for a man and a human society than freedom."[4]

The Grand Inquisitor understands quite clearly what freedom is and what it implies. Freedom is the distinctive offering of Christ. It is the essential meaning of the Incarnation. Christ's coming in the flesh has disclosed "that transcendent paradoxical basis of life in God, which finds expression in the completely problematical character of existence."[5] This is the burden which is insupportable for man and society and which transforms the authority of the Church into ecclesiasticism. The alchemy is compounded of the expressed desire to relieve the burdens of humanity and the suppressed desire to perpetuate an illegitimate sovereignty. The Cardinal tells Christ that

> now—for the first time it has become possible to think of the happiness of men. Man was created a rebel; and how can rebels be happy? Thou wast warned. . . . Thou hast had no lack of admonitions and warnings, but Thou didst not listen to those warnings; Thou didst reject the only way by which men might be made happy. But fortunately, departing Thou didst hand on the work to us. . . . Thou hast given us the right to bind and to unbind, and now, of course, Thou canst not think of taking it away. Why then, hast Thou come to hinder us?[6]

4. Dostoevsky, *Op. cit.*, pp. 276-77.
5. Thurneysen, *Op. cit.*, p. 46.
6. Dostoevsky, *Op. cit.*, p. 276.

This is the great temptation of the Church. Under the guise of humanitarianism, it substitutes its own authority for that of its Lord. The attainment of happiness at the price of the burden of freedom contradicts both freedom and the sovereign Christ who bears it. To this temptation, the Inquisitor avowedly succumbs.

Man was created a rebel; and how can rebels be happy? Dostoevsky's formulation of the problem is the only real one, and it contradicts both the philosophic tradition and Catholic Christianity. They both seek to reduce the problematical character of human existence to the level of realizable potentiality. They betray thereby a conception of the relations between God and man in which freedom and the Incarnation are ultimately superfluous. They are superfluous because they do not govern the understanding of human existence, but are themselves included among the independently determined possibilities of human existence. The preoccupation of the philosophic tradition with the demands of man's rational nature, on the one hand, and the absorbing interest in its sacramental system by Roman Catholicism, on the other, cannot be allowed to obscure their common conception of the conditions under which God and man can meet. The fact that the former sooner or later becomes involved in the static controversy over the relations between freedom and necessity, and the latter in the equally sterile debate over the relations between free will and grace, proves that any significant understanding of the connection between the event of the Incarnation and the problematical character of human existence has been surrendered to abstract speculation.

Dostoevsky's acute religious sense has enabled him to uncover the vulnerable point in the treatment of freedom in Catholic Christianity. The authority of the Church permits the denial of it even while affirming it. Under the guise of the obvious ethical circumstances of human existence, the Vatican neatly turns its back upon the dilemma in which it is trapped by its philosophical foundation, and persuades men that they may have what its own mind and heart know they can never have. The Inquisitor adroitly adopts an *argumentum ad hominem* which seems to set the Redeemer of mankind against humanity:

> Thou didst promise them the bread of Heaven, . . . and if for the sake of the bread of Heaven thousands shall follow Thee, what is to become of the millions and tens of thousands of millions of creatures who will not have the strength to forego the earthly bread for the sake of the heavenly? Or

dost Thou care only for the tens of thousands of the great and strong, while the millions, . . . who are weak and love Thee, must exist only for the sake of the great and the strong? No, we care for the weak too. . . . Didst Thou forget that man prefers peace, and even death, to freedom of choice in the knowledge of good and evil? Nothing is more seductive for man than his freedom of conscience, but nothing is a greater cause of suffering. And behold, instead of giving a firm foundation for setting the conscience of man at rest forever, Thou didst choose all that is exceptional, vague, enigmatic, acting as though Thou didst not love them at all—Thou who didst come to give Thy life for them! Instead of taking possession of men's freedom, Thou didst increase it, and burdened the spiritual kingdom of mankind with its sufferings forever. Thou didst desire man's free love, that he should follow Thee freely, enticed and taken captive by Thee. . . . But didst Thou not know that he would at last reject even Thy image and Thy truth, if he is weighed down by the fearful burden of free choice? . . . How is the weak soul to blame that it is unable to receive such terrible gifts? Canst Thou have simply come to the elect and for the elect? But if so, it is a mystery and we cannot understand it. And if it is a mystery, we too have a right to preach a mystery, and to teach them that it's not the free judgement of their hearts, not love that matters, but a mystery which they must follow blindly, even against their conscience. So we have done. We have corrected Thy work and have founded it upon miracle, mystery and authority. And men rejoiced that they were again led like sheep, and that the terrible gift that had brought them such suffering was, at last, lifted from their hearts.[7]

*Extra ecclesiam nulla salus est!* This is a betrayal of freedom and the Incarnation by the authority of the Church. Catholic Christianity knows that man is a rebel and that rebels cannot be happy, so it undertakes to hide the fact of that rebellion and its dread consequences within the bosom of its own mysteries. It reminds men of them sufficiently to keep them slaves, but not sufficiently to make them free. That is why the Mass is less a commemoration of the atoning death of the Lord of the Church than a celebration of the bequest of the keys of the kingdom of heaven to a Church whose Lord is no longer free over it, but its own captive. That is why the aristocracy of the free has been replaced by the hierarchy of the obedient. That is why two sacraments are insufficient to compass the points of threatening weakness in human existence, at which (unless there be more mysteries to fascinate despair) man might yet burst the bonds of his obedience in that ultimate rebellion, from which—like the initial one—the Lord

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 278, 280, 282.

could redeem him, but never the Church. That is why all nominalism and voluntarism are anathema, and why Aristotle lacked only miracles to effect his canonization. A straight line runs from Paul III to Pius IX, from Trent (1545-63) to Rome, Vatican Council (1869-70), which marks the steady direction and culmination of the inner logic of Catholicism. Thomism and Jesuitism have finally triumphed over Scotism and the ambiguities of Augustinianism, in the identification of the historic revelation of God in Christ with the authority of the Church. By this authority, Pelagius can remain excommunicate while Augustine and Loyola join hands. By this authority the dilemma of philosophical freedom is resolved by decree. For grace and free-will are but disparate points on the same horizontal dimensions beneath which or beyond which one simply does not gaze. Why should not rebels be happy? Here are mysteries which they can both contemplate and handle without fear. For they cannot know that they have been tricked into the surrender of a birthright for which they have been persuaded to abandon zeal. It could, moreover, be shown that thirty-nine articles and a series of speeches on religion to the educated among its despisers were insufficient to offset the consistency of this persuasion. If provisional historical circumstances seem to require the modification of the obvious pretensions of self-conscious ecclesiasticism, they cannot, in the long run, avoid the modification of the basis of all such pretensions without removing from the Church all theological sincerity or subordinating it completely to culture.

Exactly these considerations resist the epiphenomenal interpretation of the Protestant Reformation as the offspring of the Renaissance. The fanatic opposition of the Reformers against Erasmus and the Papists, with Aristotle in between, was not born of an obscurantist delirium but of theological integrity. They had a radically different conception of the relations between God and man than that to which rationalism and Catholicism were essentially committed. And there is no more illuminating indication of this fundamental divergence than that which is supplied by an analysis of the problem of freedom and the authority of the Church. Indeed, the approach to Protestantism from this standpoint discloses a unique vitality in the Protestant doctrine of the Church which is effectively correlated with the truly religious interpretation of freedom by a strict adherence to a theology of the Incarnation. It cannot be overlooked, of course, that Protestant thought

also moved within the shadow of the historic Christian controversy between the grace of predestination and the responsible activity of independent human volition. But the basic orientation of the Reformers was, from the first, in line with an interpretation of freedom which has really never come into its own.

The remarkable tract on *Christian Liberty* which appeared in the year 1520, as a part of Luther's famous trilogy calling for a reformation of the Church, and the more elaborate, though scarcely more polemical work against Erasmus five years later,[8] discloses an inner dialectic of freedom which makes every metaphysical use of the idea irrelevant, and which transcends the opposition between free-will and grace and its concomitant contrasts—nature and revelation, works and faith, the temporal and the spiritual, the secular and the sacramental, man and God. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the idea of freedom, in its strictly religious sense, is the central, positive idea by which Protestantism, when all its more obvious negative polemics have been taken into account, stands or falls.

> A Christian man is a free lord over all things and subject to no one. A Christian man is a servant of all and subject to everyone. . . . Thus, we must be certain that the soul can spare everything except the word of God, and that without the word of God nothing is of use to it. . . . Therefore, it ought to be the sole work and concern of Christians that they be well grounded in the word and Christ, continually practising and strengthening such faith. For no other work can make a Christian.[9]

It will be useful to explore the implications of this Protestant foundation with reference to certain determining motifs of the thought of Luther himself.

Luther begins with, and characteristically abides by, the same point which concerned Dostoevsky. What the latter does via the concrete instrumentality of the novel, the former does via the interpretive instrumentality of dogmatics. But they are both preoccupied with the tension which continues to afflict the existence of men whom Christ has avowedly come to redeem. Luther was constantly insisting that the relations between God and man in Christ were to be understood *von unten her in Christo*, not *von oben herab ex Christi*. And in the

8. *De servo arbitrium.*

9. *Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen* (Erlangen, 1833), Vol. 27, pp. 176, 178, 179.

whole tragic dialectic of this undertaking Dostoevsky's people simply live—unable to break through to the freedom in the Incarnation, unable to escape the struggle to break through. Thurneysen asks:

> why must Count Myschkin appear as an Idiot? Because the whole wisdom of men, everything that passes among us as a world-view and a philosophy of life, is nothing more than an attempt to outrun the question about God (as a question!), whereas the refusal to outrun this question, the facing of it becomes the divine foolishness of the idiot. . . . Why in the writings of Dostoevsky is it always a pair of enlightened dying who are fully wise and understanding? Just because the dying are especially near the great shadow of the completely problematical which hovers over existence as the most impressive witness of the fact that the meaning of life does not lie in this life itself. Why can the young Alyosha with all his faith and his redemptive insights only tread the fringe of the world of the Karamazovs? Because in the midst of the world of the Karamazovs, as in every world, unbelief rules, . . . Because every one rests everything on avoiding the sickness of life over against God, and in their own way to remain strong, healthy, powerful, and consequently cannot know anything about the resurrection and the new birth.[10]

The genius of the Lutheran dogmatics is that it sees exactly this pathos of human existence as aggravated, not eliminated, by the advent of Jesus Christ. The Protestant understanding of the relations between God and man is therefore delivered of any hypostasization of the logos and of its petrification in the sacramental symbols of an institution. Jesus Christ is neither a principle of being or life, the clue to their interpretation, nor a dispenser of authority, whether of precept or example, by which life is to be regulated. He is a dynamic, personal event of decision, in which God acts for man in order that man may act in God. The Incarnation is the declaration of independence of the children of God. They discern in it that God is for them as they can be for God. Contrary to philosophy and Catholicism, the God of Protestantism is, respectively neither knowledge nor power, but sovereign freedom. And the path to His presence is neither understanding nor submission, but the liberty of obedience. The image of God in man is neither reason nor spiritual capacity, whether limited or unlimited, but freedom. *Homo factus est: posse non peccare, sed non posse peccare.* Man has not been created to sin but to rebel. He is not simply *to be,* according to a determination, once he has been

10. Thurneysen, *Op. cit.*, p. 41.

created, of his own; but he *is to be what he is* according to his determination by God.

> Was hilfst dich, dass du lange wissest, dass ein Gott sei, und ist dir doch verborgen, was sein Wille gegen dir sei? Da träumst einer dies, ein anderer das.[11]

The terror of the Incarnation lies in its disclosure of rebellion as no longer a possibility but an act. And its sole promise lies in the disclosure of redemption as no longer a possibility but an act. The conditions for the transfer from rebellion to redemption are enveloped in Luther's thought in the inner dialectic of Christian freedom. Obedience, not autonomy, is the gateway to liberty.

If Catholicism can be said to deny freedom while affirming it, Luther can be said to affirm freedom while denying it. The former is based upon the deceptive identification of the problem of freedom with the freedom of the will, with the result that freedom is honored as the sublimest mystery of ecclesiastical authority. The latter proceeds from the sharp separation between freedom and the freedom of the will, with the result that the problem of freedom becomes the principal paradox in the paradoxical relations between God and man. This appears in the intimate connection in Luther's thought between the doctrine of the *deus absconditus* and the *servum arbitrium* in the light of which Protestantism may be seen to have its own *extra ecclesiam nulla salus est*. Since the tract on *Christian Liberty* is more or less narrowly confined to the polemical issue of salvation by grace alone versus salvation by works, and since the polemics against Erasmus in the *De servo arbitrium*, opens a wider horizon of Luther's developing mind than has been commonly supposed, the latter offers more rewarding consideration. The work against Erasmus is not a commitment to the doctrine of absolute predestination, but rather to the doctrine of the bondage of the will to a God who is not only revealed but hidden.[12]

11. Quoted by Th. Harnack, *Luthers Theologie* (Erlangen, 1862), p. 134.

12. "Obviously," says Harnack, "in the zealous pursuit of his opponent, Luther went too far. . . . To conclude, however, that under pressure he abandoned his real position for this doctrine, means the reduction of a character such as Luther to the level of a theoretician, and to display little understanding for so practical and so real a spirit. . . . In the writing against Erasmus he did reach a critical point. . . . But the Lord of the Church . . . had already led him into another controversy in which, against the Schwaermer, he had no other choice but the strengthening of his own doctrinal position which was from the first anti-predestinarian." *Ibid.*, p. 193.

The understanding of Luther's conception of the *deus absconditus* presupposes the rigorous adherence to his theological principle: *von unten her in Christo*. Consequently, he distinguishes sharply between the omnipotent majesty of God's sovereign freedom over the world and the gracious benevolence of God's freedom for the believer. Nature and reason, conscience and law, point to the first of God's relations to the creation. They are avenues to the hidden God, as their own futility to reach the living God proves. The word and faith, the spirit and the sacraments are manifestations of the second of God's relations to the world. They are the avenues by which God's own revelation in Christ becomes the believer's own, and overcomes with God's own gracious presence the despair into which the futile search for the hidden God must drive every devout heart. Luther asks:

> Are we not terrified when we confront the ten commandments, when we see and find in them our sin?[13] . . . It is not enough to believe that everything that has been said of Christ is true. One must not doubt or waver that he is one of those to whom such grace and mercy have been given, and that he has certainly received them through baptism and the sacrament.[14]

Now the important element in this distinction is that it does not deny to nature and to the reason the manifestation of divinity. But it affirms that these are powerless to make God significant for us. That is, they cannot touch the point at which God is real for us, namely, in the recognition of our estrangement from God in sin and the consequent urgency of forgiveness. The *deus absconditus* can only be the God of wrath whose inaccessibility is our destruction. It is our destruction because, unless He is to remain inaccessible, we are driven to approach Him as though we were free to find Him, and the end of our search is idolatry. Idolatry is the invasion of the hiddenness of God by the man for whom contingency rather than rebellion has become intolerable. The idol may be a dream, an idea, or a skyscraper. It is a pretension which confirms the connection which Luther has made between the *deus absconditus* and the *servum arbitrium*. Against this background, there can be either a sovereign God or a free will in the creature, but not both. And those who wish to modify this contradiction reveal thereby that they have falsified their own situation, and

13. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 171.

the God whom they desire to save from arbitrariness rather than themselves from spiritual blight. The hidden God has also a hidden will, just as the revealed God has a revealed will. The former works its judgment upon those whose unrecognized rebellion has devoured them, and the latter its mercy upon those who desist from their rebellion in obedience to Christ.

This all follows from the fact that in Christ God has made Himself, as well as our own situation, known to us. It means that the Incarnation expresses the same sovereign freedom that is expressed in the creation, that unless God is for us in this way, He is not for us at all, and we remain in our sins. If this were not true, Christ's coming would have been pointless, and our problematical existence would continue in an endless cycle of eruption and calm, of growth and decay. The Incarnation would have been absorbed into the orbit of our existence without God, or repudiated as an intrusion to hinder our own efforts to do Christ's work better than He himself.

That this should not come to pass, Christ Himself has established His Church. He is and remains its sovereign Head. The Church is as strategic to Protestant Christianity as it is to Catholicism. But its claim upon the believer is born of its dynamic-organic, rather than its hierarchical-representative, character. It lives, not as the open or secret vicar of Christ on the earth, but as the confident and concrete assembling together of those who need again and again to hear the good news of the gospel of God and to be told it in water, bread and wine. Its function is not to correct but to affirm the revelation of the redemptive love of God, not to make men blind to their rebellion in order to make them happy, but to set them free in order that they may rejoice in God. Luther explains, in his catechetical discussion of the third article of the Apostolic creed, that

> The Holy Spirit makes for sanctification through the following items, that is, through the community of those who are sanctified or the Christian Church, the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection of the body and the life everlasting, specifically, He leads us first into His sanctified community and lays us in the lap of the Church so that He might preach to us and bring us to Christ.[15]

Thus, freedom, as the essential characteristic of the relations between God and man, is the openness of being in community. It means

15. *Grosser Katechismus.* Ed. by D. Johannes Meyer. (Leipzig, 1914), p. 109.

that God and man belong together in such a way that this togetherness is the unimpeded expression of the true nature of each. The negative aspect of this freedom is that the fellowship between God and man, and between man and man, is delivered of all pretense. The positive aspect of this freedom is the abandonment of each as he *is* to the other as *he is*. God is sovereign Lord of life and love. Man is a child of God, i.e., the creature whose dependence upon God is expressed in the eager obedience to God's expressed will. Freedom and authority, therefore, are neither contradictory nor private. They are the complementary bases of true community, i.e., the Church. This is the point which gives a certain sober validity to the attempts to establish the Church before the gospels, as far back as Genesis. It establishes also the perspective from which to appraise the function of the Church in a world of sin. The relations of the creation abide in the persistent call to regeneration against the day when they shall be re-established in the community of the redeemed. When Protestantism insists upon assigning this work to the continuing operation of the Holy Spirit, it is faithful to the dynamic against the static, the decisive against the speculative, the organic against the hierarchical, understanding of the relations between God and man which is the genius of biblical religion and the basis for meaningful life.

In many ways man is free. . . . He does not, however, have the possibility of fellowship with God. . . . In this respect he is not free. One cannot say that to be a man is to be without God. But one can and must say negatively, that to be a man is *not to be* with God. . . . The issue is none other than that of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit, i.e., that God after He has become incarnate for us in Christ, also receives us in such a way that He Himself prepares us to hear His Word, that He Himself intercedes with Himself on our behalf, that He Himself makes possible the speaking and the hearing of His Word among us. The decisive answer to the question of the existence of the Church must thus certainly be the acknowledgement *(Hinweis)* of the mystery of Pentecost, of that gift which, for Christ's sake, even men in their entire humanity receive, men who themselves are not Christ: the gift of an existence through Christ for Christ and with Christ, the "power to become children of God."[16]

16. Karl Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, 1/2 (Zollikon, 1938), pp. 281, 242.

# COMMUNICATIONS

## SYMBOL AND MYTH IN RELIGION*

By E. McClung Fleming
*Fellow of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education*

Since the days of Bacon and Descartes, Western culture has had little sympathy for myth as a valid content of knowledge, or mythical interpretation as a serious method of apprehending truth. In mathematics and logic modern science recognizes the rational method of the deduction of conclusions from clear and distinct ideas; in the natural and social sciences it approves the empirical method of the observation of phenomena and induction therefrom of general laws. It has, however, tended to ignore myth as the pathetic attempt of a pre-scientific and uncritical mentality to explain natural phenomena. Modern religion has sought to minimize or deny the mythical element in Christianity. Modern democratic political theory and practice has disdained the use of challenging symbols and dramatic presentations. Modern historiography has regarded myth aesthetically as a rather amusing vagary of primitive poetic fancy without relation to primary religious experience. There are now signs, however, of a change in attitude. On the one hand, it is being realized that the rejection of symbolism by orthodox Protestantism has apparently left two equally unacceptable alternatives: Fundamentalist literalism, or a virtually atheistic humanism. Democratic countries, moreover, have expelled myths of government only to be now plagued by the growth of vital myths of race and class. On the other hand, there is noticeable a growing interest of psychology in the subconscious, of science in the symbolic character of scientific knowledge, and of post-war historiography in the irrational.

The serious concern with myth can be seen in two periods of European historiography. Early in the nineteenth century such members of the romantic and so-called "historical" school as Gustav Hugo,

* A digest of four papers and five discussions devoted to this subject in one section of the Annual Conference of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education (Keuka College, Keuka Park, New York, August 31 to September 6, 1939): "Myth in Historiography," James H. Nichols, Yale University; "Traces of God in Our Lives," Friedrich Spiegelberg, Columbia University; "Buddha in the Hindu Cosmos," Teresina Rowell, Smith College; "Myth and Symbol in Religion," George F. Thomas, University of North Carolina.

Savigny, Jacob Grimm, and J. J. Bachofen rejected Hegel's interpretation of spirit as predominantly rational intellect. Impressed by the unconscious, emotional life of man, and the difference between scientific time as another kind of space, and historical time as stages of spiritual growth, they treated cultures as spiritual units, and the forms of culture, such as law or art, as expressions of central religious myths which revealed man's relation to nature or God. The method of such a religious interpretation of history was not mere analytical thought but sympathetic insight. This movement declined by the middle of the century. More recently a renewed historical interest in myth is evident in the work of such men as Freud, Sorel, Pareto, Spengler, and Berdyaev.

A distinction is to be made, however, between myth as the historian uses it, and myth as the individual worshiper knows it. The origin of the latter is to be found in an essentially religious experience, but one that occurs at two different stages of human consciousness. For primitive man the mythical world is "concrete." Absence of differentiation between the subjective and objective is accompanied, as Cassirer has pointed out, by an identification of myth and its meaning, the symbol and the object or event described and enacted. Symbols might arise from natural objects (the World Ash Ygdrasil), and processes of outer sense experience, or from psychical phenomena which become concretized and personalized (Norns, Fates). Only later appear abstract symbols, such as the Upanishad Law of Karma, and these may then be personalized in accordance with popular needs, as when the Law of Karma becomes a deity in the Purana tales. This first naïve expression of myth was thought by Savigny and Grimm to have arisen from the folklore of the common people, and to constitute the first age of history. Gradually, however, history pushed back the mythical age of pre-history, "so that at last it was perceived to have existed before time, not in time at all."[1]

The second, mature type of myth is the expression of a religious experience that begins in a sense of the dubiousness or unreality of this life—in an awareness of a great question mark (not a cancellation mark, as Barth would say) behind this world as a whole. Then comes an awareness of "another side" of reality—the numinous, or "beyond-being," or God—which breaks through into this reality leaving

1. Nichols.

"traces" of the divine, even though the divine itself be not seen. Thus arises a consciousness of two contrasted orders of being and value: a metaphysical dualism of the conditioned-unconditioned, finite-infinite, temporal-eternal; and a moral dualism of the actual-ideal, imperfect-perfect, secular-holy. Man must now come to terms with the fact of this dual reality: as a content of knowledge, as an object of worship, and as a compulsion to moral action. A human necessity requires some bridge relating the two orders, an earthen vessel into which the divine treasure may be poured, a name for God. This is the function of myth and symbol. "Man, who belongs to both orders, uses the visible objects and events of the temporal order to symbolize the invisible realities and ideals of the eternal order. Symbols can mediate between the two orders only because they represent traces of one in the other."[2] Spengler maintains that this second level of myth is not the creation of a primitive folk during its pre-history, but of aristocratic classes of a feudal society, who thus give that society social and intellectual form in a period of relatively mature consciousness.

This second creation of myth may involve a re-working of the primitive cosmogonic and nature myths, such as are found in Hesiod, the Iliad, and the Bible. Thus Buddhism appropriated Hindu myths, and more recently a modern novelist, Thomas Mann, has made use of certain Bible myths. Interesting differences and similarities appear in Eastern and Western myths. With both Christ and Buddha are associated myths of pre-existence, birth and infancy miracles, conflict with the devil, etc. But the Christian heresy of docetism, the subordination of the unique historical personality of the Savior, represents no threat to cherished Buddhist values. For the West, that myth carries conviction that expresses the eternal in terms of unique, historical events; for the East, a greater conviction arises from a hierarchy of values expressed in patterns repeated in many successive cycles and reincarnations. The time concept of the former is of a straight line; of the latter, a wheel. The former has a weak hold on the subjective, but a passion for the outer world of objective fact; the latter believes in the objectivity of psychological states, and accepts gods, heavens, and myths as projections of states of consciousness. The interpretation of the West as life-affirming and the East as life-denying, as by Schweitzer, for example, must be rejected as a gross form of Western pro-

2. Thomas.

jection. Myth is the concrete form of revelation, and therefore relative to its culture. Monotheism demands a relativism of the forms of revelation.

This first function of myth, then, is to provide a formulation of man's immediate religious experience of God, most notably perhaps in the great crises of life: birth, sex, death. Its further function is the renewal of this experience in worship; also the very practical business of securing access to divine power through ritual, to advance the interests of the individual and the group. Wonder and curiosity find in myth an explanation of natural phenomena. But in addition to this practical role, myth also serves as a method of conveying a certain content of knowledge. That content is the numinous, not as a distinct value, but as a "dimension" or "coimplicate" of all values. It constitutes real truth, though not conceptual knowledge. It must therefore be expressed in the language of poetry—not "pure" but metaphysical poetry. This is why Urban and others insist so strongly upon the symbolic language of theology. Symbolic interpretation thus becomes one of the characteristic ways in which the mind synthesizes its experience, and myth a primary form in which the creative and formative human spirit casts its insights. As a method of knowing truth, it is neither arbitrary nor fictitious, but a principled handling of materials not derived from mere sense or impulse. In rejecting it, Humian Empiricism, with its scheme of associating sense impressions, not only ignores an actual activity of mind, but is psychologically false.

The content of religious knowledge, finally, is not merely metaphysical but also moral, and religious experience is not only contemplation of the fact of the unconditioned-conditioned, but a dynamic and practical commitment to the value revealed as inherent in the interpenetration of the ideal-actual. Myth which thus leads life out toward value constitutes functional, if not doctrinal, revelation. The former is often the more important for religion, which emphasizes commitment to the process by which the eternal impinges upon the temporal, and the ideal is realized in the actual, rather than the theoretical attempt to discover absolute logical coherence and consistency in the conceptual statement of all experience. Hence the truth of the symbol, though logically it constitutes a paradox. Hence, also, the necessity of employing drama to represent process: the movement through time of the myth. The western consciousness has felt a necessity of interpret-

ing this dramatic process as occurring in straight-line time. Therefore its myth is based on unique historical facts and "actual" events: Jahweh calls Abraham; Christ is born of the Virgin Mary, and is crucified on the cross. This implies three levels of fact: fact as "mere" historical or scientific datum (Jesus is born); fact as meaning and reality (Jesus is successor to the Prophets); fact as symbol and revelation (Jesus is the Christ). It is because the fact carries reality that it is a symbol: the historical fact is the necessary foundation of the metaphysical fact. The apparent duality is not between fact and symbol, but in our interpretation of the levels of fact, a matter which involves the important epistemological difference between knowing fact and knowing meaning. This consideration of the function of myth suggests that it is "the poetic matrix out of which the scientific and philosophical quest for truth, the moral quest for goodness, and the artistic quest for intrinsically significant form and beauty later emerge as objects of specialized interests."[3]

This approach to the subject makes it possible to formulate certain definitions. True myth is not the creation of the undifferentiated consciousness, whose product might be described as folklore, but of the mature religious experience of the two contrasting orders of reality. The latter has been described as the "broken myth" by Tillich, and the "supermyth of the paradox" by Spiegelberg. A western example is the Council of Chalcedon's affirmation that the two natures of Christ are "undivided and ununited." An Eastern example is Lord Krishna's assertion in the *Bhagavadgītā*, "I am in the things, yet I am not in the things." Both myth and symbol indicate a trace of the higher order in the lower, but the symbol (Garden of Eden) lacks the time factor of dramatic process possessed by myth (Adam's Fall). Dogma is myth stated in the terms of philosophy; allegory is philosophy using the pictorial medium of myth. An important question concerning myth is whether it actually does or does not contain the original vital power and meaning of the religious experience. Myth that has lost this is secular myth. Myth which is created without awareness of the divine, though in the form of religious myth, is demonic.

The use of myth is fraught with peculiar dangers. Its reference to two orders of being and value will lead to continuous misunderstand-

3. *Idem.*

ing; myth will always be wrong from the standpoint of naturalism, and science will tend to destroy, if not religion, its means of symbolic expression. Moreover, the creation of myth may come, not in the very moment of the religious experience, but afterwards, when this is gone; the myth may lack vital meaning, and become secularized. Or, the experience, which is of the existence, rather than the content, of the numinous, is necessarily filtered through mental categories (projection of previously acquired anthropomorphic and rationalistic terms, substantialization, personification, the assignment of cause to effect, etc.) which may constitute a barrier shutting off or distorting the divine reality. On the one hand, the moralist's positive theology may end by carelessly identifying these relative categories, names and traces of God with the absolute. This is idolatry, and an invitation to iconoclasm. On the other hand, the mystic's negation of all sensuous forms as distortions of divine reality may so blur its interpenetration with earthly actuality as to devalue it in "other-worldliness." Each is heresy and must be avoided by acceptance of a paradox: the beyond is not the here; the beyond is only to be found here.

This suggests the fundamental philosophical problem raised by the study of myth, and one made famous by Hume's objection to the cosmological and teleological arguments for the existence of God. By what right may one apply predicates derived from the finite, the relative, the temporal and the imperfect to the infinite, absolute, eternal and perfect? How can categories and analogies derived from experience be used for a hypothetical entity that is beyond experience? This problem seems to be acutely involved in the relation of morality to the revelation of myth. Granted that the religious experience yields a direction or dimension of all values, and that it calls for a certain detachment from the lower order leading to selflessness, does it justify the attribution of such human qualities as justice, goodness and love to the absolute? Aquinas' doctrine of analogy is one attempt to answer this question. It presupposes that the divine is revealed at every level of created being: the objects of nature and the events of history furnish traces of the divine nature. Our knowledge of the attributes of God is real, and these have the same content as when applied to man, though the mode of signification is different. Thus the symbol of love remains a real, if not a literal, truth. In this con-

nection it is interesting to note a growing view that all our knowledge is symbolical.

It is only partially satisfactory, however, to assert that religious intuition yields certain knowledge that can be verified by further experience and reflection. It is also necessary to demonstrate that this symbolic knowledge is not irrational. This may be impossible to a strictly monistic philosophy, whether materialistic or idealistic. Similarly, it may be impossible if one retains the narrow conception, associated with the Baconian and Cartesian schools, that reason is closed to intuition or is a function of logically deducing conclusions from premises in a consistent manner. A broader conception, now gaining currency in many quarters, interprets reason as the function of taking into account all the parts in a wholeness, of "establishing and criticising premises after a careful survey of all the relevant data."[4] The relevant data would have to include the observation and insight of the two orders of being and value which come from religious experience and lie behind the use of religious symbol and myth.[5]

4. *Idem.*

5. The foregoing digest reports the discussion which took place in one group at the National Council's Conference, or "Week of Work." Another group of participants discussed "The Philosophical Presuppositions of Competing Social Ideologies," with Dr. Gregory Vlastos, of Queen's University, Ontario, as chairman, and Dr. Hans Kohn, of Smith College, as consultant, and papers by Dr. J. Seelye Bixler, of Harvard, Dr. Walter G. Muelder, of Berea, Dr. Clarence H. Yarrow, of the University of Mississippi, and Dr. H. Martyn Estall, of Queen's University. The third group, under the chairmanship of Dr. Thornton W. Merriam, of Northwestern University, and with Dr. Grace Coyle, of Western Reserve University, as consultant, discusssed "Group Behavior." The evening sessions of the conference included addresses by Dr. Friedrich Spiegelberg, of Columbia University, Dr. Hans Kohn, of Smith College, Dr. Henry P. Van Dusen, of Union Theological Seminary, Dr. Thomas E. Jones, President of Fisk University, and Dr. John R. Steelman, Chief of the Division of Conciliation of the Department of Labor, U. S. Government.

## BOOK REVIEWS

*Eastern Religions and Western Thought.* By S. Radhakrishnan. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1939. xiii + 394 pp. $5.00.

A fresh breeze continues to waft from the East. The lords of creation, wide-awake, aggressive, possessing, scientific, Christian, are being challenged. Western failures—economic, intellectual, humanitarian, religious—have fanned Eastern self-consciousness. The dreamy, drowsy Orient is no more; it has become visionary, enthusiastic, activistic. Its meekness scantily covers up a feeling of superiority that sucks its strength from a past reckoned in thousands of years.

In things Indian we did not listen to philosopher-scholars, we read *Mother India* instead. We allowed ourselves to be outraged by a presentation of a spiritual and social degradation of Hinduism; condescendingly we criticised. Now we must bear having our own troubles psychoanalysed and Oriental medicines suggested. The Hindu carries in his breast a consciousness of spiritual victory that makes him undaunted even in physical defeat.

The religious position of our well-known author is splendidly taken, we think. Were we to characterize it simply as a mysticism, which it avowedly is, we would run the risk of inviting a negative attitude at once. Radhakrishnan's religion is "opposed to the naturalism which categorically denies the existence of God and the dogmatism which talks as if it knew all about Him" (p. 62). It is the spiritualism of the Oriental type which "lays stress on the personal experience of God, direct contact with the creative spirit" (pp. 62-63). Common notions of this spiritual religion include "the plain truths, the pure morals, the inward worship, and the world loyalty" (p. 296).

Uncovering the assumptions, we find the concept of a vast all-inclusive reality, God, neither thoroughly personal nor absolutely impersonal (cf. p. 241), toward which man by nature strives in thinking and feeling, and having recognized it, adjusts his action in conformity to it as a universal, unitary, harmonious principle, gaining, on the individual's side, quiet confidence and calm, and, on the social side, love of neighbor (cf. p. 323). To the measure in which institutionalized religion is thus supplanted by a personal and direct adjustment to God, tolerance becomes strengthened, tolerance which is "the hom-

age which the finite mind pays to the inexhaustibility of the Infinite" (p. 317).

A clear definition of God is not needed (cf. p. 21). Hence, Radhakrishnan's theology is meagre. He would accept the ability to form such a concept, the endeavor toward perfection, the urge to the ideal, or a bare sense of lack as quite sufficient, mystico-religiously. Like every Indian philosopher, he rates insight, energizing spiritual attainment, *jñāna*, wisdom, gnosis, creative thinking, religious experience, as superior to mere emotionalism or ecstasy, taking care to place himself beyond the criticism that mere knowledge would lead to the end. There is no opposition to science or reason, we are assured; but how mysticism can take its stand on verifiable truth (p. 294) is, to judge by his anti-pragmatism (cf. p. 112), something not plainly evident, even though verifiable truth is, in that passage, contrasted merely with credal puzzles.

Unhampered by theologico-sectarian scruples, Radhakrishnan discusses Christianity as one religion among many. It was the Jews, he says, who "first invented the myth that only one religion could be true" (p. 10). The Godhead has a non-historical, or super-historical, character to a mystic, and therefore he cannot appreciate historical continuity in religion, nor the special doctrine of incarnation, while a rationalized theology and a humanism as such have no meaning to him. These things, together with special revelation and the will-of-God doctrines are hindrances to a unity among religions. Mystics are "spiritual kinsmen" (pp. viii-ix), dogmatic theologians are not; consequently his quarrel with Karl Barth, among others. Mystical aspiration is "a genuine part of human nature" (p. 116), and may be said to be latent in the depths of the world's subconsciousness (p. 297). Everyone can commune with spiritual reality, can acknowledge God as the true environment of our souls (cf. p. 83). Because in Hindu fashion Radhakrishnan believes in the great Upanishadic doctrine of the self, which regards God, *brahman*, or Logos, as identical with the self, every person, therefore, approaches God in his way, according to his capacity. Salvation is thus possible for everyone and it is not dependent on any particular religion or the acceptance of one or the other of the creeds which are but historical formulations of the formless truth (cf. p. 327). This is Radhakrishnan's inference from the universality of the facts of religious experience which bear a close re-

semblance in all parts of the world, and "attest to the persistent unity of the main spirit" (p. 296).

A painful admission it must be to many, perhaps, that the real basis of morality and of a religion which has a grip "born of first-hand conviction" (p. 110) and could supplement the world-compromising social gospel in effectiveness, should be found in Hindu speculation. Yet, three quarters of the book are devoted to persuading us of just that in various ways:[1] The Hindu outlook is presented anew, modern authorities are cited, the doctrine of ancient and medieval thinkers and mystics are compared, and, when actual contacts and influences are unascertainable, Radhakrishnan proceeds on the principle that agreements are striking and the differences are negligible in the world of ideals (cf. p. 35). We do not regret that a disproportionately large space has been accorded the important source-material of the Upanishads, on which practically all later Hindu philosophy is in dependence. The author could not be said to have offended the conscience of scholars nor transgressed or erred in his reserve. In speaking without the prudence of theological students and the caution of comparative religionists, he may be justified in his belief that whether similarities are due to borrowing or to a parallel evolution is less important than the fact of ideas being similar (cf. p. 149).

Of the many illustrations of a universal mysticism in the Indian and Radhakrishnan's sense let us mention only the contention that Jesus "breaks away from the Jewish tradition and approximates to Hindu and Buddhistic thought" (p. 176), that primitive Christianity was a mystery religion (cf. p. 219), that there is sometimes a closer relation to Orphic, and hence Indian, than to the rationalistic Greek or messianic Jewish thinking in Paul, who is stamped a mystic (cf. pp. 223-25), and that most of the Fathers were mystics, Augustine however not consistently. The perfectly frank discussions of the genuine Christ, and the contrast which is often effectively brought out between official and mystery religion is thought-provoking, as is also

1. The source-material, confined practically to English, German and Sanskrit literature might have been extended to include more references to American contributions. Thus, Josiah Royce ought to have been mentioned in connection with the discussion of loyalty; the Orientalism of noted American authors is certainly not exhausted with the perfunctory references on p. 249, nor the book quoted on p. 251, in the footnote; American religious life could have yielded other illustrative phases, not only fundamentalism (cf. p. 283) and *The Green Pastures* (p. 334).

the charmingly candid assertion that "some of the noblest of the moral lessons usually supposed to be characteristic of Christianity are not characteristic of it alone" (p. 174). These discussions well illustrate Radhakrishnan's universalist thinking.

Though primarily a plea for a return to religious principles, the book reaches deeply into the sociologico-political reality of today as well. Idealist to the core, Radhakrishnan dreams of world-unity through the achievement of a mystic insight. Oblivious to economic reality, his quarrel is with the nation and the State, concepts which he regards as the very antithesis of his religious views. The utter sincerity and loftiness of Radhakrishnan's ideas should alone be more than sufficient to endow his ideals with power and drive, and ensure their transplantation into many human hearts without the suggestion of a revolutionary interference with the business of government. What will take care of itself is better left untouched, if the conditions for a desirable turn in political affairs have been provided in a right outlook. Religion is bound to suffer—and all the historic chapters of the book are excellent proof—if mixed with politics, even to the end of transfiguring it.

The author could have avoided involving himself in a number of contradictions and saved himself the objection of expounding daydreams. We agree wholeheartedly when he says that civilization is based on a vision (p. 358); if it is not, it should be. That civilization is comradeship (p. 112), too is acceptable, but very weak and sentimental. How the gentleness and calm of a mystic (cf. pp. 108, 323) can change, even in a normal one, into a burning passion for social righteousness (p. 109) is conceivable, but not that it should run into indignation, because admittedly "the passions of the heart upset the balance of the mind and the even course of the world" (p. 113). An emotional appeal for religious ends would certainly involve us in the historical developments which he flays.

There is some biting chutney mixed up in Radhakrishnan's tirade against the nation-State. The worst possible view of the State and nation is taken. Beginning with the intense nationalism of the Jews, due to the expectation of the kingdom of God "within the limits of this life" (p. 165), humanity became "plunged to the depths in external things, class and nation, State and society" (p. 107). Radhakrishnan asks that the old attachments be replaced by loyalty to a

world community (p. 61), and the primary patriotism in the shape of love of humanity (cf. p. 52). "Our normal attitudes to other races and nations are no more than artificial masks, habits of thought and feeling, sedulously cultivated by long practice in dissimulation" (p. 33). The State—always capitalized—is to have no right to demand sacrifices because it exists essentially for the good of the individual (p. 360).

That the world is a moral invalid (p. 253) we may well grant. And yet, the new humanity cannot be built *in vacuo*. That the state is not a mere convenience (cf. p. 360), but answers a certain need, is acknowledged indirectly by Radhakrishnan himself, particularly in the chapter on the organization of Hinduism and the paragraphs written against conversion. Not only does India now become conscious of her nationhood as expressed in her anthem, but society is neatly articulated in a "natural hierarchy" (p. 366), enforcement of law is considered necessary though reeking of imperfection (cf. p. 361) and a general regulatory mechanism or a framework for guidance are deemed important (pp. 367, 378). And if in India, how much more in the complicated modern society of the West? It is useless to argue for a naturally controlled society, because the "spirit of status" (cf. p. 367) is quite lacking today, and the doctrine of specific excellence (cf. p. 368) is not generally held.

Change of heart, through something like Radhakrishnan's religion, is the real desideratum, rather than a utopian dream, as long as individuals are not all wise, loving, and believers in a universal harmony. Men recognize lesser loyalties, and these not any too well. Besides, the "natural relations of man" (cf. pp. 39, 43 and 47) may not be viewed with optimism. The oceans of time, at the disposal of Orientals, may eventually bring forth a humanity in which "all" individuals share the transcendent idealism of Radhakrishnan. But until that time in which true law, which, without being a check on liberty, develops from within (p. 371), becomes universal, we must content ourselves with laws that, with the co-operation of our noblest minds, approximate a better society.

That caste ever has been a democratic institution (cf. p. 369 and elsewhere) takes faith in the efficacy of a subtle dialectics and should be difficult to establish in minds which have only a slight knowledge of Hinduism. Of course, Radhakrishnan admits that caste has de-

generated and in its rigidity is no longer desirable (p. 378). Being against all racial and national dogmas, he nevertheless sets up a bond of cohesion: tradition, which is defined as "society's memory of its own past" (p. 328). Whether it is "tradition" that has all the potency Radhakrishnan credits it with in a creative religious impulse, compared with which an "imported," transplanted religion lacks all power, may be questioned.

Close thinking might reveal a number of other inconsistencies, all of which flow from this fateful mixing of eternal values with the transitory in history. Let him who is inspired by ideals read, and read with great benefit to himself, and through his personality, with benefit to others. Radhakrishnan's idealism and mysticism, it seems to us, is concerned with Man, not with men, which does not mean, by any means, that we should not act. It does not seem to be absolutely true that what is gained in insight is lost in power (p. 258), for insight reveals a destiny, and a destiny obligates.

In this connection we welcome some intimations by the author of an activism, though feeble as compared with some of the leaders in present-day India. "Religious life is a rhythm with moments of contemplation, and of action, of refreshment and restoration in the life of spirit, and of action with a sense of mission in the world" (p. 97). And again, "a man lives by running . . . (p. 337) and "the road is better than the resting-place" (p. 366).

To any student of religion and of the Orient the book is a significant document. It revolutionizes any ideas of an airy, anemic, or else insanely ecstatic mysticism. In Radhakrishnan's conception all mankind are the chosen people (p. 331). We are deluding ourselves if we think Christianity has conquered and made possible the rapid development and economic supremacy of the Occident: The real conquerer has been the spirit of the West (p. 271). Belief in one religion only is a mistake, for faith in one kills faith in others (p. 329). To regain the universality in outlook we must turn back to India (p. 304) which, with her outlook, survived and may still show us the way of real religion, taking which we shall also improve our moral and social order. It is a development or growth toward impersonality (p. 48) in thought, feeling, and religious aspiration, without abolishing individuality (p. 37).

As the most valuable and least utopian suggestion in the line of

social-political melioration we regard the view, inspired no doubt by the similar conception of the different types of philosophy as *darśanas*, that "the varied cultures are but dialects of a single speech of the soul" (p. 350). This is accomplished by the reduction of what Radhakrishnan calls reciprocal incomprehensions (cf. p. 253), which should not be so difficult with a dash of Vedāntic philosophy and some Western virtues that, we are glad to know, have also been mentioned by our ambassador of good-will from the East (cf. pp. 314, 330, 348), appreciation, sympathy, and *respect*.

KURT F. LEIDECKER

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

*The Foundations of Living Faiths*. By HARIDAS BHATTACHARYYA. Calcutta: the Calcutta University Press, 1938. Vol. I. xii + 526 pp. 10*s*.

Somewhat delayed in publication, but none the less welcome, is this first volume of the Ghosh Lectures for the year 1933, at the University of Calcutta. We shall await eagerly the coming of Volume Two with its treatment of Buddhism, Jainism, Confucianism, Taoism and Shinto, and with its index to both volumes. Meanwhile, we may examine with good reason this first installment dealing with things Hindu, Jewish, Christian, Moslem and Zoroastrian. The delay in publication may mean, for one thing, a ripening of the product, for the lecturer says he spoke originally extempore—which many Indians do with extreme facility. Doubtless many references have been added and many interpolations made into the body of the material while the manuscript was being prepared for the press. The second volume should be even better than the first—at least, Buddhism, Jainism and even the Far Eastern religions should be more easily handled by an Indian than Judaism and Christianity.

Among our first grounds of interest in these books are: the fact that they represent the Stephanos Nirmalendu Ghosh lectureship, whose purpose, as stated in a notice once received by the writer, is a demonstration "that the highest ideal for man lies in love and service to his fellow-men according to the essence of the teaching and life of Christ, and that life lived under the guidance of this ideal constitutes the highest advancement of human personality, the acceptance of a particular creed or dogma being of subordinate importance"; the fact

that the author is an orthodox brahman Hindu educated in an Indian Christian college, who is now head of the department of philosophy in the University of Dacca; and the fact that the subject is of extraordinarily far-reaching consequence and one to which increasing attention is being given in thoughtful circles in the Orient, in western Europe, and in North America. It is also interesting, incidentally, that the Senate of the University of Calcutta found no objection to a Hindu's filling the "Christian" lectureship, since "essence" is, they think, more important that "particular creed," etc. This, we may immediately observe, is a typically Hindu point of view which the lecturer shares fully,—as we may see again below.

There is a sub-title to the volume, namely, "An Introduction to Comparative Religion," which tends to indicate at once the method of treatment of the contents in the vast field. I say tends, because I am not altogether sure of the meaning of "introduction" as here used. Perhaps it may be in part apologetic—yet no man need apologize for his inability to handle authoritatively all the data which the venture calls for. The author acknowledges his "inability to handle any foreign religious literature except in English." This is, of course, a severe handicap for work of this sort, and yet the lectures have merits of their own. The term may indicate an opening up of some main lines of approach to fields worthy of continuing study—there is a suggestion of this sort by the author himself in his preface to the book. The word may scarcely be taken in its fully technical sense, if it be taken to mean a closely comparative or philosophical treatment. There are occasional comparative evaluations and comments now and then of a philosophical character, but the separate chapters are devoted mainly to expositions of individual faiths—and that not altogether restricted to the topics which the chapters bear, e.g., "The Gods of Hinduism," "God in Islam." For instance, one-third of the latter chapter is given over to a "digression about the nature and function of Muhammad as the Prophet of God."

However, in his dealing more or less historically with his materials, the author does often express a point of view and offer a judgment. He has been at work among these materials for many years—the lectures were not a hasty compilation. His first chapter, on "The Living Faiths," best indicates his attitude and the mood which he often

manifests as he goes his later way. In a sense there is one word through which to identify and define the quality: the author is typically *Hindu.* We thus take his display of religious tolerance, at least tolerance for any doctrine, as a matter of course. There is no inconsistency in a Hindu's worshipful regard of Christ. Now Bhattacharyya's study is doctrinal, scriptural, with never more than slight reference to social and political environment, although he indicates at least once (p. 89) that the relations of religion to social and political conditions should be taken into account in any thorough-going analysis of religion. He is, of course, right, for there are many obvious and sometimes fatal defects in any purely doctrinal comparison of religions. Times and seasons must be reckoned with,—factors which no Indian philosopher or theologian has yet fully considered. The eastern horizon of the newer day of social emphasis is only faintly aglow. Our author, however, may mean much by his remark that "the *arhat* in Buddhism . . . is an introspective introvert . . . prone to religious selfishness" (p. 5). While he admits that "philosophy may prove a treacherous ally to religion," he leans toward reason as religion's chief ingredient and guarantee; only the religion, or those religions, which are "towards reason" may expect "a future." He seems to be an interpreter of the *jnana-marga,* or "knowledge-way," although knowledge must not breed cynicism. "A cynic can never be a saviour," he says. He accepts no doctrine of "final revelation," assuming that "all the religions possess good points," that "none is perfect, in spite of all that its adherents may claim on its behalf." Yet he seems to hold some sort of theory of progress, even though he often neglects (e.g., in the treatment of the Moslem idea of God) to record the *development* of ideas, giving an historical description, instead. Sects, to him, may be signs of progress, and indications of the reasonableness of further change. He expects that his own faith, Hinduism, will "evolve on purer lines of speculation and worship" and will "usher in fuller appreciation of the brotherhood of man through the common fatherhood of God or through the ultimate identity of all finite spirits in and through Brahman" (p. 248); did we not say the author is a typical Hindu? This is an idealistic, almost theosophical consummation.

Further, the author takes as his text Koran 2:172, which he gives in Rodwell's version, "There is no piety in turning your faces toward

the east or the west, but he is pious who believeth in God and the last day and the angels and the scriptures and the prophets; who disburseth his wealth," etc., including prayer, alms-giving, integrity, patience and the fear of God. *But* Mohammed said also in this same sura, "We have seen thee turning thy face toward every part of heaven. . . . Turn toward the sacred Mosque . . . wherever ye be." Is there something suggestive here of our author's sometimes questionable use of references? True, the text stands for breadth and tolerance of outlook, but the volume calls for historical treatment of the elements of the various religions. If one examines his sources he finds a great deal lacking. While such good authorities are cited as Cumont, Streeter, Harnack, Caird, Moffatt, Pringle-Pattison, and Hastings ERE; Lammens, Macdonald, Muir, Margoliouth, Wensinck Nicholson; Lods, Grant Allen, Peters, Smith, Abelson; there are many important authorities—even in English—for Christianity, Islam and Judaism not referred to. And Jackson and Moulton bear the weight of the treatment of Zoroastrianism. And even in treating Hinduism the author cites freely such foreign Indologists as Macdonell, Barnett, Hopkins, Eliot, Keith, Muir, Avalon and Farquhar, with comparatively less use of Bhandarkar and other Indians and the Indian scriptures.

The work is on the whole an excellent digest, thoughtful even to the point of independence now and then in its evaluations, and written in good, clear English style. If the reader encounters much familiar material, he nevertheless finds occasion to think about what he reads and to gaze off into long avenues of perspective. Here indeed are the "foundation" materials of great faiths. If something seems lacking in the interpretation of the Hebrew prophet, of the Christian theory of revelation, of the quality of personal experience and its fruitage, and of the very ramifications of the branches of the "tree of religion," there is in the volume, on the other hand, enough of value. This is so far, in the reviewer's humble judgment, the best treatment of comparative religion by an Indian,—assuming that volume two proves to be at least equally good. It is a proper *introduction* in the general meaning of the term, especially to Indian students who would pursue the vast theme further. And for us not only the contents themselves but the Hindu view are considerable and profitable.

John Clark Archer

Yale University

*The Iconography of Tibetan Lamaism.* By ANTOINETTE K. GORDON. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939. xxxi + 129 pp. 48 Plates. $16.00.

This book, accurate in the main, terse and to the point, sets forth a practical method greatly facilitating the identification of Lamaist images, and should prove invaluable to museum workers and collectors of Tibetan paintings and metalwork, to all, in short, who wish to label objects used in the rituals of Lamaism, whether images of divinities, painted, sculptured or cast, or ceremonial implements. It may be added that in these classes falls practically everything from the "Land of the Lamas." Although avowedly restricted to objects from Tibet, the book may be used also for the paraphernalia of Mongolian and Chinese Lamaist ritual. Seekers after esoteric truth and/or interpretation of the doctrines of this complex development of Buddhism may not hope for satisfaction from a work limited in scope to iconographical data. Nor may scholars find the solution of technical problems. However, the comprehensive, if not complete bibliography, affords a guide to studies of the religious and philosophical background, and of the esoteric significance of some, at least, of the many symbols identified by Miss Gordon. The omission of the definition of an image, and of an explanation of its purpose and function seems to the reviewer regrettable.[1]

Plates to the number of forty-eight, two of them in color, and full-page diagrams to the number of eight, adequately illustrate the text. The reviewer rather misses the convenience of numbers on the plates and of letters indicating the separate objects shown on each, of which there are in many cases four to a plate. Of the numerous specimens reproduced, all seem to the reviewer genuine cult objects. Two or three appear to be Chinese, and as many Nepalese. It may be noted, however, that Nepalese craftsmen made metal images for use in Tibetan lamaseries, and that, for purposes of iconography, the provenance is to a large degree immaterial. Since the great majority of the objects illustrated come, in all probability, from the eighteenth century, and since none of them are dated or schooled by Miss Gordon, the

1. These points are well covered by Dr. Coomaraswamy, in his "The Intellectual Operation in Indian Art" (we may add that his explanation holds good also for Tibetan art—the example he takes, Tārā, is probably the divinity best beloved by the Tibetans). The article is in the *Journal of the Indian Society of Oriental Art*, Vol. III, No. 1, June, 1939. It is not in Miss Gordon's bibliography.

book will by no means serve as a history of Tibetan art, a work that needs writing by the way, now that Tucci has found a number of examples of older art. Within the limitations set by the author, however, we find the work excellent, and have no hesitation in recommending it as a handbook of Tibetan Lamaist iconography, practical, well illustrated and, in the main, accurate, at least in so far as we are able to judge.

After a foreword by the late William B. Whitney, and the acknowledgements, comes an introduction by the author. In it, she states her double purpose: "to give the student interested in Tibetan iconography a general idea of the development of Buddhism into Lamaism, and to make easier the identification of the various divinities of the Tibetan pantheon." The stress lies strongly on the second aim; five pages only are devoted to the first and, although the highlights flash as they should, only the barest outline is given. The introduction further states that "the only sources of information are the museums and books such as those by Pander, Grünwedel and Waddell, which are not easy to obtain." The omission of Miss Alice Getty's name here strikes an odd note, since her book fits more closely than any of the other three into the same category as Miss Gordon's own, that of a practical handbook of iconography. Valuable though they are, it has been the experience of the reviewer to find *The Gods of Northern Buddhism* far more often in the hands of those trying to identify Lamaist images.[2] Indeed, Miss Getty, as a pioneer in the field now entered by Miss Gordon, merits mention in the introduction, as well as inclusion in the bibliography, where she does appear.[3] The reviewer is not unaware that *The Gods of Northern Buddhism* (the second edition as well as the first) contains errors; what pioneer work does not? Its scope is nothing short of monumental, stretching far into Chinese and Japanese Buddhism on the one hand and wide into Tibetan and Mongolian Lamaism on the other, and, in addition to its main preoccupation, iconography, covering to a certain extent doctrine and his-

2. Pander's work is indeed difficult to obtain; but the new edition (1934) of Waddell's *Lamaism* puts it within the reach of all who are interested (it is inexpensive). Grünwedel may be out of print, but copies appear from time to time in book-dealers' catalogues at by no means prohibitive prices.

3. We can not forbear comparison of this omission with the kindly and appreciative reference to Granet's work made by Arthur Waley in his new translation of the *Shih ching*, the *Book of Songs*.

tory. It was nobly planned, however, and in the main, well executed; and we find it difficult to see how it could have failed to be an aid to Miss Gordon, if only as a warning to limit her study to one phase of the subject—and limit it she did, almost too strictly, to our taste. We mean that, while it is scientific, from the Western point of view, to deal only with the means of identification, it may be unwise to encourage identification without understanding.

After a note on Sanskrit pronunciation, follow a list of Sanskrit terms in general use with their English equivalents, by no means exhaustive but none the less useful, and an English-Sanskrit version. As is fitting, the names and terms throughout are given in Sanskrit form (not always accompanied by the Tibetan), except in cases of indigenous Tibetan divinities or objects, or where the Sanskrit is not known. The reader, having now acquired the necessary vocabulary, passes on to the book itself (preceded by a new title page), which starts out with the five pages of history mentioned above. It proceeds with illustrated lists of ritual objects, talismans, symbols, *mudrā*s (hand poses), *āsana*s (seats), and *vāhana*s (mounts), with notes as to the divinities with whom each is to be found associated. These lists with the clear outline pictures of the attributes, *mudrā*s, etc., constitute an especially valuable feature of the book, making identification by the method explained farther on a simple matter. Next comes a discussion of the kinds of paintings, among which we find *maṇḍala*s. Here we may pause.

In the first place, *maṇḍala*s are by no means limited to paintings, as the text leads one to infer. On the contrary, "magic circles" and "magic squares" made of wood or stone, of sand or butter, have just as good a claim to the term as their counterparts painted on silk or cloth. Indeed, probably the first *maṇḍala* was the Vedic fire-altar, made of bricks, or its prototype; in any case, the world is as old as the *Rig-Veda*, where it is used to designate the hymns, which were rituals (spells). Miss Gordon says: "They (*maṇḍala*s) probably originated from the Yoga doctrine of the Union of the spiritual (represented by the Vajradhatu,[4] symbolizing the World of Ideas) and the material (represented by the Garbhadhatu,[4] symbolizing the World of forms)." This statement, practically all that is given on the subject, is misleading. The Vajradhātu and Garbhadhātu (Garbhakośadhātu) represent

4. The long *a* in *dhātu* is not indicated.

a late and highly developed form of *maṇḍala*. If it is not possible to date the first application of the word to structures of one kind or another,[5] it is possible to explain its meaning or meanings. A *maṇḍala* is a microcosm identical with a or the macrocosm; it seems to carry the idea of the centre and four (or eight or more) directions. The meaning of *maṇḍa* is heart and marrow, or essence, and *la* is a suffix of completion, perfection. Many meanings have become incorporated in this word; they may be grouped under the four headings, basis (root, fundament), place of worship (place of enlightenment), altar, and assembly. To enter the *maṇḍala* under the instruction of a qualified *guru* (Master) is to know one's self identical with the primordial Buddha. This word and its many applications and varied meanings have not yet, so far as the reviewer is aware, received adequate treatment in a Western language; they are dealt with at length by Toganoo Shōun in his *Mandara no kenkyū*, "Study of *maṇḍala*s", in Japanese, to which we are much indebted.

Passing over a discussion of the Trikāya and the classification of sacred images, we come to the key to their identification, which may be regarded as the great contribution of the book. After an enumeration of the ranks of divinities with a list of the most important members of each group, comes a classification according to ornaments and garments, followed by identification examples, clearly put with questions and answers and an explanation of the procedure. The rest of the book is devoted to descriptions of those members of the Tibetan Lamaist pantheon who are extensively imaged, arranged according to their classes or ranks, Ādibuddhas, Dhyānibodhisattvas, historical persons deified, etc., together with illustrations, the bibliography and a valuable index.

One or two minor points may be raised. The meaning of *vajra* is given "Thunderbolt (literally, diamond)." Now, Monier-Williams, in his *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (p. 878) gives for *vajra*, "Adamantine, hard, impenetrable . . . the thunderbolt and weapon of Indra . . . a diamond (this gem being considered to possess the hardness of the thunderbolt). . . ." The original meaning was probably thunder-

5. Toganoo says in his *Mandara no kenkyū*, p. 29, that square *maṇḍala*s are based on the king's city, and round *maṇḍala*s on the *caitya*. Both the *caitya* and the king's city have a venerable antiquity.

bolt or thunder-stone (meteorite).[6] We may note that the Chinese translation, *chin-kang*, means literally "metal-hard" or "metal-hardness." Mochizuki, in his Buddhist dictionary, *Bukkyō daijiten* (p. 1309), explains the term thus, "Among metals, the very hardest." Like *vajra*, however, the Chinese word *chin-kang* is applied to the diamond. In esoteric Buddhism, the *vajra* is the indestructible wisdom of the Tathāgatas.

The book fails to enlighten its readers as to when the English given with a Sanskrit term is a translation and when it is not, e.g., in the list of *mudrās* (p. 22) we find "Vajrahuṁkāra, Buddha supreme and Eternal," which is not a translation; after it, come "Varada or Vara, charity," and "Vitarka, argument," which are translations. In *Vajrahūṁkāra*, by the way, the *u* is long, ū; authorities differ as to the length of the next to the last *a*, some giving -kara, others, -kāra.[7] We are not sure whether "best perfection" is intended as a translation of Uttarabodhi. "With Pitying Look" translates or explains Avalokiteśvara, although the late Baron von Staël Holstein, in his article *Avalokita and Apalokita*,[8] proved that Avalokita, the original form of the name, meant "Savior." The form Avalokiteśvara results from the coalition of Avalokita and Īśvara, "Lord." On the same page, after "Mahāsthamaprāpta," comes the parenthesis "(Tibetan?)"; the Tibetan name of this not unimportant member of the pantheon is given in the *Mahāvyutpatti*, No. 653, as Mthu-chen-thob. By the way, the bibliography omits this valuable work, which gives the Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese and Japanese forms of a large number of names and terms. To come back to Mahāsthāmaprāpta, apparently nowhere in the book is this Bodhisattva correctly referred to; on page 33, as we have seen, the third *a* lacks its long mark, while in the index and on pages 59 and 61, the *h* after the *t* is missing. In the main, however, the names and terms seem to be correct, even to the diacritical marks, though here and there occurs on error, now of commission, now of omission.

6. See Coomaraswamy, "The Symbolism of the Dome," in *The Indian Historical Quarterly*, March, 1938, p. 23 f.

7. In either case, this part of the term comes from the verb meaning "to make"; *hūṁ* is the sound or letter *hūṁ*; and *vajra* is "thunderbolt" or "the indestructible."

8. *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 1, Nos. 3 and 4 (combined), November, 1936, pp. 350-362. Neither this nor any other work of its author, a noted Tibetan scholar, appears in the bibliography.

Transliterations of terms, we note, are throughout not italicized; when an English *s* is added for the plural, some ambiguity results. *Skandas*, p. xxviii, not only falls in this category but also lacks its *h* (after the *d*); Skanda is one of the names of Kārttikeya, Śiva's son, god of war, while *skandha*, evidently meant here (Miss Gordon translates somewhat freely, "senses"[9]), is an aggregate, of which there are five, constituting the whole of conscious experience. Other aberrations might be cited.

Minor errors, however, can not vitiate the excellent character of the work as a whole, by virtue of which it merits a wide use among collectors of Lamaist ritual objects as a practical guide to identification.

HELEN B. CHAPIN

Berkeley, California

*Un grand Saint de l'Islam: 'Abd al-Kâdir Guilînî (1077–1166).* By MEHEMED ALI AINI, in collaboration with F. J. SIMORE-MUNIR. Paris, Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner. 1938. 257 pp. Fr. 75.

This sixth volume of M. Geuthner's series, *Les grandes figures de l'Orient*, is devoted to the founder of the Qadariyya Order of Dervishes, perhaps the largest in numbers, and certainly the most widely spread of all the Dervish fraternities of Islam. It is written by a former professor in the Theological Faculty of the University of Istanbul, who is well-known in the West as a kindly interpreter of what he would call "the spiritual philosophy of Islam."

The work contains an introductory study, attempting to show the situation which brought about the rise of Sufism within Islam, an account of the Schools at Baghdad at the time 'Abd al-Qādir came there as a student, a sketch of the life of the great Saint from his boyhood in Jīlān to his apostolic labors and death in Baghdad, a summary of his doctrine as this can be extracted from the numerous works attributed to him, selections translated from his sermons and pietistic works, with some necessary explanations of the technical Sufi terms used by him, and some selections in translation from his poetry. As an Appendix there is a list of the various works attributed to him, a bibliography of studies on the Saint both Oriental and Western, and a list of known branches of the Dervish order he founded.

9. The first *skandha*, e.g., is *rūpa*, form or matter. The *ṣaḍāyatana* more nearly correspond to the senses.

Let us say at once that this is a very interesting and useful work. Even though one may in places disagree entirely with the author's interpretation of the history of what led up to 'Abd al-Qādir, or with his translations and interpretations of technical matters, one must confess that he makes the great Saint a living figure before our eyes, and succeeds very well in letting us see the significance of his teaching for his own time, and indeed for Islam at the present day.

Turkey, of course, has disestablished the Dervish Orders, so that the Qadariyya as an organized force for religious and social development in that country is no longer active. It is therefore of greater interest to see how this Turk, of modern education, attempts to show that, though the Order has been disbanded, the spirit of the Order and the teaching of the Master can still be a vital force in the religious life of Turkey.

As might have been expected in the case of so great a figure, his early life is obscured by pious myth. Even the date of his birth is uncertain. Legend provides him with a genealogy which takes him back on both sides to the Prophet's own family, so that he was an Arab, and both a Sayyid and a Sherif. The truth seems to be that he was of native Jīlān peasant stock. True to the modern Pan-Turkish enthusiasm, M. Ali Aini would claim him as a Turk, but the probabilities are that he was of Persian origin, as were so many of the families of Jīlān. His birth, of course, was miraculous, his mother having given birth to him when she was some sixty years of age, and this is given as a proof of his Arab origin, for only the women of the Quraish, the Prophet's own tribe, had this gift of still bearing at so advanced an age. His sainthood began in his infancy, for it was cloudy in his native village of Niff that year when the fasting month of Ramaḍān came around, and the Sheikhs were in distress because they could not see the moon to decide when the month of fasting had begun, but they enquired of the mother of 'Abd al-Qādir whether the infant had taken his suckling as usual, and when they learned that he had refused the breast, they knew that the time of fasting had begun.

The story of his call to his vocation is characteristic. We are told that, when he was seventeen, he was wandering in the fields one evening just before a feast day, when his path was blocked by a bullock, which said to him, "Thy vocation is not to be a laborer." Terrified by this portent, he ran home and out onto the terrace of the

house, but from there, instead of looking out, as he had always done, on the quiet fields of Jīlān, what he now saw before him was Mt. ʿArafāt in Arabia, with the pilgrim crowds moving back to Mecca at the close of the Pilgrimage ceremonies. On the strength of this double portent he persuaded his widowed mother, in spite of their poverty, to allow him to leave the work on the land, and go to Baghdad as a student.

Baghdad was the Oxford of the day to an Eastern student, and at Baghdad he entered as a student of Law, naturally of Ḥanbalī Law, as that was the system in vogue in Jīlān at that time, and there is no need to bring in a theory of the spiritual attraction of the pious life and sufferings of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal as leading ʿAbd al-Qādir to study that system. His life as a poor student doubtless involved much of those privations over which his biographers love to linger, and there is no need to doubt that weakness consequent on lack of proper nourishment brought about those frequent swooning fits to which so many references are made. Baghdad was a great intellectual centre during his student days, but though lists are given of the famous teachers whose lectures he heard, we do not gather that he profited to any great extent from their teaching. He seems to have had much greater interest in the Sufi circles in the city, and in the mystical teaching of Ḥammād b. Muslim ad-Dabbās, by whom he was later initiated into the Sufi life.

His call to his mission was as characteristic as that to his vocation. Though Baghdad was an intellectual city, the centre of a flourishing cultural movement, it was also a very wicked city. Apparently ʿAbd al-Qādir's fellow students were not unattracted by the opportunities for forbidden pleasures and sinful delights, and he, terrified lest he himself might lose his soul in such a sinful environment, determined to flee the city. Early one morning, before it was yet light, he gathered his few poor belongings, and with his Qur'ān tied to his right shoulder, he made his way to the city gate to depart as soon as it was opened. But as he stepped across the gateway some power drove him back. Three times this happened, and then he heard a voice bidding him remain in Baghdad, and prepare himself for a work among men. This obviously was the same impulse from the Unseen that had sent him from Jīlān to Baghdad years before, and which was now giving him his call to his mission. That mission, he learned, was to preach.

There were famous preachers in Baghdad at that day, and it was a little difficult to see how a poor student from Jīlān, with no connections, and with only a very undistinguished record behind him in the Schools, could compete with men of such fame. He himself was conscious that he had no gift for public speech, but his Sufi teachers encouraged him with the advice that if he had the call to preach he should at least try to preach. So he began preaching outside the city walls, not daring to start within, and to his own astonishment he immediately began to attract audiences. The crowds soon became so great that he had to transfer his chair to a public square in the city. Later he took the biggest auditorium in Baghdad, and when that grew too small, his now numerous followers built him a special building in which were quarters for himself, and where, when he founded his Order, he housed the pupils whom he began to train in the Sufi way.

Many sermons attributed to him have been preserved, and some collections have been printed in the Orient. Specimens in translation are given in this volume. It is very possible that ʿAbd al-Qādir had a gift for preaching, but if his contemporaries can be believed, it was not so much his oratory that held his audiences, as his subject matter. The famous preachers of his day had been dealing in flowers of rhetoric and subtilties of dialectic, but ʿAbd al-Qādir preached of the love of God, and the message he gave was the message for which the people were hungering. In his School he seems to have dealt also with questions of jurisprudence and Qur'ānic exegesis, just as any head of a School would be expected to do, but the opinions on these matters quoted from him seem to be quite undistinguished. It was as a preacher and a Sufi that he was famous. His Sufi doctrine appears never to have been systematically worked out, but it can be gathered from his writings, particularly the *Ghunya* and the *Ghawthiyya,* as supplemented by his sermons.

M. Ali Aini has attempted a summary of his doctrine, utilizing sources both published and unpublished, among the latter the Stambul MS of the *Sirr al-Asrār*. The reviewer feels some doubts about this summary of doctrine, but judgment must be withheld until some of the sources used become available for study. One feels too that a great deal has yet to be done to decide what is genuinely the teaching of the Master, and what has been attributed to him. M. Ali Aini is inclined to accept as genuine everything that passes under his name, but with

regard to some of this one must confess to considerable scepticism. The Persian *Dīwān* in particular needs examination, but this must wait till we have a sound edition of the poems available.

'Abd al-Qādir was an important figure in the development of Dervishism; even as a legendary figure he represents certain Sufi ideals, and M. Ali Aini has done a notable service in bringing him anew to the attention of the West. That he is perhaps over enthusiastic for his hero is a pardonable fault. What is not pardonable is the form in which his work has been allowed to appear. The transliteration of Arabic names and words is appalling in its confusion, and it is rare to find a page that is not disfigured by the grossest typographical errors. The distance between author and printer may explain this, but does not excuse it. *Les grandes figures de l'Orient* have a right to a better presentation to the West than this.

ARTHUR JEFFERY

Columbia University

*The Pharisees: The Sociological Background of Their Faith.* By LOUIS FINKELSTEIN. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1938. xxviii + 793 pages. $5.00.

The sociological aspects of Pharisaism have intrigued many scholars ever since Abraham Geiger, followed by Wellhausen, detected the social background of the struggle between the aristocratic Sadducees and the middle-class Pharisees. Professor Finkelstein, on several previous occasions, has significantly contributed to the clarification of this problem. In an essay, "The Pharisees, Their Origin and Their Philosophy," (*Harvard Theological Review*, 1929), he has formulated a new approach to the understanding of the social mainsprings in the rise of Pharisaism, while in his biography, *Akiba: Scholar, Saint and Martyr* (New York, 1936) he has tested the validity of this approach on the example of the outstanding teacher of Pharisaism in its transition to Talmudism. The present work is the culmination of these studies, offering a most comprehensive examination of the extant sources in the light of the author's sociological interpretation. This well-written study will be found thought-provoking and illuminating, even by scholars who will not see their way clear towards an agreement with its fundamental thesis.

The author offers no clean-cut definition of Pharisaism. His treat-

ment oscillates between the examination of individual teachings emanating from the particular Pharisaic order of pietist scholars living during the Maccabean and Herodian age and the analysis of the broader aspects of Pharisaism. In the wider sense, Pharaism appears as the direct offshoot of ancient Israelitic prophecy, the foundation of Talmudism and medieval as well as modern Rabbinism, and even the basic source of both Christianity and Islam. "Pharisaism was Prophecy in action; the difference is merely one between denunciation and renunciation. The kinship is more than ideological, however; it derived from the very nature and essence of the groups, for the Pharisees were drawn from the same social classes as the earlier prophetic following itself. . . . Just as the impact of Prophecy on the market-place of Jerusalem created Pharisaism, so its impact on the market-place of London created Puritanism" (pp. xvi f.). This diversity in scope, involving a certain ambiguity in terminology, explains in part the wide range given to the present investigation. While the author refrains from examining the evolution of Pharisaism in its subsequent modifications by Talmudic and medieval Judaism, he examines the earlier history of Jewish religion and society with almost the same thoroughness as he does the socio-religious developments in Maccabean and Herodian Palestine. That is why entire chapters are devoted to pre-exilic and early post-exilic teachings and their social setting. If thus, incidentally, the author raises new sociological problems in the interpretation of Old Testament prophecy and religion, this is undoubtedly a gain which will easily compensate the reader for a certain lack of concentration on the main problem, the sociology of Pharisaism in its narrower sectarian area.

Finkelstein's main contention is that, sociologically speaking, the basic controversies between Pharisaism and Sadduceeism were but a reflection of the rural-urban conflict, "one of the few constants in the recorded history of civilization." More specifically, the Pharisees were recruited from the "plebeian" (A Weberian term) class of traders and artisans in Jerusalem, while the Sadducees derived their strength from the landowning aristocracy and the higher priesthood of the city. While this class division of the two groups has long been generally accepted, Finkelstein's novel attempt is to explain, on the basis of the different world outlook and social interests of the two groups, their respective positions in all matters of theology, ritual

and law. Realizing that many of these controversies had roots in earlier theological doctrines and ritualistic practices, he pursues that same line of reasoning back into the Old Testament religious evolution. There, however, he must take cognizance of two other groups, the farmers in the lowlands and the shepherds on the hills. It is, for example, to Ezekiel's early farming environment that he ascribes the crude anthropomorphisms of that prophet's visions (pp. 323 ff.). As a parallel, he cites the anthropomorphic excesses in certain Jewish writings of the early Muslim period, but fails to adduce any evidence that the latter, too, owed their origin to a Jewish peasant environment. In fact, such origin appears extremely unlikely, in view of the havoc increasingly played with Jewish farming by the discriminatory Muslim land taxes. Neither does he explain why the author of the *Book of Jubilees,* whose rural background is no more certain, is likewise guilty of extreme anthropomorphisms, at least with regard to angels. In fact, it was, in Finkelstein's opinion, the patrician landowners who insisted upon impersonal angels, whereas the urban plebeians refused to "impute to God the slaveholding which they considered an imperfection in human society," and hence conceived of angels as of animate and intelligent beings with a personality of their own (pp. 170 f., 178, 184). Finkelstein is able, on the other hand, to sidetrack the more thorough investigation of the socio-religious biases of the shepherd group, which, even for those scholars who do not subscribe to the alleged preponderance of the "nomadic ideals" in Israelitic prophecy, undoubtedly deserves considerable attention in any sociological treatment of the Hebrew Bible, by postulating an intrinsic affinity between the teachings inherent in a cattle-raising society and those emanating from city plebeians. He must, nevertheless, admit that there has existed at least a "tripartite division in the nation" with respect to such fundamental teachings as the idea of divine providence, of human equality, of religious universalism, and the idea of peace. "The plebeians of the city and the shepherd class demanded equality; the patricians denied it; while the peasantry, both rich gentry and the poorer farmers, were unaware of any struggle or difference" (p. 342). Thus the conflict really appears removed from the main arena of urban-rural antagonism to that of the accepted class struggle between opposing classes in Jerusalem.

This is but another illustration of the numerous inconsistencies

which necessarily affect an interpretation which tries to shackle the richness of life within the confines of a theory, however alluring. Such inconsistency comes even more clearly to the fore when Professor Finkelstein tries to indicate Pharisaism's outlook for the future. He is a firm believer in the vitality of Pharisaic teachings and their importance for the future evolution of mankind. He suggests that perhaps "the contribution of Pharisaism to the world, unique as it has been, is still incomplete; and that its most important influence on world thought is yet to be exerted" (p. 624). This may indicate that he believes in the further urbanization of mankind and the continued preponderance of the "plebeian" groups (i.e., democracy) for whom the Pharisaic ideals and attitudes might prove increasingly attractive. On the other hand, he clearly realizes the weaknesses of urban civilization. Quoting with approval Eduard Meyer's explanation of the collapse of ancient Rome, he senses that the new era of metropolitan life has generated many forces of destruction which threaten also the survival of our present civilization. He comforts the reader, therefore, by stating that "perhaps at such a time the ancient amalgam of urbanity and rusticity, the intellectual *rus in urbe* which formulated itself successively in the profoundly spiritual movements of Prophecy and Pharisaism, may be studied not only out of curiosity and historical interest, but also for guidance" (p. xxvii).

These few remarks can give only a faint idea of the complexity and richness of the problem raised, and of the fruitfulness of the solutions offered, by the author. If his attempt to explain a vast and powerful social and religious movement in terms of a single sociological category will necessarily appear one-sided, his brilliant and erudite marshalling of all evidence in favor of his theory undoubtedly will help elucidate innumerable obscure phases in the ancient Jewish religious history, shed new light on many controversial problems, and interpret, from new angles, a multitude of hitherto unexplored passages in the ancient letters. Through his significant contributions in an endless variety of detail, even more than through the arguments adduced in support of his major thesis, Dr. Finkelstein has greatly enriched the available scholarly literature on Judaism in a most crucial period of its historic evolution.

Salo W. Baron

Columbia University

*Law and Religion.* Edited by Erwin I. J. Rosenthal. (*Judaism and Christianity,* Volume III). London: The Sheldon Press, 1938. xiv + 248 pp. $5.00.

This collection of essays is the outgrowth of a course of lectures delivered under the auspices of the Semitics Department of Manchester University. It is a sequel to two previous collections dealing with the general problem of the relationship between Christianity and Judaism. Unlike these two prior collections, this third volume has a specific integration. It is concerned with the relationship subsisting between law and religion in these two cultures.

The necessity for dealing with this problem weighs heavily on some of the authors. Professor Robertson, for example, contributes an excellent brief picture of the Samaritan culture and the apologetic basis of Samaritan separatism, but has much difficulty in focusing any of this material on the question of law and religion. Whether for this, or another reason, there is nothing in this volume to compare with the brilliant essays by S. H. Hooke, in the first volume of the series.

Though H. Loewe's "Afterword" insists on the continuity of the essays in this volume, and "the unity of outlook of the lectures" (p. 236), to this reviewer the major weakness of the book was a disunity of outlook. The lecturers were not in agreement on their definition of law. Since this definition is fundamental to the work, it is apparent that, in many instances, different subjects are being discussed. All are agreed, however, that the development of law (as each defines law) is closely related to the evolution of religion. It is, perhaps, significant here that, in the foreword, the Archbishop of York, taking a somewhat humanitarian approach, insists on the topical nature of the discussion, showing how it involves questions of both sovereignty and justice. The sovereign, or the source of law, has the obligation to make law just. Justice in the Judaeo-Christian tradition involves the maintenance of the rights of the individual against the state of which he is a citizen. In totalitarian states, however, justice is defined as the interest of the State. The rights of the individual are outlawed; these states are, therefore, outside the tradition. On the theme of law itself, however, the foreword merely says, "The book helps to clarify . . . some elements in the idea of Law" (p. v).

Professor J. Murphy, in an interesting analysis of "Primitive Origins of Law in Relation to Religion," emphasizes the fact that law

has evolved and is evolving. The evolution, he claims, is in the direction of greater abstraction in the law, and greater concreteness in the definition of law-enforcing agencies. Thus he is able to show that, with the development of more complex social organization, law enforcement became the function of courts with appropriate machinery, and that the early codes, such as that of Hamurabi, represent attempts to stabilize primitive social relationships, but differ from modern codes in being collections of rules for specific cases rather than true codes, unified under general principles.

Principal H. Wheeler Robinson shows in great detail, with much profundity, how law in Israel was taken up into religion as a permanent quality. He emphasizes the distinction between the conception of Law as *Nomos,* as custom hardening into principle, and the Hebrew conception of law as *Torah,* as "direction or instruction, especially as given by God through priests and prophets" (p. 50). Further, both pedagogically and emotionally, he insists, Torah, law handed down by revelation, is superior to the ideal as developed by Greek philosophy, the law of nature. His contribution to the continuity of the volume comes in his presentation of the written law as necessarily temporary, and subject to re-interpretation by oral tradition.

The theme of re-interpretation is picked up by R. Travers Herford, in his "The Law and Pharisaism," which presents that sympathetic and learned approach to Pharisaism which readers of this author's books have come to appreciate. The opposite point of view, that Judaism (or Pharisaism) is mere legalism against which both Jesus and Paul crusaded, is presented by Professor T. W. Manson of Manchester in his "Jesus, Paul, and the Law." Manson is the only contributor to this volume whose work shows any trace of lack of scholarly balance, not because of his thesis, which is maintained by many, but because of his overemphatic presentation of the thesis. It is interesting to note that, in emphasizing the factor of love in Paul, Manson says of Paul what Herford asserts, and Manson denies, of the Pharisees: that the legalistic aspects have been unduly overemphasized by other critics.

Most interesting are the two concluding essays, the Editor's "Mediaeval Judaism and the Law" and Fr. Vincent McNabb's "The Scholastic Approach to the Law." Rosenthal's essay notes the key position of Maimonides in Jewish Law; McNabb's does as much for

Thomas Aquinas in Canon Law. Both are scholarly and temperate, both are thoroughly at home with their materials. There is a charm in McNabb's work which none of the other writers can match. This is due almost entirely to his devotion to Aquinas, who appears in the essay as truly very little lower than the angels.

On the whole, in spite of the defects noted, the book repays reading. There are a good many stimulating points of view represented, especially on topics which touch the central topic only casually. Certainly, the book shows that there is much to be gained from the collective approach to a common problem. If not the best in its series, this is a worthy member.

Joseph L. Blau

New York City

*St. Paul.* By Arthur Darby Nock. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1938. 255 pp. $2.00.

*St. Paul and the Church of the Gentiles.* By Wilfred L. Knox. Cambridge University Press: New York, The Macmillan Company, 1939. x + 261 pp. $4.00.

These two books have a certain connection, in the sense that the writer of the second acknowledges constant indebtedness to the author of the first. But on the surface they seem curiously interchanged in authorship. Dr. Nock is Frothingham Professor of the History of Religion at Harvard, and Father Knox is a member of an Anglican religious order; we should therefore expect from the former an erudite treatise and from the latter a definitely devotional work. On the contrary, however, the expert's volume is "popular" to the last degree, with few footnotes, only a brief bibliography and a minimal index; while Father Knox's treatise is of a nature to appal the tyro: the index of citations alone fills 17 pages and among these citations are listed—by actual count—376 from the works of Philo. Nor does this fully indicate the contrast. Dr. Nock's work moves, on the whole, well along "received" lines. His purpose, naturally, is to write history and history alone, but many of his pages could be used unchanged by the leader of a Bible class. Father Knox, on the other hand, seems to have made it his purpose to cut off from received lines as far as possible; Pauline theology, as he reconstructs it, bears no resemblance whatever to that of the traditional textbooks; frequently only specialists who have kept

up with the left wing of Pauline criticism will have the least idea of what he is talking about.

This fact perhaps needs a little explanation. Of recent years the Anglo-Catholic movement has split into two widely divergent tendencies. On the one hand, the older conservative tradition still has its vigorous champions, but it is now confronted with an equally vigorous group more or less corresponding to the Roman Catholic "Modernists" of a generation ago; these hold that history must be investigated with entire impartiality, and the results of historical study must be stated fearlessly, no matter how unpalatable they may appear. It is to this group that Father Knox belongs. In 1925, when he published *St. Paul and the Church of Jerusalem,* he was still meticulously careful to keep within conservative bounds, but in this second volume all external restraints have been cast aside.

To the Greeks Paul became a Greek that he might win the Greeks; specifically he recast his Jewish thinking into Hellenistic thought forms. In the Greco-Roman world of the day religious speculation held that the present world is essentially evil because it is a world of matter; to win salvation the soul must escape from it into the higher world of spirit. Here men are under the blind rule of necessity; a necessity dictated by the planets who are the true "world rulers" (astrology). If man is to escape their grasp he must be rescued by a higher deity, who has broken their power. This conception was so widespread as to be all but universal; Paul therefore adopted it and united it with Old Testament concepts.

In consequence, Paul assumed that God created Adam as a purely spiritual being. But Adam sinned, and his sin was a "fall." Not merely a moral fall but a literal fall as well; a fall out of the realm of spirit into the realm of matter. As a consequence of his sin he acquired a material body and became subject to the planetary "world rulers" (a term mistranslated in Galatians and Colossians as "rudiments"). So he—and necessarily all his descendants as well—were doomed to death. For the Jews an even worse fate was reserved. They were given the Law, accepted it and were bound to fulfil its Draconic requirements under penalty of its curse. And this curse fell upon them all; their fallen condition led them into perpetual breaches of the Law, whose ideals were too high for "flesh" to attain.

So Paul translated man's misery into Greek terms. How—still in

these terms—could redemption be achieved? The redemption was wrought by Christ, who descended from on high into the world ruled by the planets. If they had known him, they would have shrunk from him in terror; he therefore disguised himself in his descent and on earth took a material body in which they could not recognize him. His ministry aroused their hostility and they crucified him—and in so doing wrought their own ruin. By leaving his body in their hands he satisfied their claims on man; his resurrection and ascension took him—and all who believe on him—out of their power forever. And so the effects of Adam's sin were reversed.

This reconstruction of Paulinism will leave many readers aghast. If this is what the Pauline theology really means, what message can it possibly have for the twentieth century? But, of course, this is not the question; present-day utility is no criterion of historical fact. So the proper question is: Did Paul really teach this purely first-century "gnostic" system?

He did not. Despite all Father Knox's erudition and skill, his book suffers from a grave defect: the constant premise is that Paul was a speculative thinker of the highest logical rigor. And Paul was nothing of the sort. He was a man dominated by an inconceivable religious experience, who sought words to express that experience and, in his search, used any terms that came to hand at the moment. Consistency never troubled him; in Romans the Law is given by God, in Galatians it is given by the world-rulers; in Romans 2 men have the light of their conscience, in Romans 3 fallen man is hopelessly corrupt; in Romans 2 Jews are blamed for thinking moral defects can be negatived by religious orthodoxy, in I Corinthians 11 Christians are told that God judges their sins more leniently than those of the "world." Father Knox is perfectly right in noting that the apostle often uses Greek terms that can be understood only when the Greek concepts are known. In Galatians and Colossians the "world-rulers" certainly appear; Romans 8:38 is taken straight from the language of astrology; I Corinthians 2:8 has nothing to do with Caiaphas and Pontius Pilate, but is concerned wholly with hostile "angelic" powers. All this has long been recognized by specialists and is properly evaluated in, e.g., Dr. G. S. Duncan's *Galatians*. But to take such passages as basic, and to wrest everything else in Paul until it accords with them, is the method of Procustes.

Nor is this all. Father Knox seeks to corroborate his results by arguing that the Hellenistic concepts had obtained a foothold in Judaism before Paul's day. He makes this assertion—to take the most critical instance—of Adam's fall as a fall into matter on pages 98-99: "Judaism had already [so] interpreted the fall of Adam." But examination of the references discloses that "Judaism" reduces to Philo alone—Philo, who stood entirely by himself, and whose influence on Judaism proper was non-existent. Yet, as a matter of fact, even Philo is incorrectly cited. Only two citations are given from the entire Philonic corpus; both are given in a paraphrase in which the cruicial word is inserted by Father Knox; and consultation of the original reveals that Philo is not talking about the fall of Adam at all! In point of fact, the doctrine that matter is inherently evil is a doctrine that neither Paul, Philo nor any other Jew could hold in the face of Genesis 1, especially vs. 31: "God saw all things that he had made and, behold, they were very good." It is for this reason that Judaism alone among the first-century religions escaped the struggle with gnosticism; apostate Jews (Simon Magus, Menander, etc.) might become gnostics, but a true Jewish gnosticism did not and could not exist.

All this does not mean that Father Knox's book has not real utility. But it should be used only by students who are in a position to check the references and evaluate them; where this is impracticable the volume should be left to those capable of weighing it judiciously. To specialists it will be indispensable, if only for the immense amount of information it makes accessible, information available nowhere else.

Dr. Nock's book, on the other hand, is trustworthy to the last degree. On certain points, naturally, specialists differ and will continue to differ to the end of time. He returns to the "North Galatian" theory, for instance, is chary about ascribing Colossians to Ephesus, and is quite positive that Philippians was written from Rome; some of us will dissent from these positions, and yet Dr. Nock may be perfectly right on them all. The amount of research that lies behind these pages is stupendous, and the reader may rest assured that every scrap of available evidence has been weighed before each sentence was written.

Burton Scott Easton

General Theological Seminary

*Medieval Number Symbolism; Its Sources, Meaning, and Influence on Thought and Expression.* By VINCENT FOSTER HOPPER. (Columbia University Studies in English and Comparative Literature, Number 132.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1938. xii + 241 pp. $2.90.

The theme to which Dante scholarship recurs again and again is that one can read, in epitome, in Dante's works the whole history of human culture to the thirteenth century. There is just enough basis of truth in this assertion to justify the obsession of these otherwise sober men of judgment.

Perhaps the most precious of the works resulting from this treatment of Dante as the repository of all knowledge and the expositor of all systems is the undeniably brilliant study by Karl Vossler. Though published in German as *Die goettliche Komoedie*, in English translation Vossler's work was given the far more general and more symptomatic title, *Mediaeval Culture: An Introduction to Dante and His Times*. In the preface to the English translation, Vossler suggests that "Dante sums up so many sides of his own age, and the study of his background carries us over so wide a field, that a work such as this may very well serve as a gateway to the study of mediaeval culture in all its manifold activities. The implication of the title and the treatment is, however, the reverse of this. For they suggest that the study of medieval culture should serve as the gateway to the study of Dante.

Dr. Hopper's *Medieval Number Symbolism* is conceived and executed in the manner of Vossler's more profound and more comprehensive work. It elaborates one phase of Dante's background and work which received only slight attention on the vaster canvas of Vossler. In the first two-thirds of the book, the author treats briefly "elementary" number symbolism, or those recurrent types of symbolic interpretations on which there is unanimity in all ages and climes, astrological number symbolism among the Egyptians and Babylonians, the Pythagorean number theory, number among the Gnostics and the early Christian writers, and medieval number philosophy. The remaining third is devoted to the discovery and analysis of the elements of number symbolism in Dante. An appendix deals in random fashion

with the number symbolism of northern paganism, which had no influence in the formation of Dante's number philosophy.

The details of all these systems are sketched in rapid strokes, with rather less depth than the title leads one to expect. While recognizing that "in many minds the symbolic implications of number had come to be regarded as realities, indisputable and final" (p. 111), the author suggests that often the use of traditional numbers in the Middle Ages is due to delight in the numbers as traditional, rather than to their symbolism. There is an inconsistency here which can be duplicated too frequently in the book; if the symbolic implications of a number had come to be regarded as realities, then the use of the number is to state the realities, rather than to voice some vague delight in tradition.

In medieval number philosophy, the most important figure is that of Joachim of Flora, who became, later, the inspiration of much Franciscan study and elaboration. Despite the comparative brevity of Vossler's treatment of number, he finds space to present Joachim in something like his full stature. Dr. Hopper, however, with fewer limitations of space, fails to indicate the importance of Joachim, and thus vitiates the historical basis of his treatment of medieval number philosophy.

Readers of this *Review* will feel that Dr. Hopper has understated the importance of religious conditions in the development of number symbolism in Babylonia and Egypt by his emphasis on the astrological significance of this development. Thus, when number symbolism appears in the Christian tradition as a vehicle of religious thought, it must be presented as a novelty, rather than as a religious device with many historical analogies.

It is unfortunate, too, that, in dealing with both Gnostic and Cabalistic number symbolism, Dr. Hopper uses sources which are suspect because of their theosophical authorship. The chief source of Gnostic number symbolism is the *Pistis Sophia;* the edition of G.R.S. Mead, which the author used, is tinged with expressions which anticipate Mead's own theosophical position, and is distinctly inferior to G. Horner's later and more accurate translation. In dealing with Cabalism, the author used as his source Macgregor Mather's *Kabbalah Unveiled,* a theosophist's translation from a Latin version of seventeenth century Christian Cabalistic number speculation, when there is

available an excellent and reliable recent translation of the *Zohar*.

The body of the text is free from minor inaccuracies; there are, however, several names misspelled in the Bibliography. In brief, this work has value as a survey of number symbolism, but cannot be trusted as a complete guide to the subject.

JOSEPH L. BLAU

New York City

*The Crusades in the Later Middle Ages.* By AZIZ SURYAL ATIYA. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1938. xvi + 603 pp. with maps, plans and seven illustrations. 30*s*.

In a sense this book may be considered as an Appendix to our commonly accepted works on the Crusades, but it is a lengthy, solid and important Appendix, which will yield much interest to the student of the Middle Ages, and the intercourse during the later Middle Ages between the West and the East. We usually count the Crusades as seven, and think of the crusading movement as coming to an end in 1291, when, after the fall of Acre, the Latin dominion in the Holy Land came to an end. In a sense we are justified in this limitation, for the spectacular series of Crusades did end with the Seventh. The crusading movement, however, did not. Right through the fourteenth century and along into the fifteenth, the preaching of Crusades went on in Europe, and expeditions continued to be fitted out to proceed to the East against the Muslim kingdoms, until, after the Turkish conquest of Constantinople, the counter-crusades of the Turkish Sultans finally put an end to the movement.

In recent years much new material, both Western and Oriental, regarding these later crusading movements has been made available, and notable monographs on individual leaders in these various ventures, have appeared. Dr. Atiya, however, has attempted the more ambitious project of a general survey of the whole of this period of the later Crusades, picturing for us the European world of the fourteenth century and the situations out of which the individual movements grew; analysing with unusual ability the works of propaganda which appeared during this period to urge on the Church and the Princes the necessity of further Crusades; giving us also the other side of the picture, the Eastern world against which the Crusades were directed, and where the Churches of Eastern Christendom were living under

Muslim domination and suffered as much, if not more, from the Crusaders than the Muslims themselves; and finally describing, with as much detail as the limits of his space would allow, each crusading expedition, up to the final disaster at Nicopolis, and their aftermaths in the fifteenth century.

Dr. Atiya has the unusual qualification of being himself an Oriental who handles the Oriental sources with as great facility as he does the Western, and who can look at many of the questions concerning these movements from the point of view of the East, a point of view not easily obtained by even the best equipped Western scholar. On the other hand he has been trained in modern scientific method, so that in his work the sources are assembled and classified and appraised with skill and judgment, and the carefully documented study based on this material is a notable contribution to our knowledge of a little explored period in the history of the relations between Europe and the Near East.

The account is clearly and easily written, though perhaps in places a little too overloaded with detail to let the picture always stand out vividly before us. The detail, however, has the advantage of making accessible to us a mass of information about persons and places and events which otherwise would be hard to come at. For this reason also the Appendices are particularly valuable, especially Appendix II on "Pilgrims and Travellers," which gives a chronological list of those known from 1274 to the end of the fifteenth century, with the necessary bibliographical indications, and the detailed Bibliography of thirty-two pages, which is an invaluable inventory of both the source material, whether in manuscript or in print, and the relevant modern literature dealing with the period. The labor involved in hunting out much of this source material in libraries in Europe and the East has been immense, and it is no small attainment to have so thoroughly digested this material as to be able to produce a well-balanced account of the whole. In some instances the author has even journeyed to the sites of important events in his chronicle, in order to check accounts in the sources by actual knowledge of the topography of the sites.

Occasionally one feels that, with his eye on the Muslim community in the Near East among whom he has to live, he has been unduly enthusiastic in his accounts of the prowess and praiseworthiness of the Sultans and their peoples, and skipped very softly over passages which

give an unfavorable impression of Islam. But, on the other hand, it is probably true that Western writers have often erred in the opposite direction. One thing he has shown conclusively is that, though there were many factors at work leading to the failure of these Crusades, one decisive element in their failure was the fact that the Crusaders went out to meet the Muslim armies in the belief that they were a disorderly, disorganized, uncouth mob of miscreants, whereas they met with trained and disciplined troops every whit as well prepared as themselves, and believing on their side that they were fighting a Holy War against an aggressive mob of infidels. The Christians were also deceived in their persuasion that their cumbrous fighting armor would serve them under the climatic conditions of the East, and in their expectation that their mixed horde, so divided in its command and so far from its homes, could hold anything that its valor might conquer. The saddest feature in all their failure, however, is that over and over again they were betrayed to the enemy by one or other of the Italian Republics, who would unashamedly betray them to the Sultans in return for trade privileges in the East.

The religious note runs right through the story of these later Crusades, as it did that of the earlier. It was the Holy Land which was the goal of their endeavors, however often they might get turned aside to some more immediate objective. It is thus the sadder to be reminded that the subjection or rooting out of the Eastern Churches was often only a little less prominent in their plans than the freeing of the Holy Land from the infidels, and proved no unimportant factor in their failure. Rome dominates the picture, and to many the most interesting sections of the book will be those where the author analyses the propaganda literature that grew up during this period and sheds a flood of light on the attitude of the Church to Islam.

Not the least interesting feature of the book is its illustrations taken from contemporary manuscripts. The work attains a high standard of accuracy in its references and has been very carefully prepared for and seen through the press. After such careful and painstaking work on this survey, let us hope that the author will give us yet further fruits of his labor by editing for us some of the important Oriental sources to which his study of this period has led him.

ARTHUR JEFFERY

Columbia University

ΚΥΡΙΛΛΟΣ Ο ΛΟΥΚΑΡΙΣ (1572-1638). *Kyrillos Loukaris (1572-1638).* Volume issued on the three hundredth anniversary of his death (1638-1938) by the Society of Cretan Studies and the Council of Mediaeval Studies. Athens, 1939, 214 pp.

The three hundredth anniversary of the death of Kyrillos Loukaris, seven times Patriarch of Constantinople between 1620 and 1638, passed almost unnoticed in the West, but in Greece this beautiful and learned volume was issued as the crowning point of the commemoration of the great Patriarch. Whatever may have been the faults of the man, we must recognize him as the outstanding representative of Greek thought in the seventeenth century, and a figure who for good or ill played an important part in the theological and historical developments in the east of Europe.

The articles included in the volume are of varying importance. They are: a letter of Nikolaos, Patriarch of Alexandria; a biographical study by Adamantios N. Diamantopoulos; an article on Loukaris' service as Patriarch of Alexandria, by Iezekiel, Metropolitan of Thessaliotis and Phanariophersala; a joint letter from the Monks of Sinai and Loukaris; letters of Loukaris on the Monasteries of Vatopedion and Mauros Molos; an article on the last years and death of the Patriarch by Georgios Io. Arvanitides; and a description of his burial place, the Monastery of St. Andrew, by Manouel Io. Gedeon. Of these the biography and the article on the death of the Patriarch are the most important. The second, indeed, forms over half of the volume, and is an exceedingly careful study of the mysterious conspiracy which finally ended the career of the Patriarch.

The influence and work of Kyrillos Loukaris extended for beyond the Greek world. As a young man, he was sent by Meletios Pigas, the then Patriarch, to Poland, and he was for a while the director of the Orthodox School in Wilno. He was present at the Council of Brest Litovsk in 1596, where he sought with Prince Ostrozsky to prevent the establishment of the Unia in the Orthodox dioceses of Poland, and for his pains he was compelled to flee in 1597. He apparently maintained his interest in the Cossacks to the end of his life, and one of the most common attacks upon him was the accusation that he was encouraging them to ravage the Ottoman Empire.

His stay in Poland probably increased his antagonism to the Jesuits and the Roman Catholic Church, and his work as Patriarch of both

Alexandria and Constantinople was largely connected with his efforts to prevent the growth of Roman Catholic methods of thinking in the Orthodox Church. This brought him into sharp conflict with the Ambassadors of France and Austria at Constantinople, as well as with the Jesuits, Capuchins, and other orders. Curiously enough, his relations with the Ambassador of Venice seemed quite friendly, largely because of a feud between the Franciscans, whom the Venetians favored, and the Jesuits. All this did not prevent the appearance of documents attributed to him and extremely pro-Roman. These were probably spurious in the opinion of the authors of this work, and we may well believe it.

For his support Kyrillos came to rely on the Ambassadors of England, especially Sir Thomas Roe, and of Holland, Cornelius Haga. As a result, he was accused first of Lutheran and later of Calvinistic tendencies. In 1629 there appeared ascribed to him a Confession of Faith with extreme Calvinistic statements. Mr. Diamantopoulos connects this with the name of Antony Leger, a secretary of the Dutch Embassy, who worked hard for a union of the Orthodox and Calvinist Churches. It is hard to believe that Kyrillos wrote this Confession. He was far too clever a diplomat and too sincere a theologian to do such a thing, and many of his actions easily refute the charges of extreme Calvinism.

At the same time, the explanations given in this volume are too easy. Orthodox theological thought was extremely stereotyped after the capture of Constantinople by the Turks. The renewed activity in the West connected with the Counter-reformation and the rise of Protestantism reacted strongly upon the oppressed Christians of the East. At the end of the century the Council of Bethlehem, and before that the Confession of Peter Mogila, both strongly Orthodox, tended to graft upon Orthodox thought a scholastic character. This has never yet been properly studied and evaluated. At the same time there was a definite Protestant influence on the mode of thinking of other ecclesiastics. It is fair to presume that Kyrillos, with his many friends in England and in Holland, belonged to this tendency but it is yet to be proved, if the Confession is regarded as spurious, whether his thought went beyond the permitted bounds of Greek Orthodox theology. Apparently it did not, but the authors have not treated this phase of the work of Kyrillos satisfactorily. One and all, they have

relied upon the opposition of the Patriarch to the more extreme forms of Calvinism, and they have not studied the details of his efforts to introduce a printing press into Constantinople, to send young men to Protestant countries to be educated, and to adapt the Church to the necessities of the time.

On the other hand, the study of the death of the Patriarch by Mr. Arvanitides is most carefully done. It shows the involved chain of events by which the final conspiracy was carried through, and the patriarch deposed, arrested, and murdered. Many details are still not clear. We do not even know the precise dates, owing to the confusion of Old and New Style in the various accounts. However, from the scholarly point of view, this is the most valuable article in the volume.

We can well welcome this contribution to the history of Kyrillos Loukaris. It is a monument to Greek scholarship. There may seem too great an animus against the Roman Catholic Church in some paragraphs, but the history of the intrigues of the day do not make nice reading. Perhaps from the standpoint of the diplomats, Kyrillos was an important figure in an international intrigue, a diplomatic duel, the like of which is still going on in 1939. With some variation the same charges are being hurled at every outstanding ecclesiastic today. After the World War, Meletios, Metropolitan of Athens, later Patriarch of Constantinople and then of Alexandria, at one moment was only saved by the British from the same fate as befell Loukaris. The East knows too much of history, and it cannot fail to show it in such a work. At the same time, we have here a valuable study, and we can only hope that Western scholarship will take this and similar works into consideration, when it tries to present a picture of the centuries after the fall of Constantinople.

CLARENCE A. MANNING

Columbia University

*Jedidiah Morse: A Champion of New England Orthodoxy*. By JAMES KING MORSE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939, ix + 180 pp. $2.50.

The student of New England religious history will find in this interesting monograph an objective and scholarly study of the part played by the Reverend Jedidiah Morse, of Charlestown, Massachusetts, in the bitter controversy over Unitarianism which finally split the Con-

gregational Church in the early years of the nineteenth century. The study is not intended to be a complete history of that famous controversy, nor does it enter extensively into the currents of contemporary thought which produced the Unitarian movement. It is primarily concerned with the leadership of Morse in the conservative reaction against the rising tide of liberalism within the Church.

In the Unitarian controversy, Morse, as the author points out, became the outstanding "Champion of New England Orthodoxy." That the Charlestown minister should have assumed such a role was due, not only to the fact that he clung tenaciously to the orthodox Congregationalism which his Connecticut background and Yale College had given him and resented what he regarded as an insidious attack upon "the faith of the fathers," but equally to the fact that he was a controversialist of no mean ability. Moreover, while Morse was not naturally a trouble maker, he was inclined to be distinctly sensitive where his interests and opinions were involved and somewhat contentious, with an impetuosity which sometimes precipitated quarrels that might possibly have been avoided. At the same time he possessed no little organizing ability, and a persistence in attaining his ends little short of remarkable.

That such a man, settled over the Charlestown Church in 1789, would have doctrinal difficulties with the neighboring clergy was inevitable, for "liberal views" were making marked headway in many of the Congregational churches of eastern Massachusetts, due to the increase of wealth and luxury, as well as the broadening cultural contacts of the region. The wealthy, "the wise and the good" of the coastal towns, indeed, were rapidly losing their interest in Calvinism, and turning more and more to what, in time, was to be called Unitarianism. That these "liberal" churches should have persisted in remaining within the Congregational fold was due partly to the gradual nature of the changes taking place, partly to the reluctance of the congregations concerned to break with the historic church, and even more, perhaps, to the lack of any ecclesiastical authority in Massachusetts Congregationalism to do anything about it.

At the moment of his settlement in Charlestown, Morse does not seem to have been aware of the anomalous situation which existed in the churches about Boston. It was, however, soon called to his attention, and, after giving the matter serious thought, he deemed it his

duty to rally to the defense of New England orthodoxy. This he did in the first instance through a vigorous public defense of the doctrines chiefly concerned, notably those of the Trinity and the Divinity of Christ. At the same time he did his best to bring about a closer relationship between Massachusetts Congregationalism and the Presbyterian General Assembly; for, like most Connecticut Congregationalists, Morse was strongly imbued with Presbyterianism, and undoubtedly hoped through the Presbyterian influence to check the tide of error he saw rising about him. Making little headway along these lines, he next seized upon his discovery of the Bavarian Illuminati, in part at least, to unite the Church against the insidious encroachment of scepticism and infidelity. And out of this unity he no doubt hoped might come also further consideration of the dangerous progress of "liberal view" within the church. Unfortunately, Morse plunged with more zeal than discretion into this curious business of the Illuminati, and his ultimate failure to satisfactorily prove the actual existence of any lodges of the order in the United States resulted in his serious discomfiture.

The death of Dr. David Tappan, Hollis Professor of Divinity at Harvard, in 1803, finally precipitated a controversy which definitely brought the quarrel between the Liberals and Orthodox into the open. In the acrimonious discussion as to who should be Tappan's successor, Morse, a member of the Harvard Board of Overseers, played a vigorous part, for he was thoroughly convinced that the capture of Harvard by the Liberals might well prove disastrous to the orthodox cause. Despite his efforts, and those of his friends, however, the Liberals triumphed, and the Rev. Henry Ware of liberal proclivities became the Hollis Professor. It was a bitter blow, and one which convinced Morse that more aggressive measures were necessary to combat the further spread of liberalism. The result was, first, the establishment of a militantly orthodox religious paper, the *Panoplist*, and even more important, the creation of an orthodox theological seminary at Andover. In both of these efforts Jedidiah Morse played a leading part, and in the latter, as the author points out, displayed marked ability in compromising the varying shades of orthodoxy, although not without some embarrassment to his own convictions. In the founding of the Park Street Church in Boston as a further bulwark of orthodoxy, Morse was also very influential.

The outcome of this strong conservative reaction was greatly to widen the breach between liberalism and orthodoxy, although the Liberals still remained within the church. The inconsistency of this position Morse finally exposed, in 1815, when it was called to his attention that a portion of Thomas Belsham's *Life of Theophilus Lindsey* was devoted to a particularly frank discussion of the rise of American Unitarianism in the Congregational churches about Boston. This portion of Belsham's work he published in pamphlet form at his own expense. An able review of the pamphlet which followed in the *Panoplist*, June, 1815, not only called emphatic attention to the identity of the American Liberals with the English Unitarians, but went on to denounce the refusal of the Liberals to admit their Unitarian opinions and call for separation. The Unitarian pamphlet was Morse's culminating attack by which, says Dr. Morse, "he felt he achieved part of his life purpose of 'preserving the faith once delivered to the saints' in exposing its hidden enemies." The by-product of separation which actually followed a few years later "he reluctantly accepted as one of the inevitable consequences." Thus, largely through his own persistent efforts, Jedidiah Morse purged the Congregational Church of Unitarianism, and for a time, at least, gave new life and vitality to New England orthodoxy. For a time, only, however, for the liberal thought of the nineteenth century in the end was to prove too much for even Jedidiah Morse's moderate Calvinism.

As the outstanding champion of the orthodox cause, Morse was naturally a shining target for his opponents and he suffered accordingly. In the bitter personalities of the controversy he was not only denounced as bigoted, illiberal, insincere and unchristian, but several rather uncalled for efforts were made to injure his reputation as geographer and historian. Even more unfortunate was the dissension created within his own church, which finally resulted in the exodus of the Liberals in 1816, and in his own resignation in 1819, after thirty years of service. This was a bitter end to a pastorate which had begun so happily, but at least he could retire from the field with the conviction that for orthodox Congregationalism he had fought a good fight. The remaining years of his life were spent as United States Commissioner to the Indian Tribes and in peaceful retirement in his beloved New Haven. He died in 1826.

Dr. Morse has based his monograph on a thorough and careful study

of the available sources, including the recently acquired Jedidiah Morse papers in the Yale University Library. The organization of the study is excellent, and the presentation of the material clear and convincing. Furthermore, the book is good reading. Of the several chapters the most interesting are those dealing with Morse's position in the Boston environment, the Harvard controversy, the founding of Andover and the final split in the Congregational Fellowship. Not quite so satisfactory is the chapter dealing with the Illuminati. Here the effort to separate the religious from the political motives which weighed with Morse, as well as the briefness of the treatment, leaves the reader a bit puzzled to know what it was all about. The weakest feature of the study to the reviewer, however, lies in its failure to bring out a well-rounded picture of Morse. This was, perhaps, inevitable, owing to the limits of the study, but it should be kept in mind that Jedidiah Morse was much more than a somewhat contentious "Champion of New England Orthodoxy." Quite apart from the Unitarian controversy, his religious interests were extensive and important, particularly his enthusiastic support of domestic and foreign missions, his solicitude for the religious welfare of the Indian population, and his efforts in behalf of the early Bible and Tract societies. Into these various interests, as well as into a number of other worthy philanthropies, went much of the income derived from the sale of his famous geographies. Moreover, Morse was one of the outstanding literary figures of his day, his geographical works which earned for him the title of "Father of American Geography," giving him an international reputation enjoyed by few of his contemporaries on this side of the Atlantic. All in all Jedidiah Morse was one of the most interesting figures of his times, and one who should be remembered. And to this end Dr. Morse's book makes a distinct contribution.

W. R. Waterman

Dartmouth College

*The Modern Movement in American Theology: Sketches in the History of American Protestant Thought from the Civil War to the World War.* By Frank Hugh Foster. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1939. 219 pp. $1.75.

Liberal Protestant theology needs historical interpretation as a stabilizing and guiding factor in its present confusion. Here in Professor

Foster's posthumously published lectures, given at Andover Newton Seminary in 1934, is a history of the American phase of the movement.

Focusing his attention for the most part on the Congregational, Baptist, and Christian denominations, Foster traces the development of modern liberalism in theology from its beginnings in criticism of Calvinist eschatology down to the present "era of confusion." Bushnell's general theory of human nature and of Christ's work had already had great influence before the idea of evolution forced theologians to even more thorough-going restatements of the nature of God, man, and salvation. Revealed theology was adjusted to a new natural theology in the work of Beecher and Abbott. Reluctantly the liberals yielded to the results of biblical criticism, never fully accepting its implications. Three main lines of divergence can be traced in the closing years of the last century: the exploration of Christian experience as the subject matter of theology and the basis of apologetics in the work of Lewis French Stearns; the personalistic value theology of Henry C. King stemming from the Ritschlian influence; and the recasting of natural theology on the basis of a biological interpretation of nature in the work of Newman Smyth. Foster includes his own thought in a final chapter on the radical thinkers who went beyond liberalism in discarding supernaturalism and non-empirical theological speculation.

The exposition is a model of clarity and simplicity. Usefulness of the book is increased by the author's reliance on extended and carefully selected quotations to summarize the main positions. Lesser known but important figures such as Munger, Whiton, Paine are included along with the well-known leaders. Since there is no attempt at a complete survey one cannot quarrel with omissions. Yet it is regrettable that there is no treatment of the theology of the Kingdom of God, the social gospel so characteristic of the movement. We must raise the question whether this liberalism can be understood at all apart from the cultural setting and social issues amidst which it grew.

This is a critical history with an attempt to show the sources of the movement, its achievements and deficiencies, and to point the way present theology should go.

As to sources Foster interprets this liberalism as the inevitable dialectical development of a modified Calvinism attempting to incorpo-

rate the theory of evolution, results of historical criticism, and the extension of experimental method to psychology and sociology. We immediately ask if this is not to over-intellectualize the roots of liberalism. Its real heart was a changed doctrine of man, influenced to be sure by evolution and scientific method, but not dependent on them. The more optimistic doctrine of man must be understood in the light of the expansion of western civilization with its concept of social progress. Is not the key to Gladden's theology, for example, to be found in his concern for social reform? Darwinism might have been fitted into Calvinism. Is all depends on the point of view.

Two glaring and related deficiencies appear in this liberalism, according to Foster. The thinkers were too conservative and they lacked critical power. Both conservatism and confusion appear in the treatment of the Trinity, miracles, person of Christ, and biblical criticism. Theologians held on to an out-grown supernaturalism with bad logic, and bad scriptural exegesis, covered over with emotion and rhetoric. Liberalism has yet to produce a frank and thorough treatment of the problem of miracles and the doctrine of Scripture. In attacking this vagueness and equivocation Foster wields an effective critical weapon. However, to call a thinker conservative is hardly adequate criticism. More credit should be given the liberals for preserving an emphasis on human and ethical values at a time when science was de-humanizing nature. Supernaturalism had its values when nature was conceived in terms of Darwinian biology and Herbert Spencer's metaphysics.

Undoubtedly, clinging to supernaturalism has had serious results. The force of the following statement of Foster's cannot be questioned, though it does seem a little hard on the Unitarians: "There has been a long line of men who have silently gone over to the Unitarian body, or entered business or teaching, or have been found in chairs of philosophy in universities, whose original purpose it was to preach the Gospel" (p. 188).

What then should Christian theology do? Foster's suggestions are scattered and somewhat inconsistent. Most frequently he urges the revision of theology on the basis of "pure reason" (pp. 50, 76, 94, 153). One wonders where to find this pure reason, this absolutely harmonious truth. On a later page Foster says that Christian theology is the explanation and justification of Christian experience, certainly a

different position (p. 211). On the whole, he suggests a theology fully accepting naturalistic metaphysics, and an empirico-rational epistemology, surrendering, for example, the divinity as well as the deity of Jesus, but acknowledging him as the master in religion (pp. 207-10).

Foster's judgment of Andover liberalism as depending on a conservative use of dogma and ecclesiastical tradition appears to me incorrect. Egbert C. Smyth, the only Andover theologian with which Foster deals, was a church historian and did emphasize the importance of dogma more than his colleagues. Yet even Smyth sought a return to "primitive Christianity" which was to be known and tested by present Christian experience. See, for example, his lecture "From Lessing to Schleiermacher or from Rationalism to Faith" in the Boston Lectures on Christianity and Skepticism, 1870. Foster relies too much on an early Andover work, *Progressive Orthodoxy*, for interpretation of the school. Positions of this book were substantially abandoned in later Andover writings.

Presumably this is the last work Professor Foster left, and a remark about his own distinguished career is in order. He began this theological thinking deeply entrenched in the New England theology of Taylor and Park. During the writing of its history he broke with it and began the painful search for a new orientation. He arrived finally at a radical position far beyond the liberal movement, the history of which he also sketched. Here was an open and courageous mind, deeply sensitive to the scientific thought of the modern world. To the end his mind was moving. He shared the current disillusionment with the optimistic liberal doctrine of man, as the conclusion of the present volume shows. The plea of this book is for an advance of Christian theology to harmonize with scientific naturalism. If this does not take place, the apparent alternatives are, first, a return to non-rational mysticism and supernaturalism, and second, the possibility that an increasing number of those who start out to preach the Gospel will turn to "business or teaching." As a critical historian of American theology Professor Foster tried to show how and why these latter alternatives should be prevented. That is his outstanding service to Christian theology.

Daniel D. Williams

Chicago Theological Seminary

*The Conception of the Church in the Writings and Life of the German-English Philosopher Baron von Hügel: A Contribution to the Sociology of Religion.* By RICHARD S. EMRICH. Munich: Ernst Reinhardt, 1939, 52 pp. RM 2.50.

This little book on a big subject, with its top-heavy title of a German doctoral dissertation, provides an admirable summary of von Hügel's ideas of the place of the institutional and of the Church in religion.

The one-page introduction seizes the dominant quality of the Baron's thought: "many-sided, rich, and quiet," the necessary counterpart of the "one-sided, passionate, and incomplete" spirit of prophets and reformers. "His name, with that of Augustine and Aquinas, must be associated with that type of synthetic thinker whose attitude is characterized by the words 'Fulness,' 'Completeness,' 'Inclusiveness' and 'Unity Based on Complexity.' "

Chapter 1 illustrates these qualities in von Hügel's general conception of religion and in his own religious training and development. Dr. Emrich does not go out of his way to question the adequacy of the Baron's convenient distinction of the institutional, the intellectual, and the mystical elements in religion. Despite a wealth of lively and illuminating detail, which only scholarly acquaintance with von Hügel's life and work could furnish, the pamphlet is a general exposition rather than a minutely critical analysis.

Chapter 2 discusses the institutional element from the point of view of its historical service and of the social character of religion. Chapter 3 sets forth the value and the indispensability of the sensuous and the material in a spiritual religion. The repulsiveness, the attractiveness, and the dangers of organization and authority in religion, and the friction between the individual and the institution are the themes of Chapter 4.

Up to this point, the subject has been the institutional in religion—"the necessity, inevitability, value, and difficulty of religious institutions in general." This remains true despite the fact that, throughout the discussion, much that was said about the institutional was applicable primarily to the Christian Church. Chapter 5 turns directly to the Church as it appeared to von Hügel in the New Testament and in later history. And it goes straight to the Catholic conception of the Church, as, in his opinion, best embodying the principles of organiza-

tion, authority, and sense that were previously found to be essential to the institutional in religion.

So far, as Dr. Emrich remarks, we have not gone beyond a position "which any of the great Catholic Churches outside of the Roman Church could accept." Von Hügel, however, rejoiced to be "a child of the Confessional," "a son of the great Roman Church"—a devout thinker suspected of heresy and fearful of excommunication, a vivid example of an individual enriching and chastening an institution and, in "fruitful tension," enriched and chastened by it. All that is necessary and desirable in the institutional von Hügel discovered (according to the sixth and last chapter) in the Roman Church. There he found a unity and an appreciation of the supernatural too faintly evident elsewhere. And there he found unity pushed to an extreme and misdirected to temporal ends, and appreciation of the supernatural too often crowding out appreciation of nature, science, and "secular" sources of truth. He understood how some could ask, "Is there truth outside the Church?" And he understood how others could answer, "Is there truth within it?"

Dr. Emrich's brief, selected bibliography contains no mention of von Hügel's earliest book (though not published in book form until 1930) called *Some Notes on the Petrine Claims*, or of Loisy's perversely penetrating *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire religieuse de notre temps*. Meditation on those volumes might well have led him to expound von Hügel's conception of papal infallibility, a conception he scarcely refers to, though it is hardly inappropriate to his chapter on von Hügel and Rome.

About the only important place where Dr. Emrich seems inclined to disagree with von Hügel occurs in connection with the latter's attitude towards abuses of the institutional. "It is . . . a true insight when anti-institutional Christians see and fear that organization and authority may become ends in themselves and bring death to the spirit. And it is faced with the actuality of life that von Hügel's ideal breaks down, for the prophet in most cases is not allowed to return to the hive with his contribution. Balancing, checking, waiting and weighing lead to conservatism and this conservatism will not remedy tyranny and the misuse of power" (pp. 24-25). "With a keen awareness of Supernature and of God" von Hügel "attempted to correct the faults and exaggerations of the Visible Church. . . . His mind and his mysti-

cism checked and balanced his intense love for the Roman Catholic Church. His ideal of religion and his dream of the true Body of Christ on this earth are thus challenging and compelling, but whether or not the needed reforms can be brought about with his full and quiet method is a question which only the future can answer" (p. 51).

Von Hügel himself would never have thought his "full and quiet method" enough or suitable for everyone. Nevertheless, at least in the eyes of his friend Professor Friedrich Heiler, of the University of Marburg, it is an important factor. This booklet, which contains much that von Hügel once found wanting in Professor Heiler's philosophy of religion (see the Baron's *Selected Letters*, edited by Bernard Holland, London, 1928, pp. 318-21), Professor Heiler has now sponsored as one of his series of publications called *Aus der Welt Christlicher Frömmigkeit.*

A. Hazard Dakin

Amherst, Mass.

*La Personnalité divine: Comment faut-il l'envisager?* By Edmond Rochedieu. Geneva: Editions Labor (1939), 480 pp. Swiss Fr. 6.

Two remarks led the author to undertake this study (p. 7). First, since Blondel's momentous thesis on "L'Action," in 1893, at the Sorbonne, the French school of systematic thought has recovered from its positivist fever and overcome its fear of dealing with religious facts. Second, the Protestant theologians of the French-speaking countries, for the last fifty years, have practically ignored the work of the secular thinkers, with the exception of Renan and Littré, and in recent years, M. Bergson, because of his *Two Sources of Morality and Religion.* As an epigraph to his book, M. Rochedieu quotes the late Victor Monod, of Strasbourg, well known to American religious circles. "The scholar and the philosopher may ignore the God of the theologian, but the theologian cannot, without danger, ignore the God of the scholar and the philosopher." The first part of this statement might be liable to question, but it remains that theologians have nothing to lose and many things to gain by a familiarity with the philosophers of their time, particularly in the case of the contemporary French spiritualists. However, M. Rochedieu does not propose to create an artificial type of eclecticism. He would prefer to see the theologians build up their argumentation upon data acquired from the philosophers, use a more

rigorous terminology, and, above all, when they criticize philosophical systems, have an immediate, rather than second-hand, knowledge of them.

It is true that the divorce between philosophy and theology has probably more detrimental consequences for the latter than for the former. When they tried to formulate the doctrines of Grace, Salvation, Church, etc., Protestant theologians relied upon New Testament teachings. On the contrary, for the doctrine of God, they failed to propose satisfactory formulas because they were under the influence of outworn philosophical systems such as Hegelianism or Neo-Criticism.

M. Rochedieu entitles his work: *La Personnalité divine*, for he gives, in his introduction, greatest importance to this aspect of the doctrine of God. But he is obliged to extend his subject and to consider also the problems of the existence and of the nature of God. The scope of his work is therefore more comprehensive than the title strictly implies. The subtitle provides supplementary information: "*Essai de critique philosophique et de dogmatique chrétienne sur le spiritualisme français contemporain et la théologie protestante en France et en Suisse romande.*" The value of such a work lies in the questions of method which it raises and in the manner of presenting the problems, rather than in the solutions which it proposes.

The book consists of three divisions:

1. A summary of the views professed by the principal French philosophers of the last fifty years on the problem of God and related questions. Numerous quotations accompany the analyses and constitute an excellent résumé useful to those who have already studied the systems of these philosophers. But this is manifestly insufficient, if the author intends to introduce a beginner to the foremost French thinkers of the last generation. However, if this remark is true for the chapters devoted to Jules Lachelier (pp. 13-49), Jules Lagneau (pp. 51-82), and Léon Brunschvicg (pp. 113-36[1]), it must be conceded that the author has outlined particularly well the systems of Emile Boutroux (pp. 84-112), of Henri Bergson (pp. 137-85), and especially of Edouard Le Roy (pp. 187-254).

2. The second part is more succinct (pp. 304-96), and criticizes the

1. Of course, M. Rochedieu had no access to Brunschvicg's most recent study (*La Religion et la Raison*, Paris, 1939) but why did he not include Louis Lavelle in his analysis?

doctrines of God as they are formulated by the leading French and Swiss Protestant theologians of the corresponding period, namely—Jules Bovon, Auguste Bouvier, Henri Bois, Charles Renouvier, Paul Lobstein, Maurice Neeser, Wilfred Monod, and Gaston Frommel.

3. The third part is reserved for the personal opinions of the author (pp. 399-450).

After reading this book, one is convinced of the urgent need for a solution to the problem of the relation between theology and philosophy; their respective characteristics must no longer be considered from the point of view of their matter but in terms of their method, for it is impossible today to draw strict lines of demarcation between the fields of the two disciplines. The theologian, even if he were to confine his work to the description of religious facts, would encroach upon the domain of the anthropologist, of the psychologist, of the sociologist, if not of the cosmologist. In any case, he must proceed according to a theory of knowledge, and such a theory belongs to the field of philosophy. If, on the other hand, the philosopher extends his curiosity beyond contingent phenomena and penetrates within the precincts of metaphysics, is he not dealing unconsciously with problems of theology? Therefore the philosopher differs from the theologian essentially in his method. In fact, the philosopher, even though he may not be a rationalist, appeals to reason, whereas the theologian, for whom the criterion of reason is not prohibitive, brings in a non-philosophical element, namely—revelation. But the problem is only deferred, since it is now necessary to determine the concepts of reason and revelation. M. Rochedieu, who includes in his bibliography the works of Auguste Lecerf, but does not use them in his criticism of Protestant theology, might have presented to his readers, on this point especially, the dogmatic premises of this theologian, whose influence is already considerable among the younger generation, and who is giving a very fresh and vital impulse to religious thought in the Reformed Church of France.[2]

However, M. Rochedieu points out, before making any dogmatic attempt, the need to formulate a theory of knowledge in general

2. cf. Auguste Lecerf, *Introduction à la Dogmatique Réformée*. I. *De la nature de la connaissance religieuse* (Paris, 1931). II. *Du fondement et de la signification de la connaissance religieuse* (Paris, 1938). See the discussion between this theologian and the Roman Catholic philosopher, Etienne Gilson, especially in Lecerf's second book, pp. 36-58.

and of religious knowledge in particular, but when he formulates his doctrine of God, he fails to indicate his theory of knowledge.

In order to appreciate the problem of the divine personality, it is necessary first to deal with the problem of the existence of God. On this point, a clarification of terms is very much to be desired, and the philosopher might help the theologian. Utilizing the efforts of Lachelier, Lagneau distinguishes between the concepts of *Existence*, *Being*, and *Reality*. *To exist* is to be perceived and supposed intelligible. *To be* is to be apprehended by the intellect and susceptible of being perceived. *Existence* remains contingent and depends upon perceptions; *Being* is necessary and remains independent of circumstances. In order to comprehend the *reality* of a fact, it is necessary to add to *existence* as our senses reveal it to us, and to *being* apprehended by the intellect, a third notion, the affirmation of the *value* of the act by which "we affirm the necessary being of the thing which strikes us" (pp. 60, 274, 404). It is to be conceded that Lagneau's idea is not without affinity to Höffding's (p. 404, note). The theologian will employ the expression *reality* of God preferably to that of *existence* of God, these two expressions not being interchangeable. There is not only here a question of terminology. The theologian does not need to state the contingent existence of God. The mind requires the idea of logical necessity, and at the same time the moral life of the believer wants the idea of value. In order to attain the absolute reality of God, the intellect must be united to the will. The act which apprehends the reality of God is moral as well as purely intellectual. The logical and necessary being cannot be an object of faith (p. 403). To affirm the reality of God is to say that God is a value which transforms the life of men by enriching it. The element of will consciously intervening in faith must please M. Bergson, for whom doubt is but a deficiency of will (cf. *La Pensée et le Mouvant*, p. 618, and Rochedieu, p. 151). It might have been appropriate to recall here the traditional distinction between *fides* and *fiducia*. With this strict definition of existence M. Rochedieu has no difficulty in showing that traditional proofs of the existence of God, taken from the physical world, end in a degree of reality altogether insufficient. The proofs from the physical world are related to contingent existence, those inferred from pure reason, to rational necessity. The moral proofs, either from history, or from the aspirations of the soul, even the moral proof *par excellence*, revived from Kant by M. Le Roy,

imply at their basis an act of faith (pp. 407-9). Since the failure of the philosophical proofs, the theologian will turn to revelation according to the principle of the Reformers and will search for the reality of God in the Bible (pp. 408-11). Here again, M. Rochedieu neglects to legitimize philosophically the mode of knowledge by revelation, and moreover, to indicate how to find this revelation by giving the criteria of interpretation of the Scriptures.

In order to describe the nature of God, the author recalls the Pascalian opposition between the God of Christians and the God of philosophers. He avoids quite unexpectedly the extreme position of Karl Barth, who rejects any idea of God not directly and integrally inspired by the New Testament, and he admits that certain aspects of the nature of God might be apprehended by the intellect. He accepts that the philosophical notion of God might prepare the way for the evangelical conception of a heavenly Father (p. 430). Then he touches upon the problem of evil, and in his opinion to explain evil is almost to legitimate it. It is true that *sub specie æternitatis*, there is no problem of evil, but one questions whether evil becomes a problem for man only in the measure of the development of his moral life. At any rate, Christianity places the problem on a practical ground, and its solution must not be sought outside of Christian experience.

Finally, the writer is ready to present his notion of the divine personality. Protestant theologians have been preoccupied with the affirmation of a personal God, because they carefully avoided all kinds of pantheism or even a certain immanentism which tends to confuse God with the hidden forces of the Universe. On the other hand, several spiritual philosophers (Boutroux, Bergson, Le Roy) consider God as a personal being. Lagneau avoids using the word itself but describes God as if he were personal. Others consider the notion of personality as inferior to the divine being (Lachelier), or take refuge in an agnosticism of rationalistic origin (Brunschvicg).

But what is meant by the concept of personality? Modern psychology agrees with the New Testament teaching which sees in it a complex whole in addition to a conscious will. The famous passage of Paul on "not what I would, that do I practise" (Romans 7: 15-23), as well as other texts found in the Gospels, permits a definition of the person as a being who possesses a double virtuality which tends to rise by the spirit or fall by the flesh. This analysis of human personality is in itself

of interest, but one hardly sees its importance in a study of the personality of God, where anthropomorphism is to be avoided. M. Rochedieu recognizes that it is not possible to pass from the relativity of the human person to the absolute of the divine, for the difference between both is not only of a quantitative but also of a qualitative order (p. 441). Therefore one asks what role might be played by the study of the anthropological dualism when it is a matter of describing the person of God.

According to M. Rochedieu, the theologian must limit himself to a paraphrase of the Scriptures without trying to reduce the antinomies. The biblical expressions referring to God scarcely allude to his personality: "God is Spirit" (John 4: 24), "Light" (I John 1: 5), "Father of Lights" (James 1: 17), "the Alpha and Omega" (Revelation 1: 8), "the first and the last" (Isaiah 44: 6), "the Rock" (Psalms 71: 3). M. Rochedieu thus relegates the doctrine of the divine personality to a place of secondary importance,—a surprising conclusion following the introduction of his study,—and at the same time he excludes the problem of immanence-transcendence because the Scriptures ignore it. The element which will dominate the doctrine of God is the notion of the Father as taught especially by Jesus. Since M. Rochedieu refuses to leave the field of biblical theology, one might wonder why he has undertaken such a vast inquiry among the philosophers of our time. Nevertheless, his positive contribution of the notion of value applied to the reality of God is to be praised, as well as his plea for the use a stricter theological vocabulary.

Instead of rejecting the doctrine of the personality of God to a secondary place, M. Rochedieu should not fear, like M. Le Roy (p. 298), to face frankly the mystery of the Trinity. This dogma of the early Church, although it has been expressed in terms which might seem outworn to many, represents indubitably the deepest religious experience of Christianity. The author seems not unaware of it, since he states at the end of his book (p. 449) that the person of God is accessible to men only through the person of Christ. What part will he assign to the profound Christian reality which was intellectually expressed by the Church Fathers in the doctrine of the *Person* of the Holy Ghost?

Samuel L. Terrien

The College of Wooster

*The Knowledge of God and the Service of God.* By KARL BARTH. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939, xxix + 255 pp. $5.00.

Karl Barth giving the Gifford Lectures is an event in itself. One wonders what the founder would think, were he to know that the trustees of the foundation had elected such a spokesman on a foundation committed definitely to an opposite pattern of thought. A lectureship for natural religion and a crass supernaturalist in the rostrum! I still think the appointment and its acceptance savors of questionable morality—at least the point is something to chew over.

Highly conscious of the inappropriateness of his lectures at such an occasion, the author of this book goes into a somewhat lengthy defense. "I know," he seems to say, "that the thing looks bad. But I am here to show the naturalists that the case for supernaturalism is still a good one, and I believe I can contribute to their cause (!) in the spirit of the foundation by giving the opposition something hard to strike at." (Even the un-elected used to say that they, at least, were furnishing background for those going to glory.)

A running text serves to tie the book together; it is the Scots' Confession. Articles of that Confession give the author the opportunity of stating his own systematic theology. I find myself raising the usual questions all the way through:

Naturalists, it is declared, create their own gods and are thus sinners true to form. (But so do the supernaturalists, with perhaps the added sin of dogmatism. They simply declare, and that is all there is to it.) Universities are the temples of idolatrous religions. (But, how are the Seminaries exempt unless by a simple declaration?) All systems are relative. (But so is Barth's—even to Barth.) A God who could be known otherwise than through Himself would not be God. (But a naturalist could say the same thing by considering God in the warp and woof of nature—e.g., Spinoza.) God could only be God by being distinct from nature. (But a naturalist could say that, whereas God is revealed in nature, not all nature reveals God in the same degree. The principle of concretion may be distinguished from the temporary, though both are a part of the general weave of reality. Even the traditional supernaturalists allowed the doctrine that the created revealed the Creator.) Again, faith is held to be a special kind of knowledge. (But faith is not knowledge; it is an adventure.) One must know the darkness of Sinai and Calvary to know God. (But the naturalist would

here agree, with a proper theory of value and under a different vocabulary.) "The love of God consists in this, that though He does not need the world and man He will not be without them." (But a naturalist need not either affirm or deny such a statement. Other supernaturalists might well disagree.) Man's calling is to present to the Creator the spirit of gratitude. (But there is no hard and fast dispute here on the side of the naturalist. A higher gratitude, he may well affirm, lies even more on the side of a naturalistic theory as over against a crass Absolutism.) Man is against God. (But not all the charges against man claimed by Barth are moral. One cannot slur over the problem of morality by an easygoing wholesale doctrine of original sin.) Man is a tainted mirror. (But if he were all tainted he would be no mirror. The figure is self-contradictory.) Man, thus, is to destroy his own glory and thereby glorify God. (But this surely is not to glorify God. Shall we then become as worms?)

And so on through the book. Barthianism is here at its best. It is good old-fashioned dogmatic theology in the literal sense of that term. Those of us who have passed through a theology similar to this will recognize many values which will be preserved from the older theologies, but we are not impressed by this type of revival—unless it be that we are amazed to know that it has created a vogue.

VERGILIUS FERM

The College of Wooster

*Theories of Religious Experience: With Special Reference to James, Otto and Bergson.* By JOHN MORRISON MOORE. New York: Round Table Press, Inc., 1938. xi + 253 pp. $3.00.

Professor Moore has written a clear and searching analysis of three recent theories of religious experience, those of James, Otto, and Bergson. The main question he sets out to answer is whether normal religious experience is "revelatory of objective meanings and realities" and "originative with respect to the ideas and practices of developed religion." His general answer is that the claims made for religious experience in these respects are exaggerated. He therefore subjects them to acute criticism both psychological and epistemological.

Theories of the psychological nature and roots of religion he finds to be abstract and one-sided. The emphasis upon a *primordial feeling* is vague; the theory of a distinctive *religious emotion* cannot be proved

by the "unreliable methods of introspective analysis," nor is it compatible with the diversity of religious emotions; and the *desires*, *attitudes*, and *sentiments* connected with religion are many. All of these psychological theories "contain a measure of truth" but suffer from their "restricted and partial character." "Religious experience is immensely complicated, and any theory which finds its essence in some particular psychological function represents an oversimplification" (p. 180).

He is equally insistent that "no general answer can be given to the problem of the cognitive value of religious experience" (p. 186). "The meaning of any experience, and thus of any religious experience, can only be determined when it is interpreted in connection with the rest of experience" (p. 187). This is perhaps the main epistemological conclusion of the book. It rests, in part, upon Moore's pluralistic view of religious experience mentioned above, in part upon his theory of knowledge, which comes out in the course of his criticism of opposed theories. From James's "radical empiricism," for instance, he dissents sharply on the ground that it overestimates the significance of immediate experience. James is led by his preference for immediacy to raise "knowledge of acquaintance" above conceptual "knowledge about," and thus to depreciate the importance of the theological element in religion and to depend upon a vivid and warm "sense of reality" as an evidence of objectivity. Moore rightly objects to this as subjectivistic. "Of course," he says, "we do not mean to deny the importance of acquaintance in knowledge; if there were no acquaintance there would be no knowledge of fact. But it does not provide any insight into ultimate questions or any warrant for setting bounds to the validity of conceptual knowledge" (p. 71). Thus, Moore does not deny that acquaintance is a factor in religious knowledge, but emphasizes the importance of rational verification of its suggestions. In his long chapter on James he shows how a false conception of "pure" experience leads to a tendency to substitute feelings and prejudices rooted in temperament for rational verification, in deciding such philosophical issues as that between pluralistic meliorism and monistic absolutism.

In his excellent exposition of Otto's theory, Moore points out that the "holy" is "a complex category whose constituents are, on the one hand, moral and rational ideas and, on the other, an obscure structure of feelings or non-rational elements" (p. 83). Otto did not mean to

deny the essential connection between these two factors, for the former constitutes a "filling-in" or "schematization" of the latter. In other words, the "numinous" experience contains not only a kind of feeling but also an "immediate appreciation and valuation." However, Moore objects to this on the ground that "a feeling, however vivid, cannot guarantee the validity of an inference" (p. 93), and hence that theological problems cannot be decided "by appealing to feelings which are believed to underlie and determine them" (p. 95). Does Otto, we may ask, really mean that a feeling as such has cognitive value, or only that an intuition accompanied by a feeling may have such value? But Moore's main criticism of Otto has to do with his idea of a priori elements in the category of the "holy," elements attributed in the manner of rationalism to "pure reason." An instrumentalist conception of a priori categories, Moore thinks, would avoid the error of rationalism. "Their origin," he suggests, "lies rather in tentative activities whereby the intelligent organism seeks to control and comprehend its experience. They begin as accidental or experimental variations, and experience sifts out those which perform a satisfactory function" (p. 107). Moore has avoided rationalism; but does his own view as here stated avoid the dangers of an instrumentalism which is based upon a functional biological psychology and is as one-sided as rationalism itself?

Even if one holds that intuition is cognitive rather than "pre-cognitive" or "post-cognitive," he must agree with Moore's criticism of the sharp dualism between intuition and intelligence in Bergson's theory, as well as the dualism between "open" and "closed" religion which corresponds to it. These contrasted types are abstractions, and historical religions have combined elements from both of them. Thus, Bergson's exclusive reference of myth to "closed" religion, on the ground that it is always protective and static, is false. Many myths, such as that of early Christian apocalyptic, have been dynamic. Similarly, his virtual identification of mysticism of the dynamic type with "open" religion is arbitrary and erroneous. Mysticism has often been static; and there are non-mystical elements in "open" religion.

In short, Moore's analysis is thorough and on the whole sound. The main doubt it raises in my mind is whether he is too cautious in dealing with the cognitive claims of religious experience. Is mystical experience, for instance, a mere "product of an organic or temperamental pre-

disposition shared by certain people," accommodating itself to "whatever framework of ideas the mystic may possess"? Granting that the insights of religious experience must be verified in some sense by "the ordinary processes of scientific or philosophical thought," must science and philosophy always be cast in the superior role of *judges* of religious experience and never in the more modest role of *learners* from its insights?

George F. Thomas

University of North Carolina

# BOOK NOTES

*Die dogmatische Stellung des Königs in der Theologie der alten Aegypter.* By Helmuth Jacobsohn. Glückstadt-Hamburg-New York: J. J. Augustin, 1939. 71 pp. R.M. 9.

In this essay, the author sets out to investigate the identity of the deity which the ancient Egyptians believed was incarnate in their King, how the Egyptians represented to themselves such an incarnation, and what were the accompanying ideas. With much detail and careful reasoning, he shows that the King was believed to be the incarnation of a deity who was his father. The deity was called the Ka-Mutef, or "Bull of his Mother." He was the creator-god, whose power to create was called his Ka. Every king, then, was created by the Ka of the creator-god, as were also each and every one of his successors. It was the Ka who formed the bond between God, King, and his successors. That is, the same nature, power, personality pervaded all three persons, God, King, and Ka; and these three persons formed a trinity.

In sixty closely written large pages, each step in the above reconstruction of ancient Egyptian religious ideas is made, accompanied by a mass of textual evidence. But the reasoning seems too consistent to be true of any one period in Egyptian religious history. Did all Egyptians, or even any considerable percentage of them, hold all these ideas at one and the same time? One may reconstruct as the author has done, from Egyptian literary sources, a consistent system of dogma, but there is really no evidence that the Egyptians themselves ever possessed such a creed. The chances are they did not, for the material used by our author represents almost every age in Egyptian religious thought, from the Pyramid Texts to the Roman period. Nor does it seem scientific to take a fairy tale—the Tale of Two Brothers—as the author does, and make it the framework of such a consistent religious dogma.

But what will be of wider interest in this essay is the comparison which its author makes with the details of the Christian dogma of the Trinity. One is left with the impression that Dr. Jacobsohn started with the details of the Christian dogma of the Trinity in mind, and by careful manipulation found a similar dogma among the ancient Egyptians. However, it must be emphasized at once that Jacobsohn is no dilettante. Every statement he makes is based upon textual evidence, and his knowledge of his subject is profound. No student of comparative religious ideas can afford to neglect a thorough reading of this essay. Every religious idea discussed by the author is to be found in ancient Egyptian religious literature, but whether these same ideas existed in a system of thinking such as has been outlined by Dr. Jacobsohn is very doubtful. Each and every separate idea in the Christian dogma of the Trinity may be paralleled in Egyptian religious thought, but

one is justified in doubting whether these ideas were ever organized and unified by any given Egyptian thinker.

This is one of the finest Ph.D. dissertations I have ever read. It was presented to the philosophical faculty of the University of Munich in 1938, and if its thesis can be proved, it will turn out to be one of the most important books ever written on the religious idea of a Trinity found in any non-Christian religion.

SAMUEL A. B. MERCER

*Hindu Scriptures.* Edited by NICOL MACNICOL. (Everyman's Library, 944.) New York: E. P. Dutton, 1938. XXIV + 293 pp. 90¢.

This small volume contains selections of three standard translations: Hymns from the Rigveda in the translation of Macnicol; the best known chapters of five Upanishads, in the translation of Max Müller in the SBE; and Barnett's translation of the Bhagavadgita in full. In his short foreword Tagore stresses the fact that this choice best surveys the many centuries of development of Hindu thought. Half of the Rigveda hymns included here are taken from the tenth book, and the editor explains in his introduction the tendency of this selection by the fact that neither Varuna nor Indra "represent the true direction of the Indian mind," but that rather the symbols and abstractions, the speculations as to the cosmic order and its meaning, are the place where "the Indian spirit is finding its natural element and the direction of its future travail."

The publication is especially to be welcomed for its condensation of a vast material, and for the low cost in which this becomes available to all groups working on Indian religion, as well as to the general reader. Some unnecessary repetitions in the Upanishad section could well be avoided in a second edition.

FRIEDRICH SPIEGELBERG

*Penthouse of the Gods.* By THEOS BERNARD. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939. XII + 344 pp. $3.50.

Here is a travel book which gives us something more than a description of unusual and interesting scenery. To begin with, Mr. Bernard seems to be one of those gifted young men who knows definitely the path where his interests lie and then follows it, regardless of the hardships involved. He is an adventurer with spiritual insight which is rare, and a scholar for whom the difficulty of mastering the Tibetan language is not a deterrent, but merely another obstacle to be overcome.

In the second chapter of his book Mr. Bernard tells something of his background and education. In most respects it was that of the typical American; but the germ of Eastern philosophy was there. His parents, he says, had contacts with a great Indian teacher, and so the desire for knowledge

at first hand grew into a determination to go to the source of the teachings. He went to India and studied the Yoga philosophy under an Indian teacher. From there, after a period of preparation, he was sent to a teacher in Gantok in northern Sikhim on the border of Tibet. Here he settled down for a time for further study of manuscripts, and most important, the learning of the Tibetan language. While there he also made the necessary contacts with the people who could be influential in securing him permission to enter Tibet. His ultimate aim, he states clearly, was to study the religion and spread the teachings of the Buddha in the West.

The book is an interesting narrative of his adventures and spiritual experiences. During his sojourn in Lhasa he was a guest in the household of one of the wealthiest and most aristocratic families of Tibet. He was entertained by all the religious and lay officials. In relating his experiences he describes the life and customs of the people and the contrasts between the gorgeous apparel and jewels of the rich, and the squalor of the masses. In spite of the sordid poverty of many, the people seem to be a cheerful and contented lot, singing at their work and happy in the belief that they are fulfilling their destiny.

Of particular interest, in view of Mr. Bernard's intention of bringing the religion to America, are those parts of the book dealing with his religious experiences. While in Lhasa he received instruction in the Tantras (the esoteric doctrines), from a learned Lama. It was in Lhasa that he went through his first initiation. He was received into the Faith, not as a disciple but as an adept, for the monks were convinced that he was a re-incarnation of the Tibetan saint, Padmasambhava (Guru Rimpocche). For this reason he had access to many of the sacred shrines to which no foreigner had ever before been admitted, and was permitted to witness and to take photographs of the rites. The interiors of the monasteries with their wealth of images, paintings, and ritual objects are vividly described.

Mr. Bernard tells us something of the origin of Lamaism and of the various sects that sprang up since its introduction into Tibet in the eighth century. He tells little, however, about the doctrines. In referring to the symbols employed in the ceremonies, he implies that their true significance can only be understood by those who have made a study of the esoteric doctrines. He says, "in the teachings of the Tantras it is possible to discover where they originated and through the application of Yoga it is possible to apply their universal origins to oneself."

The book is profusely illustrated with beautiful and interesting photographs. The author impresses you with the fact that, for those interested in religions, a study of the ethical and esthetic values of Lamaism is of great importance.

We look forward with great interest to Mr. Bernard's further researches into the Lamaism of Tibet.

ANTOINETTE K. GORDON

*Third Class World. A Roving Philosopher Observes the Common Man.* With one hundred illustrations from the author's photographs. By MARION J. BRADSHAW. Bangor, Maine, 1938. 266 pp. 100 plates. $4.00.

This is an unusual account of an informal and somewhat strenuous trip around the world by the Professor of the Philosophy of Religion in Bangor Theological Seminary. With refreshing directness and simplicity Dr. Bradshaw tells successively of his travels in Third Class and on foot through much of Russia, Japan, North China and Manchuria, South Eastern Asia, India, Palestine and Greece. The book is privately and handsomely printed for the author's friends in a limited de luxe edition of five hundred copies. The photographs, recording some unusually beautiful views, are exceedingly good and very well reproduced.

Dr. Bradshaw's experience makes an appealing case for the advantages of traveling Third Class in the Asiatic countries, or anywhere for that matter, and his readers will certainly find "the book full of the joy of living . . . and loaded with an abiding regard for the great masses of common humanity." Though the author is not concerned here to formulate a philosophy, one comes to realize that there is reflective depth, as well as pervasive zest in his democratic persuasion. Upon his interesting interviews with such different personalities as Kagawa, Hu Shih, Tagore, and Gandhi he makes the final remark that "the most notable fact about the group is this: that each is making it life's chief concern to raise the life level for the depressed masses of the world."

Dr. Bradshaw reports no special investigation of problems in the countries visited, but comments only on what any energetic and alert traveller might see of their complex patterns of life. Yet his unprejudiced and thoughtful way of considering the surfaces thus exposed begets much confidence in the validity of his impressions. This extends from his sampling of Russian conditions, in the earlier chapters, through his later comments on religious phenomena observed on the way through the Far Eastern countries. Dr. Bradshaw's own theistic convictions are rounded by a sufficiently comprehensive sense of religion, nature, and man to allow an understanding regard for the enlightening functions of naturalistic and humanistic thought. One is not inclined to doubt his "abiding interest in religion," when reading his comments on places, symbols, and ways of worship, his appreciation of Hu Shih's "unremitting warfare against superstition," and his expressions of "revolt against the pervasive holiness of India." On the contrary, one becomes agreeably convinced that at least this author is personally entitled to his "effort to make it clear (to Chinese as well as other students) that American philosophy of religion is concerned with the realistic content of religion rather than with efforts to win for it the right to claim title to euphemistic phrases."

H. L. F.

*Manuel arabe de la langue des Turcs et des Kiptchaks (époque de l'état mamelouk)*. By ANANIASZ ZAJACZKOWSKI. XXI + 56 + 16 pp. 4 Plates. (No. 2 of the Publications of the Oriental Commission of the Warsaw Academy of Science and Letters.) Warszawa, 1938.

It was at the turn of the century that the Russian savant Melioranskij drew attention to the importance, for the historical grammar of Turkish, of the documents dealing with Turkish dialects, written in Arabic by Muslim authors of the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries. It is only within the last twenty years, however, that this study has received serious attention.

The Arabic works on Turkish are for the most part due to the rise in Egypt of the Mameluk or Slave Dynasties, Dynasties whose history forms one of the most colorful episodes in the medieval period of both Egypt and Syria. These Mameluks, who ruled a large and important section of the Islamic world from behind the throne of puppet Caliphs, were for the most part Turkish speaking, and Turkish in their cultural connections. The Arab Chronicles tell us that under the Mameluks the superior officers of the Army, and the Court officials used Turkish among themselves, official Court documents were for the most part in Turkish, and to some extent the language of administration was Turkish. In many cases the chieftains knew little or no Arabic, though they ruled over Arabic speaking populations. Of the great Sultan Qalā'ūn, for instance, we read that he spoke Turkish eloquently, but knew very little Arabic. Sultan Barqūq, again, was famous for his interest in having Arabic and Persian works translated into Turkish that he might understand and enjoy them. It was natural that the Arabic speaking subjects should have some interest in understanding the dialect of the ruling class, and a number of attempts were made in Mameluk times to prepare Glossaries and grammatical summaries, which would make the Turkish dialects of the rulers to some extent intelligible to the speakers of Arabic. The value for the history of the Turkish language of such early material is obvious.

The work that is here presented by M. Zajaczkowski is a continuation of his earlier studies on Old Turkish, the *Turkish Version of Kalila wa Dimna*, published in 1934, and the *Specimen of an Old Turkish Translation of the Qur'an*, published in 1937. The present study is a Glossary giving Turkish and Kiptchak equivalents for Arabic terms, written probably in Syria in the fourteenth century by one Jamāl ad-Dīn Abū Muḥammad 'Abdallah. As the author is called at-Turki, he would seem to have been of Turkish origin himself. His work is based on earlier written sources, which he enumerates, but also on actual gatherings of material from speakers of the dialects concerned. He has arranged his material topically in four parts—(1) on the names of God, the celestial bodies and other phenomena under His control; (2) things terrestrial, minerals, animals, vegetables, and things concerning man's life; (3) adverbs and pronouns; (4) verbs. Only sections I-III are given in this study, which reproduces the text, and pro-

vides a vocabulary in Latin transliteration and arranged alphabetically, of the Turkish words, with translations both in Polish and French, and with admirably complete reference to relevant source material and to discussions by European scholars. Of particular value in this vocabulary is the use of illustrative material from the Codex Cumanicus.

The MS that has been used is in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, and is curiously written in a lozenge pattern, the Arabic in black ink, and the Turkish in red, so curious an arrangement that the editor has provided four plates at the end to give some illustration of it.

The work has been admirably edited and carefully printed, and one may venture the hope that M. Zajaczkowski may be spared to edit the final and philologically more interesting section on the verbs.

A. J.

*The Holy Scriptures. Numbers, with Commentary.* By JULIUS H. GREENSTONE. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1939. XXXVIII + 373 pp.

This volume strives to interpret the Book of Numbers "for the teacher, the interested pupil and the general reader," taking frequent cognizance of the interpretations of the Hebrew exegetes of the Middle Ages, and making occasional reference to suggestions of modern scholarship. It will doubtless serve to keep the lamp of biblical knowledge burning among the Jews of America. The modern Protestant student of the Old Testament, however, will not find it very helpful, since the author does not really come to grips with the literary and historical problems, without a solution of which no adequate understanding of the book is possible.

EMIL G. KRAELING

*A Rabbi Teaches: A Collection of Sermons and Addresses.* By HERMAN HAILPERIN. New York: Bloch Publishing Company, 1939. 171 pp. $2.00.

This small volume helps to indicate the kind of preaching and other public activity engaged in by one type of American rabbi. Since the center of Jewish life has shifted physically and spiritually to this country, this may be of some general interest. Rabbi Hailperin's sermons and addresses are essentially priestly rather than prophetic. They comfort and instruct; they do not inspire, nor are they likely to stir to action. For the most part, they deal with immediate, practical matters, not with profound, subtle or far-reaching concerns. They are easy to comprehend; they are never burdensome because of their length, nor are they stimulating because of originality.

Rabbi Hailperin is a thorough-going conservative. In an address entitled "Is There a Jewish Predilection for Radicalism?" he assumes as axiomatic for himself and his audience that to be radical is bad for anyone, but is especially so for Jews. He is convinced that (p. 95) business men "readily

adjust themselves to new conditions in their commercial and industrial affairs."

These addresses are well-intentioned, unsensational, devoid of anything vulgar or cheap. They are also devoid of anything challenging or striking. They do not help to clarify the new and complicated problems of our troubled days. The lectures delivered upon the occasion of the Maimonides Octocentennial demonstrate special interest in medieval Jewish codes and philosophy. They show ability in popularizing various phases of the culture and history of the Jews.

ISIDOR B. HOFFMAN

*S. Anselmi cantuariensis archiepiscopi opera omnia.* Volumen primum continens opera quae prior et abbas beccensis composuit, adiectis quattuor tabulis phototypicis. Ad fidem codicum recensuit FRANCISCUS SALESIUS SCHMITT, monachus grissoviensis, O.S.B. Sekkau in Styria: Ex officina abbatiae Seccoviensis, 1938. ix + 290 pp.

This new edition of the writings of Saint Anselm, sumptuously printed in folio at the Benedictine abbey of Sekkau, near Graz in former Austria, is intended to supersede the old and unique edition of Gerberon, dating from 1675 and reprinted in Migne. Nine MSS. are cited; the editor says: "Apparatus qui varias praebet lectiones amplus non est, quoniam quantum fieri poterat codices nisi optimos et antiquissimos non abhibuimus." The orthography of the text has been modernized, the manuscript readings appearing in footnotes.

The first volume contains the works written by Saint Anselm as prior and abbot of Bec: Monologion, Proslogion, De grammatico, De veritate, De libertate arbitrii, De casu diaboli, and the first version of the letter De incarnatione verbi. Five volumes are planned in all. The second will comprise the works written as archbishop; the third, the Meditationes sive orationes, and the letters of the Bec period; the fourth, the letters of the archbishop; the fifth, fragments and spurious works. Dom Andreas Wilmart is announced as editor of the Meditationes. The general editor, Franc. Sal. Schmitt, O.S.B., has written extensively on the manuscript tradition of Saint Anselm; he dedicates his enterprise to Bernard Geyer.

J. H. RANDALL, JR.

*William Blake, 1757-1827. A Descriptive Catalogue of an Exhibition of the Works of William Blake Selected from Collections in the United States.* Philadelphia: The Philadelphia Museum of Art, 1939. 175 pp. $1.00.

This lavish catalogue, containing eighty-six illustrations, should find its way into the library of every student and lover of Blake. It is a treasury of valuable information, as well as a thing of beauty in itself. Each of the 283 items in the collection is described in detail, and all are grouped under

brief historical sketches of the particular work for which they were produced, in chronological order. The anonymous authors of this catalogue are to be congratulated on a thoroughly satisfying achievement.

M. B.

*Liberal Kentucky, 1780-1828.* By NIELS HENRY SONNE. (Columbia Studies in American Culture, No. 3.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1939. XI + 287 pp. $3.00.

Historians have long heard allusions to the wave of infidelity and irreligion in the early pioneering days of Kentucky, but if Dr. Sonne has combed the source materials thoroughly, and I believe he has, it turns out that Kentucky's transgression was rather venial.

The Rev. Horace Holley, who had studied under the orthodox President Timothy Dwight at Yale at the beginning of the nineteenth century, is the principal hero of liberalism and impiety in this story. After a pastorate of three years at Greenfield Hill in Fairfield County, Connecticut, he went to the South End Unitarian Church in Boston in 1808, but unlike the radical Elihu Palmer he never went any further to the left than Unitarianism. There is no suggestion in any of the numerous passages quoted by Dr. Sonne to indicate that the Rev. Mr. Holley espoused any principles of irreligion; and he shared with other successful and prosperous Unitarians of his time their upper-class preferences and ambitions. In 1818 he became President of Transylvania University in Lexington, Kentucky, at the comparatively munificent salary of $3,000 per year plus the diploma fees.

The nine-year term of President Holley's administration of Transylvania University is the focal point of this volume. From an institution which had been little more than a small secondary school which from 1799 to 1818 had granted but twenty-two degrees in almost as many years, he developed a university that "could vie with the great eastern colleges in numbers of students and repute" (p. 173).

He was a successful educator in spite of formidable opposition from the Presbyterians who had controlled the university during most of its existence before 1816. In that year, however, the anti-Presbyterians, whom Dr. Sonne calls the "liberals," gained the upper hand and, in the following year, with a bare majority succeeded in electing Holley. The Presbyterians then founded a rival institution and, of course, continued the struggle. Holley's religious orthodoxy was questioned, and a bitter controversy resulted. These petty bickerings among Protestants during the nineteenth century were unfortunately characteristic of our intellectual life during that period. The Presbyterians were finally successful in ousting President Holley from Transylvania University, but we do well not to conclude from this that they were peculiarly sectarian and illiberal. The principles for which they stood, which Dr. Sonne mistakingly labels as Calvinism, were those of Protestant Fundamentalism and were equally representative of the Bap-

tists and Methodists. It just happened that the latter two denominations were not involved in the early history of Transylvania University.

The story of American intellectual life in the early nineteenth century is the triumph of Protestant orthodoxy over the infidelity of eighteenth century philosophy, which America's upper class had shared with the intellectuals of France and England. Mrs. Trollope's contrast of our provincialism with former times was not exaggerated: "Rousseau, Voltaire, Diderot, &c., were read by the old federalists, but now they seem known more as naughty words, than as great names." In frontier Kentucky, Dr. Sonne discovered that militant anti-Christian sentiment and organizations had never developed as on the eastern seaboard, and even mild Unitarianism could not survive. We are indebted to him for a well annotated essay on the triumph of fidelity in Kentucky.

G. Adolf Koch

*God in History*. By Otto Piper. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939. xxi + 189 pp. $2.00.

This volume contains the Croall Lectures, delivered at New College, Edinburgh, in 1936. The author, who was Karl Barth's successor at Münster, is at present a guest professor at Princeton Theological Seminary. His fundamental thesis is that the teleological movement of history in general can be rightly understood only in the light of "holy" history at its core. The distinctive characteristic of events in holy history is that through them God "interferes" in order to redeem the world from the evil power which dominates it. Thus holy history contains a factor which transcends natural processes and human activity. From this standpoint the author interprets Christ's coming in "the fullness of time" as bringing in the new æon and disclosing the goal of history (Ch. I); this central event furnishes the clue to Israel's covenant and failure (Ch. IV), and to the formative influence of the Church as the continuation of the Incarnation (Ch. VI).

The general pattern is thus familiar enough to students of contemporary theological literature; unfortunately, however, some of the most important presuppositions are not brought out specifically until the third chapter. Moreover, it must be admitted that, even when he does come to discuss the relationship between the "spiritual" and the "earthly" world, on which the cogency of his whole thesis depends, Professor Piper leaves a good deal to be desired. On page 56 he tells us that "the spiritual world, while existing in time, is not subject to the laws of historical time"; but the examples furnished on the preceding page, where he refers to the soul and the power to generate life as belonging to the spiritual world, really fail to justify any such statement.

Indeed, this whole notion of a spiritual world as constituting a second order of temporal events causes confusion throughout the book. For example, page 39 states that "'fullness of time' is a term which belongs to

holy rather than to secular history . . . it denotes a moment in the spiritual world." Yet the whole preceding argument, in which the author shows how, at the moment of Christ's entrance into history, Hellenism, the Roman Empire and Jewish religion had brought mankind to "the zenith of perplexity and helplessness" (p. 17), is unavoidably empirical.

The attempt to interpret secular by means of holy history leads to some other rather curious results. The ambiguous fate of the Jews is explained as due to the fact that they have rejected Christ and yet remain under a Covenant with God (Ch. v). The Crusades are represented as restoring the unity of European Christendom at a time when nationalism threatened to destroy it; nothing is done, however, to show that the gigantic evils caused by the Crusades justified such a temporary result. In short, the author is compelled to resort to special pleading repeatedly in order to wring some Christian benefit from the mottled pages of Western history. Even the invention of printing is associated with God's desire to enable laymen to read the Bible at a time when it had become neglected by the clergy (p. 152).

Nevertheless, there are many illuminating passages which remain unaffected by the defects just mentioned. Chapter v contains some very penetrating remarks on "The Jewish Problem," and Chapter viii states powerfully the dangers and hopes confronting the Church in the modern world.

David E. Roberts

*World Community*. By William Paton. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939. 192 pp. $1.50.

This is a careful exposition of the idea of an ecumenical community with an emphasis on the missionary enterprise. Thanks to world missions, so Dr. Paton contends, a universal community actually exists; the church is now, and by its very nature, a single mission, bearing witness in repentance and forgiveness to the absolute goodness of its Lord. The Church is not international, nor is it held together by human co-operation; it is universal by virtue of its gospel and by its devotion to an absolute value. "It is not possible to adore God in Christ and to put alongside of that revelation other revelations that shall condition and limit it" (p. 42). Any community that is thus absolute must regard other communities making similar claims as rivals. Today "there are three competitors—Islam, Communism, and Christianity" (p. 35). Without defending further their incompatibilities, and without arguing their relative merits, Dr. Paton fixes attention on the claims of Christianity to universality. He surveys the successes and failures of Christians in maintaining their community in a practical way, but he falls back repeatedly on what he regards as the essential power of the Church, the power of its gospel to change human lives and living conditions. Evangelization is the Church's prime task.

Though this case is well argued formally, it is open to the same practical objection which Dr. Paton uses against national cults: "It is not possible to invest what is human and mortal with eternal and absolute value without finding that another rival absolute of human origin is raised up against it" (p. 120). If Dr. Paton and the Oxford pronouncements which he follows were content to leave this City of God in the realm of competing absolutes (a realm which suffers from its own "paradoxes"), the argument could be judged on its philosophical merits; but when its absolute is made to descend into "the center of history" and to operate as a power among powers, the paradox of the church's alternate divinity and sinfulness becomes more absurd than profound. The picture which Dr. Paton paints of Christianity as the greatest of world communities is so wholly convincing that one regrets having it spoiled by pretensions to universality. In place of the old jibe which Dr. Paton recalls, "I believe in the Holy Catholic Church and regret that it does not exist," I venture to suggest, "I believe in the Holy Catholic Church and regret that it pretends to exist."

H. W. S.

*The Brotherhood of Religions*. By SOPHIA WADIA. Bombay: International Book House, 1939. xix + 260 pp. $2.25.

This is a book in the theosophical vein, the author a Parsi, the atmosphere Vedantic Hindu. The argument of the eighteen essays, whose subjects include the *Bhagavad Gita*, the Hebrew Shekinah, the Buddha, the Unknown God, self-education, Nanak, East and West, etc., is that of Primaeval Wisdom, Truth, Soul-life, one Over-Soul, Universal Spirit omnipresent God, that the true, secret teaching of all religions looks to the cultivation of the inner reality; man's real religion is brotherhood, and there would be no "necessity of law if through self-education men and women brought themselves to recognize the truth," etc., etc., but what can one do with a book and a doctrine of this sort in review? We give up! Here is sheer subjective idealism, a divine consummation devoutly to be wished, beyond law, caste, sect, body and all things this side the ocean of the world. And here is a vision of man who is more than God (cf. p. 234). Everything is explained except the exact nature or quality of divine wisdom, truth, inner reality, etc!

JOHN CLARK ARCHER

*Types of Religious Philosophy*. By EDWIN ARTHUR BURTT. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1939. ix + 512 pp. $3.00.

This volume begins with an Introduction, and an unusually good short outline of the distinctive contributions of the ancient Hebrews, Jesus, Paul, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, neo-Platonists and Augustine to orthodox Christian philosophy of religion. Each of the next following chapters is an exposition of one of the "main points of view in religious philosophy which now compete for acceptance among western thinkers, together with an

analysis of the major issues on which they differ." Each point of view is impartially stated, with the more important arguments in its favor, and its replies to the counter arguments of its opponents. The distinctive affirmations of each view are summarized in a table useful for comparison with the others. The points of view are: *Roman Catholicism* (Anglo-Catholicism being only mentioned in a foot note); *Protestant Fundamentalism* (including all orthodox Protestants, but with most attention given to Calvinistic interpretations); the *Religion of Science* (with reference mostly to Spinoza, together with mention of Descartes, Ernst Haeckel and Walter Lippmann); *Agnosticism* (with accounts of Hume, J. S. Mill, T. H. Huxley and Herbert Spencer); *Ethical Idealism* (principally Kant and Felix Adler); *Modernism* (Schleiermacher, McGiffert, Lyman Abbott, W. M. Horton, H. E. Fosdick, H. N. Wieman, and H. F. Ward are mentioned in the bibliography—the type includes all liberal Christians who accept evolution and the higher criticism, but yet believe in God and attempt to follow Jesus unreservedly); *Humanism* (Auer, Reese, Sellars, Dewey, Santayana, J. H. Randall, E. S. Ames, C. F. Potter, J. S. Huxley, the socialists and the communists—apparently all those who do not commit themselves to belief in God and do not consider themselves in all respects bound by the teachings of Jesus, but who are earnestly concerned with social betterment). A separate chapter discusses a miscellaneous collection of thinkers who do not readily fall under any of the seven types, including William James, W. E. Hocking, S. Alexander, A. N. Whitehead, Bergson, Barth, J. W. Krutch and others.

Professor Burtt's primary concern is to set forth the distinct types of religious philosophical thought now competing for dominance in western thought rather than to classify individual thinkers, and he will not be disturbed if it should be pointed out that certain philosophers have not in everything that they have ever said conformed to the types of which in the main they are representatives. It will have to be admitted that Professor Burtt has convincingly shown that the seven types which he discusses do actually exist; he has not created them out of his imagination. He is thoroughly objective, and entirely impartial, except possibly that he shows more eloquence in his accounts of Humanism and Modernism. He has rendered a valuable service in making clear the distinctive features of each type, and in setting forth the outstanding issues between them in a perspective that is fair to all. The book will assist specialists in the philosophy of religion to discriminate between the types, and it will form an excellent introduction for beginners.

Has Professor Burtt made any omissions in his restriction of the principal types of contemporary religious philosophy to seven? The distinguished members of the Sage School of Philosophy of the last generation would have been astonished if they could have known that one of their successors at Cornell would omit Absolute Idealism from the principal types of con-

temporary religious philosophy: Burtt does not even mention the name of Bernard Bosanquet on whom they placed much emphasis (at any rate the name is not in the index). But times have changed; possibly Absolute Idealism now belongs wholly to the past, although to a past tenderly remembered even by many like myself who never accepted Absolute Idealism. However, Mysticism might have been included among the principal contemporary types of religious thought; it would appear to have a better claim for recognition than at least two of the types that are placed among the seven. Men like von Hügel and Rufus M. Jones are certainly influencing contemporary religious thought. Some of us may regret that more significance was not attached to the views of Bergson, Whitehead and Alexander. Admirers of William James will feel that an exposition of James' religious thought confined to the essay, "The Will to Believe," is hardly adequate. Perhaps none of these possible criticisms is justified; at any rate they concern only minor details. This is a capital book.

WILLIAM KELLEY WRIGHT

*This Business of Living.* By L. W. GRENSTED. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939. 187 pp. $1.75.

The author of this volume, L. W. Grensted, Nolloth Professor of the Christian Religion at Oxford, is a psychologist, and his book sets forth the relationship between Christian truth and modern psychology. Professor Grensted tells us that living is difficult, that is constantly presents us with problems the real nature of which is generally hidden. Eventually, however, the problems turn out to be "the conflict of impulse and desire, fear and pride," the challenge to each of us to do the thing he ought to do. The question which confronts every one of us is "how we can act other than we do when we are what we are."

There have been many answers to this question. One answer is provided by moral maxims and proverbs: "Be patient," "Work hard," "Be kind," "Don't worry." But these conventional remedies do not get to the root of our difficulty. They do not answer our real problem: How shall we be other than we are?

Another answer is that of science. Science can analyze and describe our personalities and can tell us what we lack. We lack the "master sentiment," or the "herd sentiment," or the "ego sentiment." But science cannot tell us how we may obtain what we lack. Furthermore, from the strictly scientific point of view it does not matter that our wants should be supplied. Science as science is interested in describing our difficulties and not in adjusting them.

Finally there is the answer of art, with its stimulation of feeling, sentiment, and emotion. Art can help because it gives us assurances of value as well as fact, and because it places beauty and goodness and freedom and moral responsibility alongside of anatomy and evolution and behavior. Art shows

us that good living depends upon the right response to life. It shows us what our eyes ought to see. But if we do not see aright, if we do not have the right response, art cannot help us. The fundamental problem remains: How can we be other than we are?

Professor Grensted says that this fundamental problem is solved by a real religion, not what most of us call religion, but by a faith that "sets us free to be out best and enables us to help others to be their best." It is possible for Christianity to be that religion. Through the life of Jesus, God is made known to us, and love is awakened in us that can make response to the love of God. Thus through Christ we obtain what science and art and racial prudence cannot give; we obtain understanding and guidance; we obtain the right response.

Modern psychology helps us to understand this work of Christ in the human soul. Christianity, like psychology, emphasizes a deep inner transformation, the unraveling of the whole complex personality, and the transplanting of life to a different level. It urges complete honesty, and it provides us with a personal friend through whom we escape from our self-centeredness and our pride, escape from the bondage of our own problems, and enter into the freedom of a new and better life with a new focus and a new center.

There is every reason to be grateful to Professor Grensted for what he has set forth in this volume. It provides a bridge between the traditional doctrines of the Christian Church and the contemporary science of personality. If one reads between the lines he perceives, as I believe Professor Grensted perceives, that the problems and difficulties of living are permanent spiritual experiences. The sense of sin, the burden of the soul, the need of salvation—these are true today as always. It is this human experience which the church has had in mind when it has taught that man is a being that needs to be re-made. Professor Grensted indicates that this re-birth is made through Jesus Christ. Through him the burden is cast from the soul, and by the grace of God man does become a new creature. This is fundamental Christian doctrine. The expression of it in modern terms should make possible more convincing preaching, and that in turn should give new life to the Christian Church.

PAUL AUSTIN WOLFE

*The Troubled Mind. A General Account of the Human Mind and Its Disorders and their Remedies.* By HARRY ROBERTS. With chapters on the insanities by MARGARET NELSON JACKSON. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1939. 284 pp. $2.00.

*Life Without Fear.* By PETER FLETCHER. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1939. 111 pp. $1.00.

Two books dealing with the subject of psycho-therapy, but from quite different points of view. Dr. Roberts gives a clear and useful outline of the

various trends in modern psychology with reference to the causes and development of neuroses and phychoses, but with practically no mention at all of religion, not even in relation to Jung's contribution. He almost completely ignores spiritual maladjustment as a causal factor—a strange omission in the face of such conclusions as those found in Jung's *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* and *Psychology and Religion,* and in Anton T. Boisen's *The Exploration of the Inner World.*

The book by Fletcher, on the contrary, is strongly religious in feeling, and treats psychological conditions as primarily "the manifestations of spiritual attitudes to life and its responsibilities." Psychology alone is not sufficient to reconstruct a human personality—religion must also be part of the therapeutic process, if the patient is ever to "face the big and noble responsibility of being whole."

M. B.

*Sight Unseen.* By FREDERICK G. LIEB. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1939. x + 257 pp. $2.50.

A mélange of occulistic terminology and naïveté, deep sincerity but many non sequiturs, this book illustrates too well the dangers of dilettantism in a field where profound knowledge and wide experience must be seasoned with considerable restraint and broad imagination before even tentative conclusions can be reached.

The author, a sportswriter of twenty-five years experience, approaches the field of parapsychology obliquely, via the route of "metaphysical" (which he distinguishes from "faith") healing. Intrigued by the beneficial effects of Christian Science therapy on his gastro-intestinal complaints, his curiosity leads him to a study of other religious cults, and he comes to the conclusion that they all can be reduced to a common denominator, which might be expressed as that process by which man, through certain experiences, can tap a greater unity (God) and thus lend himself, in a sense, to divine guidance.

From mediumistic séances, Ouija board sessions and communicated information, Lieb comes to a belief in the reality of spiritism and reincarnation. The problem of unifying these multitudinous beliefs and experiences under some integrating principle leads him to the acceptance of the existence of an all-pervading "Akasa-fluid . . . invisible, free from matter, purer than ether and finer than electricity though it may be the very essence of the latter. It is the cohesive element in minerals, the power which makes things grow in the vegetable kingdom and the vital life force of human beings and animals. It is a connecting link between the world we know and the unseen world." This "Akasa-fluid" acts at the "astral plane," the plane at which spirit communication is achieved, the level at which "metaphysical" healing operates.

HENRY J. WEGROCKI

*Toward a Dimensional Realism.* By CHARLES M. PERRY. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1939. ix + 180 pp. $2.50.

Here is a metaphysical essay in the old style. Professor Perry seizes upon the concept of "dimensionality," gives it a meaning broader than that which obtains in its familiar geometrical setting, and offers it as a fundamental principle of philosophical analysis. Those aspects of events in which complete determination of one by another is exhibited are said to fall within the same dimension, those which vary quite independently of each other, to belong to different dimensions intersecting at right angles, while those which show partial dependence are located within the quadrant defined by the factors of which they are a resultant. Armed with this apparatus, and with a theory which enables him to deal with most problems in terms of three basic dimensions, the author discusses briefly such traditional themes of metaphysics as change and the changeless, universality and particularity, cause and effect, subject and object, process and emergence.

The exposition is often too condensed for ready apprehension, and several important issues which it raises in this reviewer's mind are left unclarified. For example, is the dimensional scheme outlined intended to provide a comprehensive pattern in terms of which any datum of observation or mode of interpretation may be precisely located? Much that the author says would suggest this. But if so, its capacity to serve in this way should be more adequately shown. If this is not what is intended, then further indication is needed as to what the concept of dimensionality offers of metaphysical significance that is not supplied by the familiar notions of dependence and independent variability.

E. A. BURTT

# AMONG THE PERIODICALS

## Ancient Religions

L'inno a Zeus Dicteo. By Margherita Guarducci. *Studi e matieriali di storia delle religioni.* 1939. xv, 1-22.

Tyndare. By Alexandre H. Krappe. *Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni.* 1939. xv, 27-29.

Inscriptions Relating to Sacral Manumission and Confession. By A. Cameron. *Harvard Theological Review.* 1939. xxxii, 143-79.

The Asklepios Cult in Palestine. By S. V. McCasland. *Journal of Biblical Literature.* 1939. lviii, 221-27.

Cultivated Pagans and Ancient Anti-Semitism. By N. W. Goldstein. *Journal of Religion.* xix, 346-64.

Il mito della storia di Cecilio Metello. By Angelo Brelich. *Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni.* 1939. xv, 30-41.

## Oriental Religions

The Kinsman of the Sun. By Sri Krishna Prem. *Buddhism in England.* 1939. xiv, 72-74.

Buddhist Conception of Right Livelihood. By R. L. Soni. *Maha-Bodhi.* 1939. xlvii, 338-47.

Kumbum, the Mystic City. By Lama Gedun Chompell. *Maha-Bodhi.* 1939. xlvii, 355-58.

Infinite Regress in the Light of Zen Buddhism. By W. J. Gabb. *Buddhism in England.* 1939. xiv, 38-39.

The Relations Between Early Buddhism and Brahmanism. By C. A. F. Rhys Davids. *Buddhism in England,* 1939. xiv, 75-80.

The Wheel of Life. By Frederick Carter. *Buddhism in England.* 1939. xiv, 84-86.

Control of Religious Organizations in Japan. By William Axling. *World Dominion.* 1939. xvii, 289-94.

The Science of the Five Fires. By Nolini Kanta Gupta. *Aryan Path.* 1939. x, 375-77.

Bâdarâyana's Conception of Brahman. By P. M. Modi. *Prabuddha Bharata.* 1939. xliv, 341-48.

Sidelights on Hindu Culture. By the Editor. *Prabuddha Bharata.* 1938. xliv, 366-70.

A General Estimate of the Indian and European Philosophy. By Mahanambrara Brahmachari. *Kalyana-Kalpataru.* 1939. vi, 589-98.

Ahimsa: The Creed of Non-Injury and Non-Violence. Special number apropos of war. *Message of the East.* 1939. xxviii, no. 3.

Al-Sha'rānī the Mystic. By Margaret Smith. *Moslem World.* 1939. xxix, 240-47.

Our Debt to Moslem Arabs. By John Clark Archer. *Moslem World.* 1939. xxix, 248-64.

Das Moslemische Gebet und was dabei zu beachten ist. *Moslemische Revue.* 1939. XV, 33-47.

Madhe Sahaba and Tabarra. By the Editor. *Muslim Review.* 1939. XXV, 18-26.

The Madhe Sahaba and the Tabarrah Controversy. By A. MAHDI HUSAIN. *Muslim Review.* 1939. XXV, 50-53.

## JUDAISM

The Babylonian Matter in the Predeuteronomic Primeval History (JE) in Gen. 1-11. By SIGMUND MOWINCKEL and WILLIAM F. ALBRIGHT. *Journal of Biblical Literature.* 1939. LVIII, 87-103.

Syncretism in the Religion of Israel. By BEATRICE L. GOFF. *Journal of Biblical Literature.* 1939. LVIII, 151-61.

The Creation of Light in Genesis 1: 3-5. By HERBERT G. MAY. *Journal of Biblical Literature.* 1939. LVIII, 203-11.

Ein Vierteljahrhundert Danielforschung. By WALTER BAUMGARTNER. *Theologische Rundschau.* 1939. XI, 59-83; 201-28.

Zadok and Nehushtan. By H. H. ROWLEY. *Journal of Biblical Literature.* 1939. LVIII, 113-41.

The Pillars Jachin and Boaz. By R. B. Y. SCOTT. *Journal of Biblical Literature.* 1939. LVIII, 143-49.

Quotations in Wisdom Literature. By ROBERT GORDIS. *Jewish Quarterly Review.* 1939. XXX, 123-47.

Notes on Ezekiel. By CHARLES C. TORREY. *Journal of Biblical Literature.* 1939. LVIII, 69-86.

The Composition of the Book of Ezekiel. By GEORGE R. BERRY. *Journal of Biblical Literature.* 1939. LVIII, 163-75.

The Book of Jubilees, Its Character and Its Significance. By SOLOMON ZEITLIN. *Jewish Quarterly Review.* 1939. XXX, 1-31.

The 'Egla 'Arufa, or the Expiation of the Polluted Land. By RAPHAEL PATAI. *Jewish Quarterly Review.* 1939. XXX, 59-69.

Palestine Jewry: Its Achievements and Shortcomings. By MORDECAI M. KAPLAN. *Reconstructionist.* 1939. V, no. 11, 7-16.

## CHRISTIANITY: HISTORICAL

The Unnoticed Irony of Christ. By ALLAN A. HUNTER. *Religion in Life.* 1939. VIII, 411-17.

*Tendenz* versus Interpretation. By MARY E. ANDREWS. *Journal of Biblical Literature.* 1939. LVIII, 263-76.

Un nouveau manuscrit syriaque illustré de la Bibliothèque Vaticane (Vat. syr. 559). By G. DE JERPHANION. *Orientalia Christiana Periodica.* 1939. V, 207-22.

The Significance of the Early House Churches. By FLOYD V. FILSON. *Journal of Biblical Literature.* 1939. LVIII, 105-12.

The Sacrament of Baptism. By GEORGE A. BARTON. *Chronicle.* 1939. XXXIX, 180-84.

The Eucharist. By GEORGE A. BARTON. *Chronicle.* 1939. XXXIX, 205-10.

The Separation of Christianity from Judaism. By FLOYD V. FILSON. *Anglican Theological Review.* 1939. XXI, 171-85.

The Church in the New Testament. By JOSEPH B. BERNARDIN. *Anglican Theological Review.* 1939. XXI, 153-70.

The Nature of the Church: I. Historical Origins. By FREDERICK C. GRANT. *Anglican Theological Review.* 1939. XXI, 190-204.

Chalcedonian Orthodoxy: As Seen in Its Chief Ancient Exponent. By SILAS REES. *Congregational Quarterly.* 1939. XVII, 302-9.

La liturgie romano-byzantine de Saint Pierre. By J. M. HANSSENS. *Orientalia Christiana Periodica.* 1939. V, 103-50.

Saint Augustine as a Mystic. By F. J. FOAKES JACKSON. *Religion in Life.* 1939. VIII, 456-60.

Origen and the Regulae Fidei. By ALBERT C. OUTLER. *Church History.* 1939. VIII, 212-21.

Some Aspects of Dante's Teaching on the Mystery of Redemption. By LUCY REDPATH. *Theology.* 1939. XXXIX, 94-105.

Les «monastères doubles». Leur histoire, surtout en Belgique. By E. DE MOREAU. *Nouvelle revue théologique.* 1939. LXVI, 787-92.

La Confrérie dans la vie de l'Église. By J. DUHR. *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique.* 1939. XXX, 437-78.

Latin Church of the Early Crusades. By MATTHEW SPINKA. *Church History.* 1939. VIII, 113-31.

L'elemento irlandese nella cultura medievale. By M. C. CASELLA. *Religio.* 1939. XV, 251-65.

Florentine Platonism and Its Relations with Humanism and Scholasticism. By PAUL O. KRISTELLER. *Church History.* 1939. VII, 201-11.

Il maestro Eckhart nella critica tedesca contemporanea. By E. C. SALZER. *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica.* 1939. XXXI, 136-44.

The Political Theory of John Knox. By JOHN R. GRAY. *Church History.* 1939. VIII, 132-47.

The Ignored Taverner Bible of 1539. By HAROLD H. HUTSON and HAROLD R. WILLOUGHBY. *Crozer Quarterly.* 1939. XVI, 161-76.

Paradise Lost. By GRANT MCCOLLEY. *Harvard Theological Review.* 1939. XXXII, 181-85.

The Scottish Effort to Presbyterianize the Church of England. By WINTHROP S. HUDSON. *Church History.* 1939. VIII, 255-82.

Distinctive Features of Spanish Mysticism. By WOLFRAM H. KOCH. *Vedanta Kesari.* 1939. XXVI, 137-39.

Marie-Thérèse et Joseph II. Leur politique à l'égard des maisons religieuses dans les Pays-Bas. By G. DE SCHEPPER. *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique.* 1939. XXXV, 509-29.

John Wesley's Georgia Ministry. By EDGAR L. PENNINGTON. *Church History*. 1939. VIII, 231-54.

The Religion of George Bancroft. By RUSSEL B. NYE. *Journal of Religion*. 1939. XIX, 216-33.

Zur Geschichte des „Kulturprotestantismus". By HANS SCHLEMMER. *Christliche Welt*. 1939. LIII, 472-76.

Die Einigung de armenischen Kirche mit der katholischen Kirche auf dem Konzil von Florenz. By G. HOFMANN. *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*. 1939. V, 151-85.

The Policy of Pius XI. By R. E. BALFOUR. *Theology*. 1939. XXXIX, 406-18.

Kyrkornas fredsarbete. Ett tjugofemårsminne. By TORSTEN BOHLIN. *Ny Kyrklig Tidskrift*. 1939. VIII, 97-106.

### CHRISTIANITY: CONTEMPORARY

L'Art des fêtes chrétiennes et ses progrès. By ABBÉ RODHAIN. *L'Art sacré*. 1939. V, 143-47.

L'Art des fêtes. Le VIIe Centenaire de la réception de la couronne d'épines. By A.-M. ROGUET. *L'Art sacré*. 1939. V, 241-42.

Chartres and the Dilemma of Catholicism. By STURGIS LEE RIDDLE. *Churchman*. 1939. CLIII, no. 13, 14-15.

Recommencements d'un art catholique en Danemark. By SONIA HANSEN. *L'Art sacré*. 1939. V, 139-41.

Vitraux et tapisseries. *L'Art sacré*. 1939. V, no. 42.

Missionsrundschau über Afrika. By A. FREITAG. *Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft*. 1939. II, 241-66.

The Future of Religion in Spain. By "WAYFARER." *World Dominion*. 1939. XVII, 232-37.

Die Ukrainer, Orthodoxie und Union. By GOTTHOLD RHODE. *Christliche Welt*. 1939. LIII, 591-96.

Number devoted to the Reformed Church in France. *Revue de théologie et de philosophie*. 1939. No. 112.

Stadt, Dorf, Kirche. By HERMANN MULERT. *Christliche Welt*. 1939. LIII, 625-30.

Faith, Fear, and Freedom. By ALBERT PEEL. *Congregational Quarterly*. 1939. XVII, 310-24.

The Ethical Basis of Christian Salvation. By GEORGE W. DAVIS. *Crozer Quarterly*. 1939. XVI, 177-89.

The Conception of Man in Existential Philosophy. By PAUL TILLICH. *The Journal of Religion*. 1939. XIX, 201-15.

The Naturalistic Conception of Man. By EDWIN E. AUBREY. *Journal of Religion*. 1939. XIX, 189-200.

The Atonement and the Life of Human Society. By LEONARD HODGSON. *Theology*. 1939. XXXIX, 176-87.

The American Community and the Protestant Church. By R. W. Frank. *Religion in Life.* 1939. viii, 418-26.

The Church's Present Task. By Frederick C. Grant. *Religion in Life.* 1939. viii, 339-49.

A Comprehensive Church. Papers from the Twenty-sixth Annual Conference of Modern Churchmen. *Modern Churchman.* 1939. xxix, 226-414.

Le problème d'une université chrétienne. Symposium by Jean Bosc, and others. *Foi et vie.* 1939. Nos. 106-7, 103-292.

Editorial. *Theology.* 1939. xxxix, 161-65.

## General Theory of Religion

L'Art et l'iconographie. By P.-R. Régamey. *L'Art sacré.* 1939. v, 133-38.

Problem of Understanding Alien Cultures. By Stanislaw Schayer. *Brabuddha Bharata.* 1939. xliv, 331-36.

Essai sur la nature de l'unité religieuse. By the Editor, Irénée, and Arthur Smallwood. *Nouvelle revue théologique.* 1939. lxvi, 936-65.

Whitehead's Conception of God. By Anil Kumar Sarkar. *Prabuddha Bharata.* 1939. xliv, 397-403.

A Thomistic Analysis of Peace. By Francis E. McMahon. *Thomist.* 1939. i, 169-92.

Synthesis in Religion. By the Editor. *Vedanta Kesari.* 1939. xxvi, 122-30.

The Study and Contemplation of Nature. By Elizabeth P. Cross. *Aryan Path.* 1939. x, 432-35.

Poetry and Belief. By S. L. Bethell. *Theology.* 1939. xxxix, 24-35.

The Nature of Value. A Symposium. *Aryan Path.* 1939. x, 419-31.

Religion and Sociology. By Teresina Rowell. *Journal of Bible and Religion.* 1939. vii, 69-74.

Psychotherapy and Christianity. By Rollo R. May. *Religion in Life.* 1939. viii, 376-87.

## New Periodicals

*Philosophic Abstracts.* Vol. i, No. 1. Winter 1939-1940. A Quarterly. Edited by Dagobert D. Runes. Published at 884 Riverside Drive, New York, N.Y.

*Journal of the History of Ideas.* A quarterly devoted to intellectual history. Edited by Arthur O. Lovejoy. Published at the College of the City of New York.